



**DELHI UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY**

DELHI UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Cl. No. *S F91*

Date of release for loan

Ac. No. *5051*

This book should be returned on or before the date last stamped below. An overdue charge of one anna will be charged for each day the book is kept overtime.

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY
AND ITS RELATION TO LIFE

Some Opinions of the Press on Earlier Impressions of "The New Psychology."

"An original and stimulating discussion"—TIMES.

"An admirable summary of the newer point of view . . . a compact and well-ordered account of the general conclusions arrived at . . . may be most cordially commended . . . thorough, critical"—SCOTSMAN.

"This able volume . . . has succeeded in a remarkable fashion in presenting the newer teaching comprehensibly and comprehensively."—GLASGOW HERALD.

"The book is one which we can heartily recommend."—CHALLENGE.

"An extraordinarily interesting book"—TRUTH.

"A mighty well-written book."—LIFE.

"A judicious and practical outline of the meaning and importance of modern psychological research"—TIMES OF INDIA

"General readers, and teachers more particularly, who desire a sane and systematic account of psychoanalysis, could hardly hope, in the present state of knowledge, for a better introduction"—JOURNAL OF EDUCATION.

"This excellent book . . . can be thoroughly recommended for the scientific and temperate standpoint . . . and for its general clearness of exposition. It will prove full of interest, not only to the general reader . . . but also to the expert psychologist. Psychology owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. Tansley for his useful book."—MIND.

"Since . . . McDougall's 'Introduction to Social Psychology' no psychological work more fascinating or more important to the general public has appeared than this . . . an exceedingly temperate and thoroughly trustworthy account of present-day psychology."—LANCET

"Mr. Tansley has not only a thorough grasp of the subject he has undertaken to expound, but he has succeeded in expounding it in a manner it would be difficult to better"—MEDICAL PRESS AND CIRCULAR

"A very valuable and interesting presentation of the most modern trends in psychology. It would be difficult to rival it as an introduction either to psychology in general or to clinical psychology in particular . . . Though written for the educated public at large, it could be read with much profit by any medical man, sociologist or anyone who desires to be informed as to what is vital in present-day psychology."—DR ERNEST JONES IN THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

"To Mr. Tansley must go credit for accomplishing successfully a difficult task . . . shrewd insight and common sense . . . produced a generalised view of human nature which is a distinctly synthetic and incisive contribution. It deserves unqualified commendation."—THE DIAL.

"One is inclined to be a little suspicious of a book which so easily attains success . . . these doubts and suspicions are groundless. Mr. Tansley's scientific training in biology enables him to state his argument carefully and clearly, with a reasonableness and freedom from extravagance which satisfy the most critical reader. At the same time the freshness with which he approaches the subject enables him to present it with an attractive novelty. . . . The book is throughout immediately intelligible to every educated reader."

—MR HAVELOCK ELLIS IN THE DAILY HERALD.

"Is so vigorously and intelligently written that it is difficult to do anything but advise all those who take even a slight interest in the mind of man, in politics, sociology, education, religion, art, to buy the book and read every word of it . . . the book is inspired by a stoic and noble optimism."—NATION.

"His production is colourless in style, stale in manner, and pedantic in expression. . . . Where is the benefit, except to some paper merchant?"—NEW AGE.

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY

AND ITS

RELATION TO LIFE

BY

A. G. TANSLEY

LONDON : GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
RUSKIN HOUSE, 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1
NEW YORK: DODD, MEAD & COMPANY

FIRST PUBLISHED JUNE 1920
SECOND IMPRESSION NOVEMBER 1920
THIRD IMPRESSION FEBRUARY 1921
FOURTH IMPRESSION APRIL 1921
FIFTH IMPRESSION, REVISED AND ENLARGED, MARCH 1922
SIXTH IMPRESSION APRIL 1922
SEVENTH IMPRESSION NOVEMBER 1922
EIGHTH IMPRESSION DECEMBER 1923
NINTH IMPRESSION SEPTEMBER 1924
TENTH IMPRESSION JUNE 1925
ELEVENTH IMPRESSION AUGUST 1929

All rights reserved .

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
UNWIN BROTHERS LTD., WOKING

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH IMPRESSION (Revised Edition)

THE reception of this book, not only by the public but also by professional psychologists and psychoanalysts of high standing, has naturally been very gratifying to the author, and he is glad to take the present opportunity of thanking all those who have praised his work so generously. At the same time, the knowledge that the book has been widely recommended to professed students of psychology as a means of gaining a general introductory acquaintance with the modern developments of the subject tends to place upon the author an obligation he scarcely contemplated. "The book," as was stated in the original preface, "does not profess to be more than an outline picture of the subject as it shapes itself in the mind of the author." It certainly never pretended to be a text-book for students. It is neither full enough nor critical enough, and at the same time it deals with many topics scarcely suitable for treatment in a scientific text-book. The author feels that he must retain the liberty to express his own view of the subject and its significance, a view which cannot everywhere be supported by detailed data and argument without unduly extending the length of the book and thus unfitting it for its original purpose—to present to the educated reader an attempted synthesis, necessarily crude and incomplete in the present state of knowledge, of the biological and the psychoanalytic views of the human mind, and to indicate the positions of the higher human interests and efforts in such a synthesis.

Criticism, however, is always welcome ; and in psychology not only intelligent criticism, which enables defects to be made good, but also criticism which is more affective than rational. To all his critics then, both public and private, the author is grateful. The opportunity of the present issue has been taken to revise the book pretty thoroughly, to restate various points in clearer form, to guard against some possible misconceptions, and to add paragraphs on certain topics which seemed to need rather fuller treatment, and on others which could be included without greatly enlarging the size and scope of the book. Among these may be mentioned Adler's views on the importance of the struggle against a feeling of inferiority in moulding and developing the mind, and Varendonck's recent important work on "day-dreaming," perhaps more appropriately called "mind wandering." At the publishers' request a glossary has been added.

This is also a convenient opportunity for making clear the author's position on certain points which have been the subject of public or private criticism, and on which he is unable to see eye to eye with his critics.

The conception of the mental *complex* developed in Chapter V is due, as is there stated, to Jung, who borrowed it from Neisser and generalized it for the normal mind, and nothing that is said in that chapter or in the rest of the book is inconsistent with Jung's original use of the term. Bernard Hart adopted the conception, illustrated it further, and made it familiar to English readers, but he did not, as is erroneously stated by several different writers, among others by Rivers (*Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 88), "greatly extend the meaning of the term." The whole of Hart's use of the term is implicit in Jung's original treatment. The author's own use of the conception simply tries to carry it to its logical limit, and to show the vast

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY

importance of the reality it represents in the economy of the mind. On these lines it does not seem possible to escape from the conclusion that the normal mind contains three "universal complexes" (two of which, by the way, were recognized and described by Jung himself) which are the mental expressions of the play of experience upon the primary instincts. At the same time this treatment brings out the nature and limitations of the conception: conspicuously, for instance, in regard to the boundaries of the "ego-complex." We are always confronted with such limitations when we try to fit the dynamic realities of nature into our rigid framework of logical conceptions, and certainly not least in the case of the human mind. All the parts of the ideally healthy mind (a condition, of course, never in fact realizable) would be in perfectly free communication, and the mental elements, which are actually in such free communication, are continually subject to regrouping according to the changing course of development and experience. Nevertheless, the empirical ego is certainly the permanent centre of a complex carrying a strong and specific feeling tone, and radiating into the external world. The boundaries of the extended ego-complex certainly include mental elements which belong to other complexes, both "particular" and "universal." The ego-complex is from its very nature unique among the complexes. But we cannot, on that ground, deny its reality any more than we can agree with a reviewer who asserted that it is "doubtful whether the distinction between self-assertion and sexual reproduction, or between self-preservation and obedience to convention, can be strongly maintained." It is a question here of the reinforcement of two distinct impulses by one another, because they both tend to the same action. We must recognize that in the healthy mind complexes are shifting, overlapping, and often continuously extending groups of

mental elements, though they have fixed cognitive and affective centres. It may be that Jung's conception will have to give way, with the progress of psychology, to other conceptions better fitted to express these facts of mental structure. Meanwhile it seems to the author that the conception of the complex in this wide sense cannot at present be dispensed with in any general treatment of the mind, and there seems no good reason to depart from Jung's term.

It is true that Neisser and Jung employed the conception because they found it useful in making clear the nature of the irruptions into consciousness of dissociated groups of mental elements characteristic of various types of insanity and psychoneurosis, and it is also true that in current psychoanalytical writing the term complex is nearly always used as if it applied exclusively to such *repressed* complexes, because it is only these which interest the writers in question. But Jung's conception is a perfectly general psychological conception and was never intended to be limited to those complexes which are repressed. And the application of the term exclusively to these is not quite universal among psychoanalytical writers. Thus Pfister, for instance ("Die Psychoanalyse als psychol. Methode," in *Zum Kampf um die Psychoanalyse*, 1920, p. 35), clearly recognizes conscious as well as unconscious complexes, and identifies the conception with Poppelreuter's *Totalvorstellungen*, to which single presentations are at once referred by the mind, and in the light of which they are interpreted.

The author cannot but feel that the current restriction, in spite of the authority by which it is supported, is unfortunate, because it robs the conception of its logical and historical basis and obscures the essential connection of the normal and the pathological phenomena. The essential nature of the complex as a group of cognitive elements (*Vorstellungen*), united by a common affect, so that the

entrance of one element into consciousness is liable to arouse the whole complex, does not depend upon repression, though the autonomy of the complex and the "potential" of its affect are greatly heightened by dissociation from the rest of the mind. It must be remembered—it is too often forgotten—that there are various *degrees* of repression, so that the completely unconscious (dissociated) complex is really only the ultimate term of a continuous series, starting with the normal foreconscious complex. The practice of confining the conception to this ultimate term is due to the striking and strongly defined character of completely repressed (dissociated) complexes, and to the fact that psychoanalysis, from its medical origin and associations, has been almost exclusively concerned with them. But a very important contribution of modern psychiatry to normal psychology is precisely the demonstration that no sharp line can be drawn between the "normal" and the pathological mental conditions.

The objection to identifying McDougall's conception of *the sentiment* (as he suggests, *Social Psychology*, 14th ed., Preface, p. ix) with the complex of the normal mind is primarily that the term sentiment, by etymology and universal common use, relates to a *feeling*, i.e. to an affective phenomenon, while the term complex applies primarily to a united group of *cognitive* elements (*Vorstellungen*) which are, it is true, always and necessarily bound together by a common affect, but are by no means *identifiable* with that affect. A particular "sentiment" is the specific affect belonging to a specific complex, it is not the complex itself. If I love a particular woman and everything connected with her the complex so arising is not my sentiment of love, but the totality of the images and ideas centering round the beloved figure; though these would not exist, as a complex, if the sentiment did not exist. ✓

Several critics have objected to the use of the word "herd" (taken, of course, from Trotter) for the social environment of the individual human being. It is suggested that this degrades man's social relation to the animal level, and even that it may weaken the sanction of the moral law! No doubt it would be possible to substitute "society" for "herd" in a great many places without altering the general meaning, but "herd" has been used quite deliberately. The whole argument is directed to showing that the human social relation is based on the herd instinct of the gregarious animal, and that many of its leading traits are directly traceable to that instinct.

Professor McDougall, one of our greatest authorities on Social Psychology, will not admit the existence of a "herd instinct" in addition to the "gregarious instinct" which implies merely association with one's fellows. He regards the instinct of submission as the basis of the power of suggestion (including herd suggestion) on the individual mind, and he makes out a respectable case for this view (*Journ. Neur. and Psychopath.* I. p. 5 ff., 1920). It may be questioned, however, whether the "instincts" of self-assertion and submission are quite on a par with McDougall's other "simple instincts." But we cannot here discuss this difficult and fundamental question.¹ It seems to be clear that the attitude of the individual man to his "herd" is marked by a well consolidated typical instinctive mechanism whatever view we take as to how that mechanism is built up, and it seems in no way misleading to call it "herd instinct." This instinct, like others, is not in itself good or bad—it is simply an inevitable part of man's heritage. It is material which can be moulded and directed to the higher human purposes; but to the material itself ethical

¹ Compare Freud's recent and illuminating treatment of this subject in his *Massenpsychologie und Ichanalyse* (1921).

judgments cannot apply. There is nothing divine about the herd or social instinct as such, and the reverence, almost amounting to worship, with which it is sometimes regarded is entirely out of place, though intelligible enough on psychological and historical grounds. Many of its crude manifestations—craven fear of public opinion, slavery to catchwords, excessive national and class consciousness and assertion—of which the world is over full at the present moment, are quite definite and formidable obstacles to the evolution of a better society. Herd instinct in its raw form is an animal character, and the more clearly we recognize the fact the better position we shall be in to master it and direct it to worthier ends. It is perfectly true that without herd instinct the human race could never have become human at all. But a great deal more is required before we can make a society that shall be in any way worthy of the best that is in us. We are much too ready to be complacently content with certain human traits as they are, and to resent the reminder of their origin and true nature. It is well for us to realize that we constantly act like sheep, like monkeys, or like wolves; as well as that in virtue of the same instinct many of us are ready to die for our country, and a few to live for it, or even for the human race. A clear recognition of these facts should be a help, not a hindrance, in the effort to direct the driving force of our herd instinct into the channels that are possible to man, though not to the sheep, the monkeys, or the wolves.

It was stated in the first edition (p. 67) that "the theory of psychological hedonism, which supposed that human actions were invariably determined by the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, is now quite out of fashion, and there is nothing to be gained by discussing its flagrant inconsistency with the facts of experience." The author

should have written "quite out of fashion among academic psychologists," but he hardly realized the firm hold it still has on many minds. One reviewer indeed writes: "My experience of humans, even the best of them, is that they one and all are dominated by the principle of hedonism. Not to own up to this truth is to deceive oneself." Now this contention has been refuted so often and so completely¹ that it does appear a waste of space to go over the ground again, and the treatment of the subject in Chapters VI and XV may be thought sufficient. But some attention should be directed to the fact that Professor Freud has based his theory of the "regression" mechanism on what he calls the "Lustprinzip"—the "pleasure principle"—for this touches a point which the author believes may go far to explain much of the current misunderstanding of Freud's work.

Freud shows a strong tendency to use words in a more general sense, that is with decreased connotation, than is ordinarily understood—or at any rate than is ordinarily understood by their English equivalents, and there is no more dangerous pitfall in scientific and philosophical writing than the habit of using common words in a different sense from that which they convey to the plain man. The more technical sciences escape the difficulty by coining their own terms, but in psychology, as in philosophy, it is impossible wholly to follow this course, because we are constantly dealing with conceptions shared by the plain man. The outstanding examples of this tendency of Freud's are the three words, *sex*, *wish* and *pleasure*. It has often been pointed out that Freud's use of the word *sex* is much wider than the ordinary. He uses it to cover not only what we

¹ Again, quite recently, by Mr. Robert Briffault, in his very remarkable book, *Psyche's Lamp* (George Allen and Unwin, 1921), pp. 25 *et seq.*

commonly understand by the sexual impulse, normal or perverted, but also human tenderness and love at large, and not only these impulses as directed towards others, but also as directed towards oneself, thus including one's impulse to care for and preserve one's own body. The justification, or otherwise, of closely connecting all these impulses is not now in question; but can we be surprised at the misunderstanding? Again, the word *wish* is ordinarily understood as a definitely formulated conscious desire, but Freud means by the word any sort of mental set or tendency to action, in fact what modern psychology understands by conation. And finally when he writes of the tendency to seek *pleasure*, he seems to mean, quite generally, the tendency to release of mental tension, which, it is quite true, is a universal principle of mental action. In this sense a modern psychologist must certainly subscribe to the doctrine of psychological hedonism! If Freud's habit of drastically decreasing the connotation of ordinary words till he arrives at the most abstract general idea, and then using the word with which he started for that idea, be always borne in mind, there is little difficulty in accepting most of his hotly controverted theories.

It has been complained, in some quarters, that the author fails to recognize that the "New Psychology" often restates, in other terms, conclusions already arrived at by the older psychology, and that he fails to give credit to the latter where credit is due. It is quite beyond the scope of this work to write a history of the relations of the older and the newer conceptions, and many of the former are of course, freely ~~in its pages.~~ The ~~work is not~~

dealt with by the older psychology. That is only one reason, among many, why it should not be used as a text-book.

Finally a word may be said about the figures in this book, which were included, with some hesitation, in the belief that they might be helpful to some readers. One severe critic bluntly remarks that "they are of no use whatever except to demonstrate again that psychology cannot be put into pictures." With the last part of the remark the author agrees, but he still thinks that, if this fact is not forgotten, diagrams may well be a help to many minds in forming a clearer idea of unfamiliar conceptions and their relationships. For the crudity of the figures the author can only beg the indulgence of his readers.

A. G. T.

January, 1922.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THE flood of light thrown upon the workings of the human mind by the discoveries and the resulting conceptions of modern psychopathologists has illuminated the mental mechanism, not only of the hysteric and the madman, but of the normal human being. It is clear beyond all possibility of doubt or cavil that the mental factors which produce the characteristic behaviour of the neurotic and the lunatic are at work in the "normal" mind and give rise to many well-known traits of "normal" behaviour, as well as to behaviour and conduct which we may not care to call "normal," but which certainly fall far short of anything for which the help of a physician would be sought. Much of the modern work in psychopathology has in fact a most direct and intimate bearing on the everyday life of us all, and on every human problem.

Although the topics in question have interested an increasingly wide section of the public during the last few years, as is shown not only by the books that have been published, but also by magazine and newspaper articles, it seems that there has been no attempt to present a picture of the structure and working of the normal human mind which would enable the general reader to grasp the new points of view in their relation to human life.

represented, for instance, in Dr. McDougall's well-known *Introduction to Social Psychology*—with the concepts which we owe mainly to the great modern psychopathologists, Professor Freud and Dr. Jung.

The aim has been to present, in a comparatively short space, and without employing more than the most essential technical terms, a fairly comprehensive sketch of the vital characters and activities of the mind from the points of view just indicated. Selections have been made from the literature which seemed most useful for this purpose, and the ideas have been developed here and there, particularly where they bear directly on the great human problems and activities. No attempt has been made to deal with psychopathology proper. The more fundamental sources are acknowledged, and references are given in the footnotes to several recent works in English which deal with various aspects of the subject, but nothing approaching full reference to the already vast literature has been attempted. The book does not profess to be more than an outline picture of the subject as it shapes itself in the mind of the author.

My friend, Dr. Bernard Hart, has very kindly read the manuscript, which has benefited in several places from his criticism. To two or three other friends my thanks are due for suggestions in regard to individual points.

A. G. T.

January, 1920.

The New Psychology and its Relation to Life /

PART I

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY

PSYCHOLOGY is the science of the mind, of its origin, structure, activities and expressions ; and because the activity of the individual mind, conscious or unconscious, lies behind all human action, except that which is merely automatic, psychology is in reality the science of human life.

Nevertheless a sense of unreality has always clung about the older psychology, which has seemed to be divorced from life as it is actually lived. It threw but little light on the infinite complexities of human opinion, feeling and conduct, it scarcely helped us with the practical problems we all have to face in our own lives ; it was, in fact, altogether too academic and abstract for practical use. Before we consider the developments of the New Psychology we must first glance at the causes of this failure of the older psychology in the interpretation of the mind and its activities as we actually know them.

Not very many years ago the subject-matter of psychology was almost entirely limited to what is called the "content of consciousness," that is, to the thoughts and feelings of which we are fully conscious ; and almost its sole method

was introspection, which consisted in the attempt of the psychologist to describe and analyse these conscious thoughts and feelings in his own mind, and afterwards to generalize his results for the human mind at large. [Introspection must always remain one of the chief methods of the psychologist, for the very good reason that it is only of his own consciousness that the psychologist can have any direct first-hand knowledge.] He can obtain indirect knowledge of the minds of others, both from what others tell him of their minds in speech or writing, and from the results of the working of other minds as seen in behaviour and conduct, but it is only his own mind of which he can directly explore the workings as he is conscious of them from minute to minute. And it is to his own mind and its workings that he is necessarily compelled to refer in order to test the results of his observation of others. In this respect psychology is unique among the fields of science, and the peculiarity of its subject-matter involved very serious limitations so long as its method depended almost entirely on introspection.

The result of these limitations is seen in the great over-emphasis that the older psychology placed on conscious perception, and on the reasoning process—an over-emphasis which threw the picture of the mind quite out of perspective and prevented anything like a true comprehension of its actual working. One cause of the over-emphasis of the purely rational faculties is to be found in the mind tendencies of psychologists as a class. A man is not likely to become a psychologist unless he has a considerable taste and a considerable capacity for introspection and analysis, and if he has these it means that his reasoning faculty is highly developed and that he is fond of exercising it. Consequently the mind—his own—which he analyses in the first instance is a mind in which the purely rational processes are relatively highly developed; and thus the introspective psychologist is likely to overrate the part played by these processes in human minds at large. The very faculty which enables a man to become a psychologist gives him somewhat abnormal material on which to work.

But there is a far more important cause of the over-prominence of the rational faculty in the older pictures of the human mind. The process of reasoning, *in its developed form*, is from its very nature a process of the steps in which the mind must be fully conscious. Of many other mental processes, on the other hand, as we shall see in the sequel, the mind is certainly not fully conscious, or is not conscious at all. Their *results* come into consciousness, but their actual nature remains unknown or obscure; and they often wear masks which conceal the realities beneath.

The conception of mental processes which are only half conscious, or which do not become conscious at all, but which are nevertheless the actual causes of many of our actions and of many of our conscious thoughts, is still unfamiliar to many, but it is of vital importance. If we arrive at a really fully reasoned decision to take such and such an action we are necessarily fully conscious of all the steps in the process by which we arrive at the decision, and we are able to give a clear account of them. On the other hand we may perform the same action because, as we say, we feel we must; and very often we can give no clear account at all of the mental processes that have led to that feeling; or even if we think we can, the account will often be wrong and will not in fact represent the actual driving motives that have led to our action. The cause of our inability to give an account, or at least a clear and satisfactory account, of the processes in question is that, being non-rational processes, they are by no means necessarily present to consciousness. When we give a wrong account of the causes which have led to an action it is generally the case that we have unconsciously "faked" a set of "reasons" on grounds that appeal to us as "rational," and put them in the place of the real causes, of which we are unconscious. This process of "rationalization" is so exceedingly common as to be practically universal. Most of us can detect instances of it in ourselves by fearless introspection, or if we are incapable of that, we can at least detect instances of it in others. We can do this in cases where the real causes are

half conscious and can be lifted into consciousness without too much difficulty. But in other instances the real causes are quite buried and inaccessible to us, and cannot be brought into consciousness except by special methods.

Modern research has abundantly demonstrated the enormous importance of the unconscious mental processes, and with these and their relations to the conscious we shall be very largely concerned in this book. Meanwhile we cannot be surprised that the older psychology, in trying to give an account, from introspection, of the workings of the mind, could not help over-estimating the part played by the fully conscious rational processes, and correspondingly under-estimated the part played by the non-rational mental processes, which often escape in part or wholly from the gaze of introspection.

The immense advances that have been made in recent years in our knowledge of mental processes consist precisely in the recognition and analysis of the non-rational processes which play so great and so fundamental a part in our mental life. These advances are mainly due to two great paths in the development of knowledge—first the development under the influence of the doctrine of evolution of what may be called the biological way of regarding the human mind, and secondly the immense development in the comprehension of “abnormal” mental processes—psychopathology—which has taken place within quite recent years.

The treatment of the human mind as a problem in organic evolution was practically begun by Darwin in *The Descent of Man*, published in 1871. Darwin essayed to show that “there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties,” and he certainly established a very strong case for continuity between the faculties of animals and those of man. Since the general belief in organic evolution became firmly established the evolution of the human mind has been studied by many anthropologists and psychologists. The result has been that those mental characters which civilized men share with primitive men and with many of the higher mammals

have been increasingly recognized as of fundamental importance in the human mind, while the "higher" mental characters, such as the elaboration of self-consciousness and of the ethical sense, the development of artistic appreciation, of the power of abstract reasoning, and of the executive powers, appear as later and relatively superficial developments.

It is not, of course, implied that these later developments are unimportant. On the contrary, they are precisely the qualities which are of the greatest importance to man as man, because they are those which separate his mind from the mind of animals, and in them lie the causes of his past achievements and the hopes of his future development. But the fact remains that they are relatively superficial and are built on a groundwork of largely unconscious and non-rational instincts, desires and emotions, which are inherited from primitive man and from man's non-human forerunners. This inherited groundwork determines many of the most important events of our lives and profoundly influences the whole of them, not only in the obvious ways, but in many ways of which we are quite unconscious. To ignore or to minimize the importance of the groundwork makes impossible a real understanding of the structure and activities of the mind, and therefore of the actual ways in which it determines human life.

The modern study of psychopathology, the greatest advances in which we owe to Janet, Freud and Jung, has brought to light a great mass of data and some fundamentally important conceptions of the highest value to psychology, and these have given the impulse to a new development of psychological theory. The most important general conclusion reached is that the abnormal activities of the mind, as seen in cases of hysteria and insanity, are but extreme and unbalanced developments of characteristics and functions which form integral parts of the normal healthy mind. On the basis of this conclusion we are able to interpret many of the most baffling phenomena of the normal mind in the light of these pathological developments, and thus to obtain

.

a far deeper insight into mental structure and functions, in just the same way that pathological developments of the tissues and functions of the body throw light upon normal physiological processes. In both cases the reactions to extreme stimuli, the behaviour of the organism when it loses the normal balanced adaptation of parts to one another and to the environment which characterizes healthy life, do not differ in kind but only in degree from reactions to normal stimuli and from normal behaviour. Both classes of reaction and behaviour—the normal and the abnormal—are conditioned absolutely by the original structure and capacities of the organism, as modified, of course, by its previous life and experience. When the reaction and behaviour are extreme we are presented, as it were, with an analysis of the normal functions; we are able to study the deranged function more or less in isolation, and to get an idea of its real meaning and character which we cannot get when it is kept in check by the opposing tendencies which ordinarily maintain the balance of the whole organism.

The New Psychology, then, looks upon the human mind as a highly evolved organism, intimately adapted, as regards its most fundamental traits, to the needs of its possessor, built up and elaborated during a long course of evolution in constant relation to those needs, but often showing the most striking want of adaptation and adjustment to the rapidly developed and rapidly changing demands of modern civilized life. Its most fundamental activities are non-rational and largely unconscious activities. The power of conscious reasoning is a later development, playing but a minor part, even in the most highly developed human being, on the surface, so to speak, of the firmly built edifice of instincts, emotions, and desires, which form the main structure of the mental organism. In many cases the apparent importance of rational activity is seen to be illusory, forming as it were a mere cloak for the action of deep-seated instincts and desires.

(The New Psychology obtains its material from the

whole field of mental life, normal and abnormal, from external observation and from introspection, from the study of behaviour and conduct, from art, literature and practical life, from mythology and history, from the habits and customs of primitive peoples, and from those of the most advanced civilizations | Already great strides have been made towards a self-consistent and illuminating interpretation of the human mind, and the field of future investigation seems illimitable. At the same time it must be recognized that much of this wealth of material is but little developed scientifically, that there is still much difference of opinion, and a good deal of room for alternative interpretations. That must be the excuse for the method of this book, which, because it essays in a short space, and perhaps over-boldly, a systematic exposition of what appears to the author the essential framework of the subject, is obliged to be *a priori* and dogmatic in some places, and on the other hand to leave many important topics undeveloped or, at most, but roughly indicated. The aim is to present a picture, vaguely sketched in some parts, almost blank in others, but, it is hoped, not too much out of drawing.

,

CHAPTER II

THE PHYSICAL AND THE PSYCHICAL WORLDS

THE problem of the relationship of mind and body is one of the oldest of philosophical problems, and there is as yet no prospect of agreement on its solution. That mind and body *have* a very intimate relation will not be denied by anyone. It is perfectly obvious that mental processes and physiological processes are often very closely connected, that psychical changes and physiological changes often accompany one another in a perfectly definite way, and that mental processes are both initiated and followed by events in the external world in definite sequences. This relationship of the physical and the psychical is closest, of course, between the mind and the central nervous system. The brain has, in fact, been regarded by some as the organ of mind in the same sense that the stomach and intestines are the organs of digestion, and this view has been expressed in the aphorism that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." But the most materialistic philosopher must recognize that thought and emotion are phenomena essentially distinct in their nature from physiological phenomena, however closely thought and emotion may be accompanied by physiological changes in the nervous system. Thought and emotion, as we know them, are absolutely *sui generis*, and we do not get the least nearer to an understanding of them by believing (or for that matter by disbelieving) that they are *results* of brain processes. The nature of the connexion, which certainly exists, is a problem which we cannot thus attack.

We are thus driven to consider the psychical sphere separately from the physical sphere, as a distinct field for

scientific investigation, with data, concepts and laws of its own. We must not mix up physiological and psychical terms and conceptions, as is so often done by popular writers. Such a phrase—constantly met with in ordinary writing and speech—as “a thought flashed through my brain” is quite illegitimate. Thoughts belong to the mind, not to the brain, by whatever changes in brain cells they may be accompanied. Scientific writers often fall into the same mistake. The time is not yet very remote when the brilliant results of experiments in what was known as “cerebral localization” and the increasing knowledge of processes in the nervous system led to the hope that mental phenomena might be “explained” by the study of the changes in brain cells. This hope has proved quite illusory. What was really done was to show that certain nerve centres are concerned in the carrying out of certain bodily movements, and that others are connected with “mental” processes, and to discover much more than had previously been known as to the nature of the changes accompanying the activity of the nervous system. But all this brilliant work brought us no nearer to the discovery of the nature of the links between mind and brain.

Much of the admirable work done in the field of so-called “experimental psychology” is not investigation of the mind. It is very largely concerned with the physiology of the special senses. Mental processes are involved in the method of research, but only incidentally, because the investigator cannot proceed without using the mental processes of his experimental subjects. We learn nothing of the connexions of mind and brain processes, nor can the technique employed ever hope to tell us anything of such connexions. There is, of course, a true “experimental psychology,” really concerned with mental processes as such, but that is quite a distinct thing and belongs as clearly to psychology as most of the work which passes under the name belongs to physiology.

It is clear that if we are thus to recognize mind as a distinct subject of scientific investigation, the law of

causation must hold within the psychic sphere, for without postulating the law of causation science is impossible. Now experience teaches us that mental processes are often determined by one another, and it is a reasonable assumption that such determination holds throughout the mental sphere, just as it is a reasonable assumption, also based on experience, and without which science could not proceed, that inter-determination of phenomena, i.e. causation, holds throughout the physical sphere. Speaking philosophically, it is impossible to be *certain* that all mental phenomena are inter-determined, but then it is equally impossible to be *certain* that all physical phenomena are so determined. All we can safely say is that the hypothesis of universal determination has served us well in the past and continues to serve us well in the present. Without it practical life would be impossible, physical science would be impossible and psychology would be impossible. The doctrine of determinism rests on precisely the same basis in the psychical as in the physical sphere: it is an induction based on experience and has held true in all the cases we have been able to test with sufficient knowledge and accuracy. The widespread belief that it is less true in the psychical than in the physical sphere is partly due to the notion, which is both irrelevant and erroneous, that the doctrine of determinism limits our freedom as moral agents, partly to the elusive nature of the material with which psychology has to deal, and partly to the hitherto very rudimentary and largely obscure condition of our scientific knowledge of mental phenomena—a condition which has made their determination harder to discover and analyse than the determination of physical phenomena. We may admit, perhaps, that there is at present less evidence for the hypothesis of universal determinism in the psychical than there is in the physical sphere, but there is certainly enough to make it a reasonable working hypothesis, and without such a hypothesis we cannot proceed at all.

The further question as to whether mental and physical phenomena are to be regarded as causally inter-determined, i.e. whether causation holds as between the physical and

psychical worlds, need not concern us if we admit that the psychical sphere is, for practical scientific purposes, a distinct field. This is essentially a philosophical rather than a scientific question. We know that in fact definite mental phenomena regularly follow upon definite physical phenomena, and are in turn followed by other physical phenomena. To the plain man it seems clear that physical and mental phenomena form parts of the same chains of causation. The point is that the transition from the one kind of phenomenon to the other is entirely obscure, and that no useful scientific purpose is served by speculation about its nature. From the standpoint of formal philosophy it is possible to believe that the mental phenomena which apparently form links in the chain are accompanied by physical phenomena in the brain which complete the causal chain in the physical sphere, and that the connexion of these with the mental phenomena is not a causal connexion. But whether we hold this opinion, or whether we believe in universal causal inter-determination, the necessity from a practical scientific standpoint of keeping the mental sphere distinct while at the same time taking into full consideration the intervention of physical factors is not affected.

In the development of recent philosophy nothing is more conspicuous than the tendency to abandon the dualism—the very foundation of the earlier metaphysics—embodied in such contrasted conceptions as “appearance” and “reality,” “matter” and “spirit,” “object” and “subject,” “body” and “mind.” All these pairs of opposites were taken by the idealistic schools which at one time dominated philosophy as representing fundamental contrasts on which all philosophical thought must necessarily be based. The modern tendency, on the other hand, is to claim the right to treat on an equal footing, so to speak, everything of which we have knowledge, without the *a priori* assumption of a fundamental distinctness corresponding, for instance, with “appearance” and “reality.” That this is, on the whole, a healthy tendency in philosophy can hardly be doubted. But we must beware of artificial simplification. In this

connexion the work of the modern school of psychologists known as "behaviourists," is interesting and instructive. This school interprets the mind in terms of the "behaviour" of the organism under different conditions. The American psychologist, Professor Holt, for instance, very clearly expounds the view that mind is merely the "integration" of the organism's motor responses to stimuli. Professor Holt's position is that "even two reflexes acting within one organism bring it about that the organism's behaviour is no longer describable in terms of the immediate sensory stimulus, but as a function of objects and situations in the environment."¹ "It is clear that this function which behaviour or conduct is of the external situation is the very same thing which Freud deals with under the name of 'wish.' It is a course of action which the body takes or is prepared (by motor set) to take with reference to objects, relations or events in the environment. The prophetic quality of thought which makes it seem that thought is the hidden and inner secret of conduct is due to the fact that thought is the preceding labile interplay of motor settings which goes on almost constantly, and which differs from overt conduct in that the energy involved is too small to produce gross bodily movements. . . . Now in this wish or function we have the pure essence of the human will and of the soul itself."² This is a very interesting and valuable theory of the origin of mind, with which we shall be concerned in dealing, in the next chapter, with the typical or primitive mental process. But we have to confess that if mind originates in this way, yet when we have got it mind is a thing absolutely *sui generis*. If thought is the "labile interplay of motor settings" we must nevertheless have something in which this interplay goes on. Parallel processes no doubt take place in the nerve cells of the brain, but it is assuredly not those brain processes, it is the objects, situations and events of the external world and our own attitude towards them with which we are dealing in psychology. The secret of the connexion of mind

¹ E. B. Holt, *The Freudian Wish*, 1916, p. 76.

² *Ibid.*, p. 94.

and brain remains as dark as ever. Professor Holt does, indeed, admit that mind is a "synthetic novelty"—"the advent of specific response . . . is the birth of *awareness* and therefore of psychology itself." But even if the integration of "reflex responses" to become "specific response" (i.e. response to an object or situation rather than to a mere stimulus) is rightly described as "awareness," and this is by no means self-evident, we are not thereby in the least degree helped to understand awareness or cognition in terms of anything else. We are still absolutely bound to interpret mind in terms of our own mind—the only mind of which we have direct knowledge—though we may learn much about *the conditions of its evolution* from the consideration of such facts as those reviewed by Professor Holt. In short, we cannot dispense with the dualism involved in regarding mind as an entity with its own phenomena and laws.

In attempting to deal with the mind by scientific methods we are faced with the necessity of making conceptual constructions in which spatial relations are involved. It is obvious, of course, that the mind is not extended in space, and the use of such constructions may be held to be illegitimate. The practice can be defended on the ground that any conceptual construction is legitimate as an expedient if it helps us to classify phenomena and to obtain a clearer insight into their relations. It will be understood, of course, that when we speak, for instance (as in Chapter IV), of the "unconscious" part of the mind "lying below" the "foreconscious" we are merely expressing by means of a helpful metaphor the fact that the unconscious part of the mind is relatively less accessible to consciousness. It is impossible to avoid the use of concepts involving spatial relations, simply because all scientific conceptions depend upon the categories of space and time. It must be remembered that our minds, like our bodies, have developed primarily in practical relation to the external world, and we cannot possibly escape from the conditions thus imposed upon us. We are forced to use concepts

INTRODUCTORY

derived from our experience of the external world even in the consideration of the psychical sphere, which we have to recognize and treat as independent. Thus we have to consider the mind as possessing structure, activities, distinct parts and functions, because that is the only way in which we can proceed to find out anything about it. And at the same time we have to regard it as a self-contained entity, with its own laws, distinct from those of the brain and nervous system, even though we are aware of and have constantly to deal with its most intimate and apparently causal connexions with the brain and nervous system, and with the sense and motor organs and through these with the external world. The justification of this apparently illogical and contradictory procedure is simply scientific utility, which is the ultimate justification of all scientific procedure. If we can make some progress in reducing the bewildering complexity of mental phenomena to something like order, if we can get a clearer insight into their relationships, the means by which we obtain these results are fully justified.¹

¹ For some explanation of the use of the conceptual method in scientific psychology see B. Hart, *The Psychology of Insanity*, 1912, chap. ii, pp. 11-20. For a fuller treatment see the same author's "Conception of the Subconscious" (*Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, February-March, 1910). It may be as well to warn the reader that the spatial conceptions of the structure of the mind, such as those described in Chapters IV and V, are not only metaphorical but are essentially provisional. It is very unlikely, for instance, that mental phenomena will be described in exactly the same language, say, in thirty years' time. Meanwhile this "scaffolding" is quite indispensable at present for any comprehension of the knowledge we have, especially of the results of psychoanalysis.

PART II

THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND

CHAPTER III

SPECIFIC RESPONSE AND THE TYPICAL
MENTAL PROCESS

THE whole history of the development of the science of biology teaches us that it is impossible thoroughly to understand any living organism without a knowledge of its history. That is the general significance of the immense influence which the establishment of the doctrine of evolution has had on the whole group of biological sciences, and in these we include not only biology in the narrower sense, but also psychology and sociology—the study of the human mind and of the social organism as well as of animals and plants. The truth of this generalization does not involve the assertion that a knowledge of the history of an organism enables us at once to grasp its whole value and significance. To make such an assertion would be to fall into what has been called generally the “historical fallacy,” or sometimes, in the present connexion, the “biological fallacy.” But what we do mean to assert is that until we understand the history of an organism we are not really in a position to begin to estimate its existing significance at all, because we shall inevitably view it in a wrong perspective, misinterpret its characteristic features and misconceive its possibilities of future development. Of the human mind this is most conspicuously true, because we must perforce look at it through the medium of a human mind, with all its inevitable

prejudices and prepossessions. Nowhere is the objective standpoint of comparative and evolutionary biology more necessary if we would avoid the distorting effects of subjectivity.

When we speak of the "history" of an organism we include two kinds of history: first, the history of the individual—in the case of the mind from birth up to adult life and on to old age; secondly, the history of the race, or in the case of the mind the development of the mind of civilized man from that of primitive man and of this from the mind of animals. The first kind of history we can observe directly; of the second we can only obtain knowledge by comparative study. Inferences as to this second kind of history, for instance as to the evolution of organisms, are based on knowledge we obtain by comparative study, and this at best is a rough knowledge, true in broad outlines, but with much inevitably more or less obscure, and much more of which we shall always remain ignorant. Nevertheless such knowledge as we can obtain in this way is of great value, and we will therefore first consider the mind, very briefly, from the standpoint of comparative biology.

By far the most important features in the structure of the mind, alike in man and in the higher animals, are the inherited *instincts*. By instincts we mean "certain innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species."¹ "The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained."² This postulate is of absolutely fundamental importance in scientific psychology, as will appear in the sequel. The instincts form the groundwork of the whole structure of the mind, and upon them are built up all the complex elaborations which characterize the manifold activities of man. This thesis is still unwelcome to a large number of people, who consciously or unconsciously regard it as a degrading admission of the community of the human

¹ McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. Fifteenth Edition, 1920, p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

mind with the minds of the beasts that perish. Even when it is overtly accepted, its inevitable implications are very often covertly evaded. But its acceptance is natural enough to the biologist, who necessarily looks upon the human mind as inherited, along with the human body, from prehuman ancestors. Repugnance to the biological view-point should disappear when it is remembered that there is involved no limitation of the specific value of the human mind, no final assertion as to its possibilities, no minimizing of the heights to which it can rise. The biological thesis merely insists on the full and frank recognition of the basis, the plan on which the mind is built, a recognition without which a true understanding of its activities and scope is scientifically impossible.

Let us now see what exactly is the nature of an instinct. The working of an instinct in the mind always begins and ends in relation to an object of the external world. First, it is excited by that object; secondly, certain mental activities take place in regard to the object; and lastly, action takes place with reference to the object.¹ Examples of simple instincts will occur to us at once. Something excites our fear and we fly from it. Attractive food impels us to eat. A helpless child in a difficulty moves us to pity, and we try to help it. All these are simple instincts, and the working of each involves three mental processes—technically called the *cognitive*, the *affective* and the *conative*. In *cognition* the mind knows or takes cognizance of the object, the *affect* is the specific emotion aroused, the *conation* is the mental tendency or set towards appropriate action. Thus the simple instincts excited by the terrible object, the food, and the helpless child, involve respectively the specific emotions or affects of fear, the feeling excited by the food

¹ "We may define an instinct as an inherited or innate psychophysical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least to experience an impulse to such action," McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

(quite a specific thing, but for which we have no name), and tender pity, and result in the conations of flight (the attempt to get away from the fear-inspiring object), the attempt to eat the food, and the attempt to help the child. It is clear at once that these particular instances of simple instincts are common to man and the higher animals, though the specific forms in which they are manifested naturally differ according to the circumstances and according to the animal involved. The behaviour alike of man and of the higher animals in face of the external world in which they live is primarily based on such instinctive reactions, though in the case of man, and particularly of civilized man, it is enormously complicated by other factors, the nature of which will become evident in later chapters.

A simpler kind of reaction to the external world, exhibited alike by man and by all animals possessing a nervous system, is called *reflex action*. On the physiological side the working of even the simplest instinct depends on the co-ordination of a great number of movements. A reflex action on the other hand is a movement initiated "by a sense stimulus and resulting from a sequence of merely physical processes in some nervous arc."¹ Examples are the winking of the eyelids and the contraction of the pupils in bright light, the dilation of the pupils in very weak light, and many muscular actions occurring on stimulation of the skin or on physical shock of various kinds. The essential point in which reflex action differs from the working of instinct is that in the former no psychical process of which we have any knowledge is involved.

Reflex action may be (and generally is) just as *purposive* as instinct, that is, the nature of the action which follows on the stimulus may be useful to the organism in the presence of the stimulus.² For instance, the winking of eyelids and the contraction of the pupils in bright light tend to protect the retina from the harmful effect of the light. The dilation

¹ McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

² Note that "purpose," as here used, does not mean conscious purpose, but merely implies a useful relation of action to stimulus

of the pupils in weak light admits more light to the retina and thus enables advantage to be taken of the light available, as in the familiar experience of entering a nearly dark room in which at first no object can be seen. As the pupils dilate more of the very weak light present falls on the retina, and the outlines of objects become visible. In animals we cannot in practice sharply separate instinct and reflex action, because reflexes are often complex, and we cannot be sure that psychical phenomena are not involved. It seems clear that a specific affect is developed in the case of certain complex reflexes of importance for the life of the animal, and so we pass imperceptibly to the development of instinct. Thus, for instance, the higher vertebrates exhibit all the symptoms which we associate with the affect of fear in human beings. It is noteworthy that since the appearance of psychical phenomena in the evolutionary series marks the origin of mind, we are thus led to confess our ignorance of the point in the continuous evolutionary series at which that origin takes place.

If we now descend lower in the scale of organic life we come to animals which have no nervous systems, but which nevertheless exhibit purposive reactions¹ to external stimuli. Thus the very simplest organisms, consisting merely of isolated, very slightly organized, minute masses of living substance, exhibit reactions which bring them towards food and away from harmful objects and media.² Though such organisms have no nervous systems and frequently no specialized sense organs yet the general type of reaction is identical with that which we have distinguished as reflex action. The nervous system of the higher animals is merely a specialized and very complicated mechanism for receiving the stimulus and initiating the motor response, and in the case of the simple organisms the response is carried out through a simpler mechanism.

¹ In the sense defined above.

² Practically all such organisms live in water or some other liquid, and exhibit reactions which take them towards sources of food and away from sources of dissolved poisonous substances.

Generally, it may be said that the simplest organisms, like all others, tend to react towards their environment in a way which tends to preserve their lives and the life of the species. The reactions in question are perfectly definite and the particular stimuli to which responses are made are limited in number and simple in nature, in correspondence with the simple life-needs of the organism. Broadly, the reactions may be classed as those which bring the organism into contact with food and into media favourable to its life functions, those which withdraw it from harmful surroundings, and those which ensure the mating of the sexual elements.

With details of the nature, origin and mechanism of these reactions we are not concerned here. It is sufficient to point out that the physico-chemical essence of motor reaction to stimulus is the release of stored energy as the result of the sudden breaking down of complex organic substance, comparable with the detonation of an explosive, the stimulus playing the part of the detonator. The nature of the complex, chemically unstable substances, highly stored with energy, of which living protoplasm is composed, makes possible these sudden liberations of energy by the organism. The essence of the difference between the detonation of an explosive and the movement of an organism is that in the latter the mechanism of the body is so organized that the movements take place in definite ways in response to definite stimuli, and are thus what are called *specific responses*, together constituting the *behaviour* of the organism under the conditions of the various stimuli. Professor Holt, in the work mentioned in the last chapter (p. 20), points out that the behaviour of an organism adapted to its surroundings is related rather to the objects and situations of those surroundings than to physical or chemical stimuli as such, and he holds that this takes place by the *integration* (i.e. the putting together to make a new whole) of simple motor responses to form complex ones. Thus the specific responses of an organism may be regarded as "functions" (in the mathematical sense) of the objects and situations of its environment; and the history of the evolution of response

to environment, i.e. of behaviour, and of mind itself is, as Professor Holt most convincingly shows, the history of successive integrations of these "functions" to higher and higher (i.e. to more and more complex) purposes, accompanied by what he calls "recession" in consciousness of the primitive stimuli and the progressive subordination of the less complex functions.

The consideration of any consecutive set of actions that we perform will make clear this conception of integration. For instance, if I go into a shop to buy something all my actions in the shop—walking across the floor, asking for what I want, examining the things I am shown, saying which I will have, taking money out of my pocket and putting it on the counter, receiving my change, picking up the things and walking out of the shop—are integrated (i.e. put together into a whole) to form the main action of the purchase of the article. Each of the single actions mentioned will be unconsciously performed if my consciousness is wholly occupied by the act of purchase as a whole. But I can become conscious of any one of the single actions described if my consciousness momentarily loses grip of the main action. I can *attend* to any of the single actions; and, further, I can analyse any one of them into constituent parts (such as the feeling for a shilling and two pennies in my pocket) and *attend* to any one of those parts. Each one of the smallest actions incidental to the main action has originally had to be learned and performed consciously. Each when so learned involved a mental process consisting of the three parts of which, as we saw on an earlier page, all typical mental processes consist—cognition, affect and conation. The process of integration consists in their combination and subordination to a larger action, and when so combined the individual actions tend more and more to be performed unconsciously, to sink to the level of reflex action in which the psychological elements are lost. But by attention these can at once be brought into consciousness again.

In the same way the "main action" we have taken as an instance—the purchase of the article—may be part of a

more extended action, into which the purchase in question and many other acts are integrated, e.g. the furnishing of a house ; and this again may be part of a still more extended action such as embarking on a career in a fresh place. Actions of more than a certain degree of complexity cannot be performed entirely unconsciously, but when they are subordinated to a more extended action their specific affects are often notably diminished and tend to share in the affect of the extended action of which they are a part, a sign of the integration which has taken place. Thus, for instance, actions which are unpleasant in themselves lose some of their unpleasantness when they form parts of an extended action whose end is strongly desired and whose affect is therefore highly pleasurable. A slackening of attention to the more extended action always tends to lead to its concentration on the subordinate ones and to bring them more vividly into consciousness.

This process of combination and integration of minor into major responses is the key process of the evolution of behaviour—in animals of reflex actions into instincts, in man of simpler into more complicated and extended conscious actions.

We find, then, that specific responses to particular features of the environment are absolutely characteristic of all organisms, even the simplest. They are, in fact, the great distinguishing mark of the organism, as contrasted with inorganic matter, so far as its relations with the external world are concerned. In general, though not universally, these specific responses are "purposive" or "adaptive" in the sense that the response is appropriate to the stimulus in reference to the well-being of the organism or of the species.

We have distinguished four stages in the evolution of specific response. First, there is the reaction to stimulus of the simplest organisms without a nervous system. Here the whole organism exhibits a few simple capacities for reaction to a few external stimuli—and most of these are reactions without which life could not be maintained. Secondly, in

the more complex invertebrates and in all the vertebrates we have reactions (reflex actions) carried out through the medium of a nervous system designed to receive the stimuli from without and to initiate the reactions, the reflex action not being essentially distinct from the reactions to stimulus of the simplest organisms. Reflex actions may be relatively simple or relatively complex. The third stage is that in which complex co-ordinated series of movements are carried out in response to complex stimuli which take the form of objects or situations in the environment of the animal of which its activity is to be regarded as a series of "functions." This is the stage in which instinct is dominant, and is characteristic of many invertebrates and of all the vertebrate animals. In the higher vertebrates the signs of what we know in ourselves as psychical phenomena appear. The stimulating object is perceived, and the process by which the mind becomes aware of it is known as *cognition*; what is called *affect* is felt and often exhibited as specific emotion, and the mental process involves a *conation*, a directed tendency or "set," which passes over into the physical motor response. We are certainly not justified in limiting these psychical phenomena to man, for though we can have no first-hand knowledge of them except in ourselves, yet the working of the instincts which the higher animals possess in common with man is accompanied by the outward signs indicative of the psychic events of which we are ourselves conscious.

How far down in the animal scale these mental phenomena extend we have no means of deciding. There are some who hold that the life processes of the simplest animals are accompanied by psychic phenomena, but we have no scientific means available by which to decide such a question. Nor does it matter from the standpoint of human psychology. We are concerned here only with the demonstration that specific response to the environment, which is in general purposive response, is characteristic of all organisms, that it is marked by a gradual increase in complexity as we ascend the organic scale, and that psychical phenomena of the type

we are conscious of in ourselves enter in at some point of the series. We are dealing, in fact, with the gradual increase in complexity of the leading characteristic of organisms in their active relations to the external world.

Finally, we have the fourth stage, characteristic of the human mind, in which the working of instinct as such is transcended, in which we vary and adapt our actions towards their ends with a full consciousness and choice of the suitability of the means employed to attain those ends. The ends themselves extend far beyond the range of the primitive instincts, often seeming, indeed, to be at variance with instinctive ends, though as we shall see in later chapters the ends of human activity may probably all be traced to extensions, combinations, modifications or perversions of the primitive instincts.

Accompanying the evolution of the specific response, the integration of single responses into complex ones, and the increasing elaboration of mental processes, there is a corresponding evolution of the structure of the nervous system. Definite sense organs, for the reception of different kinds of stimuli, are the first elaborations to appear, and they are met with in very simple organisms indeed. Later we have the appearance of definite tracts of *nerve tissue*, *nervous centres* (ganglia), and a distinction between "*afferent*" and "*efferent*" *nerves* which convey impulses from the sense organs to the ganglia and from these to the motor organs respectively. One ganglion soon comes to exceed the rest in size and importance and becomes the *brain*, and this is the seat of the central nervous processes accompanying the more complex responses. The brain increases in size and in complexity of organization as we pass to the higher types of organism, and particularly to the higher types of vertebrate which are adapted in complex ways to a much wider environment. With increase in the mental function it is particularly the *cortex* (or outer layer) *of the brain* which shows the greatest development, and it is here that the complex nervous interactions which accompany mental processes take place.

The whole story is one of increase of elaboration in the

central organs of the nervous mechanism on the one hand, accompanying the evolution of the central mental processes on the other. This leads to the *delay* of responses to stimuli, until these, or rather the impulses arising from the stimuli, have been combined and modified, checked and counter-checked, and frequently to the final modification or even the inhibition (prevention) of motor response. This delay in response, giving the opportunity for the combination of the impulses coming from different stimuli with pre-existing dispositions within the mind, is the characteristic psychical endowment of the higher animals, and more especially of man, and forms the basis of his power of mental development and of *consciously* purposive action.




FIG. 1.—DISCHARGE OF ENERGY FROM UNSTABLE SUBSTANCE (HIGH EXPLOSIVE) STARTED BY THE ACTION OF A DETONATOR.

Figure 1 represents diagrammatically the type of energy discharge (as exemplified by the explosion of an unstable substance) on which specific response is based.




FIG. 2.—SPECIFIC RESPONSE—SIMPLEST TYPE. DIFFERENT SIMPLE REACTIONS (SPECIFIC DISCHARGES OF ENERGY) TO DIFFERENT STIMULI, AS EXHIBITED BY THE SIMPLEST ORGANISMS.




FIG. 3.—SPECIFIC RESPONSE. TYPE OF REFLEX ACTION.




FIG. 4.—SPECIFIC RESPONSE. TYPE OF INSTINCTIVE ACTION WITH PSYCHICAL CONCOMITANTS. The space within the inner circle represents the mind, that between the two circles the body.

FIG. 4.




FIG. 5.—SPECIFIC RESPONSE. TYPE OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESS. The outer border represents the body, the inner space the mind.

Figs. 2-5 represent the four types of response, exhibiting gradual increase in complexity.

It must be understood, of course, that the simpler types of response persist in organisms characterized by the higher types, but become of less relative importance as compared with the higher types for which the mechanism of the higher animals is organized.

✓ The conclusion to which we have come in this chapter is, then, that the pattern on which the thoughts, emotions

and activities of man are based is the specific response to environment (usually purposive, i.e. serving the needs of the organism) which is characteristic of all living beings. This specific response shows a gradual evolution from the simplest to the most complex organisms. At least in the higher vertebrates, including man, specific response is represented, on the psychical side, by three specific interconnected mental processes, distinguished as cognition, affect ¹ and conation. Of these cognition shows an immense elaboration in man himself, enabling him, in the first place, to vary and adapt his responses by a nice appreciation of the adaptation of means to ends, and, secondly, to develop his knowledge of the external world, and by the elaboration and multiplication of concepts to create the whole field of abstract knowledge. The affective elements also show a great, though scarcely so complex, an elaboration.

But fundamentally the human mind, like that of the animal, remains a complex mechanism for initiating and carrying out specific conations, i.e. for doing things, and its activity can only be comprehended if it be constantly regarded in this way. The specific conations involved are, in the first instance, the same as those of the higher gregarious animals, the instinct mechanisms being largely inherited as such from the pre-human Primates. We often find, however, human activities directed to ends incompatible with, or apparently flatly opposed to, the primitive instinctive ends; and we also meet with many psychical phenomena which, at first sight, seem to have no reference to specific ends at all. The mind of man appears, indeed, on a superficial survey, to be an inextricable tangle of thoughts, emotions and impulses, some of which can be directly related to clearly defined instincts, while others appear quite remote from the instinctive mechanisms.

The problem we have to face is how far the mental phenomena which appear so remote from the instincts can be interpreted as results of the complications, modifications

¹ Affect is perhaps better regarded rather as a *tone* accompanying mental action than as a mental *process*.

and interactions of the instincts and how far they must be referred to other sources. Before we can deal with such questions we must become familiar with some of the conceptions of mental structure and activity which we owe to psychopathology and which represent the most fundamental advances in our means of analysing the human mind, whether in health or disease.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNCONSCIOUS

It was pointed out in Chapter I that the study of psychology was at one time almost entirely limited to the "content of consciousness," that is, to the thoughts and feelings of which we are fully conscious. It was inevitable that psychology should start with the attempt to analyse and classify those phenomena of the mind to which we have, so to speak, direct access, and much valuable work has been and is still being done in this direction. But a little reflection on human behaviour, as we experience it in ourselves and as we see it all round us in the world, should suffice to convince us that many human thoughts and actions have no consecutive antecedents in the stream of consciousness, but are motived by causes arising from some other source. Sometimes we can clearly recognize the source, sometimes we have a vague inkling of it, and sometimes the causes of our thoughts and actions are quite hidden from our introspective gaze. The causes of which we are half conscious can often be brought into full consciousness by deliberate effort. Sometimes also a motive of which, up to a certain point of time, we had been quite unconscious will suddenly flash into consciousness. Again, we are all familiar with disconnected thoughts, images and emotions which arise in consciousness and of whose connexion with the rest of the conscious stream, or with conscious memories, we are quite ignorant.

To account for these phenomena psychologists have been driven to assume the existence of an unconscious part of the mind, lying, so to speak, below the conscious, from

which psychic elements may rise into the stream of consciousness. It is true that certain psychologists strenuously resist the assumption of an unconscious part of the mind. Faced with the facts just mentioned, some of them take refuge in the belief that the unconscious antecedents of conscious mental processes are not mental at all, but are of the nature of purely physiological processes in the nervous tissue of the brain. It has been shown, however, in Chapter II, that we cannot, in attempting to elucidate psychical processes, pass from the physiological to the mental and back again, though we must constantly take non-psychical factors into account. It is necessary to keep the psychical sphere separate if we are to make progress in obtaining a working theory of mental processes.

The real position of those psychologists who object to the assumption of unconscious mental processes is the identification of "mental" and "conscious." If we choose to *define* mental phenomena as conscious phenomena the thesis of these psychologists follows as a matter of course. The answer to that thesis is that we can get no clear comprehension of mental phenomena as a whole if we so limit the meaning of the words mind and mental. Conscious phenomena are constantly appearing as fragments of some larger whole. They cannot be understood without reference to that whole, and we cannot deal with the whole as consisting partly of mental and partly of purely physiological elements, because the two classes are not in any way comparable and cannot be handled together. They are different in kind and must be dealt with separately. It follows that we must assume the existence of unconscious mental processes to complete the whole of which conscious mental processes are clearly a fragment. In other words, the hypothesis of an unconscious part of the mind is necessary to the progress of psychology, and that is its sufficient justification.

If we now accept this conclusion and endeavour to form an outline picture of the construction of the mind on this basis we naturally start with the so-called *stream of consciousness*, the changing content of which from moment to

moment is familiar to us all. This changing content is, of course, largely dependent on sensations derived from the external world, and the perceptions of these by the mind, in other words on mental images corresponding to the things that we see or hear, touch, taste or smell, from moment to moment. By acting upon pre-existing elements in the mind, these bring about perpetual changes in consciousness. The pre-existing mental elements thus affected by the constantly inflowing sensations are determined by a complex set of causes, partly inherited dispositions, partly previous experience, and appear as the effects or *traces* of past perceptions on the mind retained by what we call *memory*. The *memory traces* only enter into the stream of consciousness when they are stimulated to activity by inflowing sensations from the external world or by the action of some other mental elements upon them.¹ Many, however, are readily accessible, and easily enter the conscious stream under the appropriate stimulus. The ordinary actions of every-day life would, of course, be impossible if this were not so. We could not consciously react to any external stimulus unless it aroused the appropriate memory traces,² for it would have no meaning to our minds.

Other memory traces, on the other hand, are not readily accessible. They lie, as it were, deeper in the structure of the mind, and are only aroused if the stimulus is specially strong or with the aid of conscious effort. Others again are not accessible at all under normal conditions, but are only aroused under special conditions or by special methods. It is the existence of this last class which led Professor Freud to develop his theory of the unconscious. All memory traces comprised in the first two classes may be said to lie in the region of the *foreconscious*, i.e. there is no special

¹ As, for instance, if one is lying awake in a dark room, when old memories arise into consciousness without the intervention of inflowing sensations from the external world.

² The "arousing of a memory trace" does not necessarily imply that a past occurrence is consciously remembered, but merely that the trace is contributing elements to consciousness.

barrier to prevent their coming into consciousness, though the ease with which they do so varies very much. In the case of the last class, however, special repressive barriers exist which have to be broken down before the memory traces can gain access to consciousness. The nature of these repressive barriers we shall have to consider in detail later (Part IV), but it may be stated generally that they are erected because the repressed elements are painful or otherwise out of harmony with the rest of the mind. Freud supposes a region of the mind normally inaccessible to consciousness, and this he calls the *unconscious*. It must be clearly understood that the Freudian unconscious does not include all the memory traces of which we are unconscious at any given moment, for many of these lie in the fore-conscious, but only those which are normally inaccessible to consciousness. Certain elements connected with these inaccessible traces may, however, arise into consciousness in isolated or distorted forms, particularly in pathological mental conditions, and, in the normal mind, especially in dreams.

But it seems necessary to take a wider view than that represented by Freud's theory that the contents of the unconscious are prevented from reaching consciousness by specific barriers. That is undoubtedly true of "repressed" mental elements (see Chapters X and XI), but by no means all mental elements which do not normally reach consciousness are repressed. In the evolution of the mind the increasing scope of consciousness has played the leading part. Consciousness may, indeed, be regarded as an instrument which has increasingly enabled man to gain the mastery of his environment. Originally most of the important reactions to environment were carried out unconsciously or were but vaguely present to consciousness. The primitive instincts are developed from the simple specific responses which we have seen to be the great characteristic of the living organism, and the growth of the consciousness which accompanies their performance is slow and is at first confined to the recognition of the object exciting the instinct

and to the attainment of the end of conation. The central parts of the instinctive process, the elaboration of cognition and the consciousness of affect are later developments. Take two fundamental instincts—sex and nutrition—as examples. The primitive man is attracted to a woman and tries to mate with her, he sees good food and tries to eat it. In each case he is conscious of the object and of the success or failure of the conation. He feels the specific emotion, but neither that nor the cognition is elaborated in consciousness. In the case of difficulty an elaboration of cognition in consciousness—the introduction of reasoning of a primitive kind—will often enable him to modify the means of approach and thus to secure the object he desires.

Thus we conclude that consciousness and the foreconscious are at first developed in direct and immediate relation to the external world and in so far as they are useful to us, and only later reach the central mental processes. Nietzsche recognized this very clearly. "Consciousness," he says,¹ "begins outwardly as co-ordination and knowledge of impressions—at first it is at the point which is remotest from the biological centre of the individual; but it is a process which deepens and which tends to become more and more an inner function, continually approaching nearer to the centre." It is this development of consciousness as an *inner function*, the becoming aware of the central parts of our mental processes, of our cognitions and affects, and the consequent enrichment and consolidation of the conscious ego, which characterizes the later stages of mental evolution. This is the evolution of *self-consciousness*, as contrasted with the superficial consciousness which is of immediate utility in our relations with our surroundings and which marks the earlier stages of the growth of consciousness. Considerable tracts of these inner regions of the mind are normally left unexplored by introspection and never become conscious at all. Again Nietzsche:—"We have senses only for a definite selection of perceptions, such

¹ *The Will to Power* (English translation edited by Oscar Levy), 1913, vol. ii, p. 24.

perceptions as concern us with a view to our self-preservation. Consciousness extends so far only as it is useful."¹

These "senses" may be developed to a greater or less extent so far as regards the inner regions of the mind, apart altogether from utility. There is, however, a residuum which probably always escapes us, particularly in the region of affect and more especially in the relations of the specific affects connected with the most fundamental instincts such as sex, with the perception of beauty, with the reaction of the mind to external nature, and so on. This is the region of the mind which may be called the *primary unconscious*. Parts of it may be brought into consciousness according to the mental equipment and taste for introspection of the individual. But it is impossible to explore it completely, because we do not possess the necessary faculties. This primary unconscious is not identical with the Freudian unconscious, which is *secondary* and developed as the result of *repression*, of the barring off from consciousness of particular contents of the mind which have often, though not necessarily, been formerly fully present to consciousness.

The relation of the regions of the mind in respect to consciousness may be schematically and very roughly indicated in the diagram (Fig. 6) on page 54.

Fig. 6 represents a section, so to speak, of the mind. On the surface is the stream of consciousness, with its constantly changing contents, as image succeeds image and thought succeeds thought. This stream is constantly altered in composition and character by the inflow of perceptions (a , etc.) from the external world which stimulate the memory traces (b , etc.) in the foreconscious stratum lying below. Some of them penetrate to deeper layers. Others, however, may strike the barriers of the Freudian unconscious and be stopped by them as at d_1 , d_2 . The groups of mental elements which constitute the Freudian or secondary unconscious are to be conceived of as closed above to direct stimulus, but open below so that they may arise into consciousness

¹ *Loc. cit.*

as at b'' as the result of a stimulus received indirectly, though generally by a roundabout course and often in a distorted or symbolized form as indicated by the wavy lines.

In dream life external impressions are at a minimum, and dreams largely have their origin partly in the primary and partly in the secondary unconscious regions of the mind, at the same time making use of material from the foreconscious. As is well known, external impressions often penetrate to the consciousness of the sleeper, and being




FIG. 6—RELATION OF EXTERNAL SENSE STIMULI AND THE MENTAL ELEMENTS OF FORECONSCIOUS AND PRIMARY UNCONSCIOUS TO THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS (see Text)

interpreted symbolically are thus woven into the structure of the dream. The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep, and elements from behind those barriers, as well as ordinary elements from the foreconscious, from the marginal zone, and from the primary unconscious, may all play their part (see Chapter XII).

The boundary between the foreconscious and the primary unconscious, as has been already indicated, is not to be represented by a hard and fast line. There is a marginal region of elements which are not so readily accessible

as those which are permanently lodged in the foreconscious, and there is continual interchange between this and the foreconscious, elements rising and falling from one to the other, and thus becoming more or less accessible to consciousness.

The primary unconscious is to be regarded (as indicated in Fig. 6) as the basis of the entire mind, as the centre or core of the psychic organism. The mental elements corresponding with the great primitive instincts are originally seated in this region, and from it the psychic energy which activates the complexes of the foreconscious (see Chapters V and VI) is continually welling up. The foreconscious is the comparatively superficial structure built by the accumulation of memory traces which have resulted from the conscious perceptions and activities during the course of the individual life. With the foreconscious alone conscious daily life is immediately concerned, for it contains the whole of the mental equipment immediately available to consciousness. Of psychic activity in the unconscious we have no means of direct knowledge. We only know that activity is constantly going on in it by occasional direct irruptions into consciousness, evidently from a source of which we had little or no previous knowledge, and by the symbolized dramas which are enacted in dreams, and whose origin we can often trace to the unconscious, both primary and secondary. The contents of the primary unconscious are vague and unspecialized: except in the form of more or less vague emotion they can only gain access to consciousness by clothing themselves in forms belonging to the foreconscious (*c*, *b'*, Fig. 6): hence their symbolic expression, especially in dreams.¹ The contents of the secondary unconscious, on the other hand, are often definite enough, that is when they have been formerly present to consciousness, but they, too, once they have become unconscious, can only gain access to consciousness in a disguised and often a symbolic form.

There has recently been a discussion² on "Why is the

¹ Cf. Maurice Nicoll, *Dream Psychology*, especially chap. xviii.

² *British Journal of Psychology*, 1918, vol. ix, pp. 230-256.

Unconscious unconscious?" It seems that the simplest answer to the question is: "For the same sort of reason that most of the substance of the earth is not in contact with the air," or more directly "Because consciousness is essentially a superficial phenomenon."

CHAPTER V

COMPLEXES

IN the diagram (Fig. 6) on p. 54 the relation of the stream of consciousness to the foreconscious and to the primary unconscious is represented as a simple spatial relation extended in time, the stream of consciousness in immediate contact with the outside world and the foreconscious and unconscious as successively deeper layers of the mind. Though useful for its immediate purpose this diagram is very defective even as a purely logical construction, because the contents of the foreconscious and the unconscious do not, like those of the stream of consciousness, change completely from moment to moment, but are for the most part relatively permanent, in spite of constant modification by the addition of new memory traces. The basis of mind structure is hereditary, and therefore permanent in the individual, and though the actual content is composed of organized systems of memory traces the source of which is the external world, yet the number added during any given relatively short period of time is small compared with the total stock, and except on rare occasions incapable of effecting a serious change in the mind content as a whole. Thus the potential relation of consciousness to these relatively permanent elements of the mind is usually not very different at this moment from what it was yesterday or will be to-morrow. This fundamental fact a diagram such as Fig. 6 is quite incapable of showing.

In order to gain a clearer insight into the actual contents of the mind we must conceive of it as a *network of mental elements*. The basis of this conception is the well-known

fact of *association* between mental elements, a fundamental condition of all psychical processes. Every perception of which we become conscious arouses associated memory traces in the foreconscious and brings them into consciousness. Without association of this kind we could not carry out the simplest processes of everyday life, for it is on the systems of associated memory traces in the foreconscious that our capacity both to act appropriately and to think systematically depends. In considering the structure of the mind from this point of view we must conceive of certain parts of the network as thrown into a state of activity as the result of some stimulus, whether from without or from within the mind, and of those




FIG. 7.—PART OF THE ASSOCIATIVE NETWORK OF THE MIND SEEN, AS IT WERE, IN SURFACE VIEW (compare Fig. 8, p. 61). Five complexes are shown, of which *a'* is a branch or sub-complex of *a*. The complex *b*, heavily lined, is supposed to be in a state of activity.

parts of the network which are active at any given moment as forming the focus of consciousness at that moment. Thus we have the momentary picture of part of the mind represented diagrammatically in Fig. 7, the heavily lined part of the associative network being the temporarily active system of associated mental elements.

The principle of association of mental elements includes the Freudian unconscious, at any rate when, as is often the case, the unconscious mental elements have previously formed part of the foreconscious. But the parts of the network lying in the Freudian unconscious cannot be awakened into consciousness, like those situated in the foreconscious, unless the barriers are first broken down. They

exist in artificial isolation, more or less complete. Nevertheless, *elements* from these regions do occasionally appear in consciousness as the result of a stimulus, though generally in a distorted form. Under certain circumstances the barriers may be broken down altogether, and the hitherto inaccessible mental elements become part of the foreconscious. To the primary unconscious, however, there are no barriers. This region of the mind is rather unexplored, and therefore undeveloped cognitively, than shut off from the rest of the mind, and the means to explore it are for the most part lacking.

The network of associated mental elements is to a large extent organized into systems to which the name *complexes* has been given. The term *complex* was introduced into psychology in a definite technical sense, by Neisser¹ and Jung² in order to present a clearer picture of the manner in which affectively toned groups of presentations, which have been repressed from consciousness (i.e. have become secondarily unconscious), because they are out of harmony with the rest of the mind, suddenly make their presence felt in consciousness and give rise to the symptoms of hysteria or insanity. Jung showed that this general conception of complexes of presentations toned with feeling (*gefühlsbetonte Vorstellungskomplexe*) applied to the structure of the normal mind, and he illustrated it by reference to the ego-complex (the most fundamental and important of all), to the state of strong religious conviction, and to the state of being in love, as well as by more "accidental" complexes created by the occurrence of particular sets of circumstances. Bernard Hart³ illustrated the conception further by describing the complexes of the party politician and of the enthusiastic amateur photographer, and showing how these complexes may be aroused and temporarily dominate the mind. Psychoanalytical writers have made great use of the conception, and have generally

¹ *Individualität und Psychose*, Berlin, 1906.

² *Ueber die Psychologie der Dementia Præcox*, Halle, 1907.

³ *The Psychology of Insanity*, Cambridge, 1912.

restricted it to *repressed* complexes, or have even defined¹ the complex as necessarily unconscious and dissociated from the rest of the mind. In this book the term is used in Jung's original sense.²

/ It must, however, be noted that organized knowledge of every sort possessed by the mind also forms systems of associated mental elements, and that these are not primarily bound together by common affect, but by purely rational bonds. Such rational systems cannot in the first instance be classed as complexes, in the sense employed here. Nevertheless prolonged occupation with such a rational system will eventually develop a common affect belonging to the system as a whole, though it may be an affect of low intensity, and in this way a rational system acquires the characters of a complex.

The elements of a complex are not all necessarily called into consciousness *at once* on the stimulation of any one of them, but the complex is for the time being the centre of mental activity, so that elements belonging to it are much more likely to enter consciousness than any others, and will continue to be so until the activity dies away or until some other complex is more powerfully stimulated. In Fig. 7 four complexes, at *a*, *b*, *c* and *d*, are supposed to be represented. Of these *b* (heavily lined) is supposed to be stimulated at the moment. A complex is characterized and its elements are bound together by a common affect of specific quality, experienced as feeling when the complex is aroused.³ Apart from the mental processes and corresponding actions depending on purely rational mental systems, it is through complexes that the typical mental process (the specific response) works, the particular complex representing the particular set of mental elements involved in the process which begins

¹ Brill, *Psychoanalysis*, second edition, New York, 1918, p. 380.

² See Preface, p. 6 ff.

³ The *sentiment* of McDougall (*Introduction to Social Psychology*, chap. v) seems to be properly the exact equivalent of this specific affect, though that author includes in his conception of the sentiment the cognitive and conative elements of the complex, so that it becomes equivalent to the complex as used in this book (see Preface, p. 9).

with perception and cognition and ends in the corresponding conation.

Complexes are of all sorts and sizes. Some directly relate to an inherited instinct common to all human beings; others are individual and depend primarily on education or experience. Some are very sharply defined and circumscribed, their elements being firmly knit together; others are indefinite in outline and loose in construction, shading off into neighbouring complexes. The former are generally characterized




FIG. 8.—RELATIONS OF DIFFERENT COMPLEXES TO ONE ANOTHER AND TO THE ACTIVATING INSTINCTS (SECTIONAL VIEW). A, instinct activating complex *a* which is segregated in a compartment of the mind, but in which the mental processes and outlets are normal. B, instinct activating complex *b*, which has normal connexions with the rest of the mind. C, instinct activating two complexes, *c* and *c'*: *c* is repressed by *d'*, a branch of *d* giving rise to conflict along the curved line representing a "shell" of repression: the energy of C, having no escape through *c*, finds a partial outlet through the weak substituted complex *c'*. D, instinct activating complex *d*, a branch of which, *d'*, uses part of the energy derived from D to repress the complex *c*.

by affect of high intensity, the latter by comparatively weak, sometimes barely recognizable, affect. Individual mental elements may become connected with more than one complex.

Complexes belong primarily to the foreconscious, and the history of their formation and development in the foreconscious forms a large part of the history of the develop-

ment of the individual mind. They are formed by the interaction of the impressions constantly flowing in from the external world with the inherited instinctive mechanisms which lie within the mind and from which the energy of the complexes is derived. Complexes may be repressed from the foreconscious, i.e. they may be denied access to consciousness and thus be driven into the Freudian (secondary) unconscious (Fig. 8, c); or they may be partially repressed (see Chapter XI). Repression congests and raises the potential energy of a complex (Chapter VI).

In the creation of complexes the instincts in some form or other are the creative forces, the perceptions are the materials with which instinct works, and the complexes are the resulting mental structures. Once formed, a complex omits and determines the modes of expression of the instinct, very much as the detailed structure of an organism limits and determines the manifestations of life. The importance of the complexes in determining our mental processes, and, as a result, our actions, is so great that it is necessary for the reader to obtain a fair grasp of the conception from a few examples.

One of the strongest and best known of complexes is the sex-complex. It is, of course, common to all normal human beings, firmly based on an instinctive mechanism inherited from countless generations of human and non-human ancestors. Without going into the disputed question as to when sex first appears in the mind of the individual we may consider, in very brief outline, some of the main characteristics of the development of the sex-complex from the time of puberty onwards. At the time of puberty the representation of the sex instinct in consciousness is normally very vague, ill-defined and fragmentary. Like all the great fundamental instincts its mental elements are largely unconscious and have numerous obscure connexions with other unconscious and largely undifferentiated mental material seated in the primary unconscious. The elements which reach consciousness are notably disconnected and become conscious as the result of very various mental stimuli, which by no means always

directly arise, as do the normal stimuli of the normal fully developed complex, from members of the opposite sex. All these elements are, however, characterized by a strong affect of very specific character. The vague strong feelings of tender yearning and the accompanying restlessness, the pangs or storms of emotion that often mark adolescence, are too well known to need illustration. The repressive effect of education on the normal working of the sex instinct, both in early puberty and later, is very marked, and doubtless accounts largely, though by no means wholly, for the fragmentariness and obscurity of the expression of sex in consciousness.

At this time, then, the mental elements of sex are undifferentiated, vague and rudimentary. As time goes on they become increasingly sensitive to external stimuli, and their expression in consciousness, and consequently in the foreconscious, increases. They are more apt to be aroused by stimuli proceeding directly from members of the opposite sex, and more or less well-defined conations towards the opposite sex begin to show themselves. It is not until a definite body of mental elements relating to sex is established in the foreconscious that we can properly speak of a sex-complex. The period at which such a complex is established, and the nature of its parts and their relations, depend, of course, upon individual opportunity, experience and education. The subsequent history of the complex depends on the fate of the individual. If the individual consciously falls in love the relation of the complex to consciousness changes. It is lifted right into the foreconscious and its elements become much more sharply defined. Its attachment to a single object brings the first and third elements of the instinctive process, viz., cognition and conation, into prominence, while the affect, always a very conspicuous feature of the complex, also increases enormously both in intensity and definiteness. At the same time the enhanced complex in the foreconscious is accessible to stimuli arising from all kinds of sources apparently unconnected with the beloved object. The most trivial resemblances and suggestions are at once

related to the dominant complex and bring it into consciousness. The difficulty, in fact, is to keep it out of consciousness.¹ This brings us to the great characteristic of a powerful complex highly charged with affect—its power of taking up and connecting with the heart of the complex all kinds of alien mental elements. The stronger the affect, that is, the more dominant the complex, the greater its power in this respect.

The subsequent history of the sex complex in the mind, its later developments, decay or perversion we need not pursue here. But it is to be noted that while the sex instinct may express itself in a single well-defined complex, it may, on the other hand, express itself in more than one. A man who is passionately in love with one woman—has eyes and ears, as they say, only for her—has a single sex complex with that woman as the central figure. Again, the man or woman with no capacity for strong sexual love, but to whom sex means "naughtiness," has also a single well-defined sex complex, though of a very different nature. In each case sex stands for a single homogeneous set of images, ideas, emotions and conations. But for one to whom sex means several different things, for instance the tender love of a wife, the physical passion for a mistress, the platonic passion for a spiritual mistress, there are several different complexes, all deriving their energy from the sex instinct. The mental elements falling within the sexual sphere are then not closely knit into a single whole, but are grouped round distinct centres of interest (cf. Chapter XXI).

There are two other great instincts or groups of instincts which, together with sex, form the basis of much the most fundamental part of the affective life of every individual, though to none of the three does the bulk of the actual structure of the *foreconscious* in the healthy mind of the average civilized man belong. These others are, first, the instincts which centre round the self, or empirical ego, giving rise to the most fundamental complex of all, which

¹ Cf. Jung, *Psychology of Dementia Præcox*, and B Hart, *The Psychology of Insanity*, p. 62.

we may call the *ego-complex*; and secondly, the herd instinct, which centres round the individual's relation to the society in which he lives, and gives rise to one or more *herd-complexes*. These complexes, depending, like sex, upon great universal instincts, may be called the *universal complexes*, in contradistinction to the *particular complexes* which depend on accidental circumstances and vary with each individual (see Part VI).

The universal complexes take different forms in different individuals, according to individual heredity, to the circumstances of life, and to the particular objects to which they are attached, e.g. the persons who excite the sexual instinct, the particular herd or herds to which the individual belongs, the nature of the individual ego; but each is necessarily coloured by the character of the instinct, of its specific affect and conations, to which the universal complex corresponds. The three universal complexes are distinguished from all particular complexes because they correspond with the three great functions or relations of the life of the individual. They bear between them by far the greater part of human affect, and their interactions involve all the greater mental conflicts. Particular complexes may be formed within them, so to speak, or belong partly to one and partly to another.

Thus it appears that what we call the three universal complexes are somewhat different in nature from the particular or accidental ones. It seems appropriate, nevertheless, to apply one term to both kinds of mental groupings, because in both cases we have to do with systems based on a definite entity or class of entity accompanied by an emotion or group of emotions of a specific kind, and leading to well-defined groups of conations. We may certainly conclude that in the formation of all complexes instinct plays a part, but while some particular complexes are formed, so to speak, inside the universal complexes and form parts of them, others depend on some more or less remote development of a primary instinct.

By way of contrast with the great universal complex let us now consider an example of a particular complex

dependent on accidental experiences and confined to the individual. Suppose a man has had an unpleasant experience, which has made a lasting impression on his mind, at an inn in a certain town. The heart of the resulting complex will be formed by the memory traces representing the actual occurrence and the persons involved. Closely associated will be the room in which the incident occurred, the inn in which the room was situated and the aspect and name of the town to which the inn belonged. The stimulation of any of the mental elements relating directly to these will certainly arouse the complex and its painful affect. But if the affect is powerful enough other mental elements which suggest the original incident, e.g. all inns wherever situated, rooms recalling the particular room, persons recalling the particular persons, and so on, will all be drawn into the complex, that is, they will all recall the incident and arouse the unpleasant affect with which it is charged. Here we may illustrate the fact that mental elements may become connected with more than one complex. Suppose an intimate friend of the man who had the unpleasant experience to have been with him on that occasion. For a time the sight or the thought of his friend may immediately arouse the complex. But, if the intimacy with his friend continues, the other associations which centre round the friend will probably soon become relatively stronger than that particular one, since the affects attached to complexes initiated by accidental experiences generally weaken with lapse of time, and the sight or thought of the friend will no longer arouse that particular complex.

Or as another case, suppose a man first realizes he is in love with a woman on some particular occasion when she is wearing a blue dress. For a time the colour blue will very probably arouse the complex of which she is the central figure. It is even possible that it may do so for the rest of the man's life. But it is more likely that the other multifarious associations of the colour will overlay that particular association and blue will cease to be part of the complex. Thus complexes are always shifting their outlines and mental



elements becoming associated and dissociated according to the changing course of experience and the waxing and waning of affects.

As another instance, let us consider the very large and important class of complexes formed by our occupations or our intellectual interests. A man's profession or occupation will probably form the centre of one of the most marked of his mental complexes. The affect attached to such a complex varies very much. If a man is enthusiastically devoted to his work it will be of high intensity. But if, on the other hand, he carries on his daily work simply to earn his bread the affect will be lower in intensity and different in nature. Finally, if the work is positively distasteful to him the attached affect will be painful in tone. In any case there will be a complex with some affect attached to it, for it appears to be a psychological fact that no mind can occupy itself in the same channels for a long period without developing a complex, however weakly organized, and a characteristic affect attached to the complex. If the affect is barely recognizable by introspection it means that it is of low intensity and not, as a whole, markedly pleasurable or painful. It may, for instance, be composed of a weak, painful component due to mild distaste for the work and a relatively weak pleasurable component due to the feeling of security in a settled occupation which guarantees a livelihood. The character and conditions of the work itself contribute the specific element which every complex-affect carries with it.

A man's hobby often carries an affect of much higher intensity than his work, because it is taken up and continued of free will and the associated complex will generally have a strongly pleasurable affect. Consequently hobbies are likely to be dominant complexes, continually annexing alien elements and penetrating more and more of a man's life. The same, of course, holds good of a man's work if he is enthusiastically devoted to it. Home life, religion, politics and other kinds of social activity form complexes which play a larger or smaller part in a man's life according to

the amount of affect they carry. Many, if not all of these, however, as we shall see in the sequel, owe their ultimate origin to one of the great universal instincts.

It is particularly to be noted that the effective bond between the different elements of a complex is the bond of affect or feeling and is not in any way a rational bond. In the case of a strong well-knit complex this results in a fixed non-rational mental attitude towards any topic or situation which arouses the complex, an attitude invariably coloured by the specific affect. Hence, for instance, the disgusted condemnation of anything relating to the physical aspect of sex in the mind of the prude ; the approbation of any measure or view connected with his own political creed, and the unhesitating rejection of anything associated with his opponents' in the mind of the fanatical party politician ; the enthusiastic acceptance of the most trivial or the least amiable traits of his mistress in the mind of the devoted lover. A very large part of our actions and opinions are entirely determined by our complexes, and by far the largest part are more or less coloured by them, even when we are able to emancipate our judgments so far as to be able to act or judge to some extent independently of the bonds of our complexes. In *purely* rational thinking, which is a great deal rarer than most people imagine, the affective bond is of a different nature. The love of objective truth (cf. p. 216) is here at least a part of the affect involved.

The network of associated mental elements which makes up the structure of the mind is not entirely organized in complexes. Organized knowledge, as has been said, consists of systems of mental elements connected by purely rational bonds, and a number of mental elements are, so to speak, indifferent, that is, they are not attached to controlling centres charged with affect, and are of little importance in the affective mental life. Such indifferent elements are always liable to be picked up and attached to dominant complexes, and if that happens the elements in question at once acquire a new significance.

The whole mental life, and consequently behaviour and

conduct, depend primarily on the character and power of the complexes in which the structure of the mind is organized. Every complex has its own conations along the lines of which the psychic energy with which the complex is charged, and of which the attached affect is the emotional expression, tends to be discharged. With the nature and laws of psychic energy we shall become acquainted in Part III.

PART III

THE ENERGY OF THE MIND

CHAPTER VI

PSYCHIC ENERGY AND THE LIBIDO (INTEREST) THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE MIND

JUST as we have to assume a mental *structure* in order to obtain an intelligible picture of the mind, so we have to postulate the existence of psychic *energy*¹ in order to "explain" its activities. Both these conceptions are founded on the model of our existing conceptions of the physical universe, both are logical constructions designed to help us to get some systematic notion of how the mind works. We have every reason to believe, though we cannot prove, that the changes in the energy of the mind are closely paralleled by actual correlated changes of physical energy which take place in the cells of the brain; but the distinct conception of *psychic* energy is necessary owing to the considerations brought forward in Chapter II.

¹ The modern theory of psychic energy has been largely, though not very systematically, developed by Dr. Jung. See especially "Versuch einer Darstellung der psychoanalytischen Theorie," *Jahrb. f. psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen*, Bd. V., 1913, pp. 308-441; *Analytical Psychology*, London, 1916, chap. viii; *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*, 1913, pp. 120-135 (translated as *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, 1916). The theory is obviously open to criticism, but the postulate seems indispensable in the present state of knowledge, because it helps us to understand a whole series of mental phenomena which we cannot otherwise interpret.

The mind, then, must be conceived of as endowed with psychic energy, just as the body is endowed with physical energy. One of the great distinguishing marks of every living organism, as opposed to non-living matter, is its power of constantly discharging energy which it as constantly replenishes from the food which it assimilates. Life, indeed, may almost be said to consist in the continual ordered discharge of energy by the organism. When this discharge is at a maximum, life is being lived at its highest intensity: when it is at a minimum, life is at a low ebb: when the co-ordination of discharge is impaired the organism is unhealthy; and when the organism is no longer capable of ordered discharge of energy it is dead. Exactly the same is true of the psychic life and of psychic energy. But we know much less scientifically about psychic energy than we know about physical energy—we cannot measure it quantitatively, we cannot speak of a law of the conservation of mental energy. We do not know what exactly is the relation of psychic energy to physical energy, though we know there is a very intimate relation between them, just as we do not understand the relation of mind processes to brain processes, though we know that such a relation exists. Our conception of psychic energy, then, is much vaguer and much less complete than our conception of physical energy, just as our picture of the structure of the mind is vaguer and less complete than our picture of the structure of the physical universe. This is because we do not obtain the pictures of mind structure and mind energy directly through our senses, but indirectly through inference and reflection, and these are much less capable than are the senses of giving us sharp and vivid pictures.

In order to fix our ideas let us consider the psychic energy exhibited in the typical mental process dealt with in Chapter III. We saw that the complete mental process there described consisted of three connected parts—cognition, affect and conation. Of these cognition arouses the affect and passes over into the conation, which is accompanied by the affect. In the conation or mental effort towards

the appropriate end psychic energy is expended,¹ just as physical energy is expended in the physical motor action into which the conation passed over. In the simplest mental processes of the specific response type, such, for example, as that which occurs when a fly tickles one's nose and one puts up one's hand to disturb it, the whole mental process is momentary (it may, of course, be only just conscious, or entirely unconscious—scarcely more than a reflex action), and the psychic energy expended in the conation is very slight, as is the physical energy expended in the raising of the hand. Correspondingly the affect is very slight. If the fly has alighted on one's face several times within a short period, or if one is bothered by a plague of mosquitoes, the affect is much more intense and the conation more violent, as, indeed, the physical action is likely to be. Affect and conation are closely correlated, and the amount of affect aroused is, on the whole, a good index of the amount of psychic energy discharged in the conation. But neither bears any necessary relation to the amount of physical energy expended on the corresponding motor action. Thus, a navvy driving a pile expends very little psychic energy, but a great deal of physical energy, with each stroke; whereas a philosopher searching for the right phrase to express a difficult and subtle idea may spend a great deal of psychic energy in the search, but uses very little physical energy in speaking or writing the words. Indeed, if the philosopher is alone, and is content with merely thinking the words, he may spend no physical energy at all—the whole effort is completed with the completion of the mental conation and does not pass over into motor action.²

The examples we have just been considering are cases

¹ Psychic energy, we must suppose, is also expended in cognition, but we can say very little about the conditions or amount of its expenditure.

² It will be understood that we are here considering only the physical energy expended in the motor action which (except in processes *completed* in the mind) normally follows upon the conation, and not the physical energy expended in the brain cell processes accompanying the mental process.

of *formally* simple, though complete, mental processes. Such simple processes are, however, frequently compounded into more or less complicated processes, occupying a considerable period of time—up to the span of a whole life. They are “integrated,” to use Professor Holt’s term, into more extended or “higher” processes of the same type. The brushing of the fly from the nose is not so compounded. It is a perfectly isolated and self-contained action. But the navy’s whole job of pile-driving is an example of such integration, and so is the philosopher’s *magnum opus*, for which we will suppose the phrase he sought to be intended. These are examples of extended conations to which the mental components of the individual actions described (and many others) are subordinated. The whole set of mental elements connected with each extended conation forms one of the *complexes* in which, as we saw in the last chapter, the structure of the mind is organized. Both the philosopher and the navy will certainly have mental complexes connected with their respective work, whether these complexes be closely knit and accompanied by strong affect, or loosely knit and with comparatively weak affect; and the complex will dominate the work as a whole—the nature and make-up of the complex with the associated affect will determine the “spirit” in which the work is done. A man’s “keenness on his job,” or, on the other hand, his dislike of it, whether the job be pile-driving or philosophizing, means that the complex is well marked and closely knit, the affect strong and pleasurable, or painful, as the case may be. If he is comparatively indifferent to his work, the complex is probably loosely knit, and the affect will be weak. It does not necessarily follow that the work will be well, badly, or indifferently done in the three cases respectively, because the philosopher may be a bad philosopher, and yet tremendously keen on his *magnum opus*, while the navy may be a muscular and efficient pile-driver and yet dislike pile-driving. Similarly, a man may be very much in love with his wife and yet make a bad husband, or he may be indifferent to her, but nevertheless

make an excellent husband.¹ Yet it is clear that the nature and strength of the affect involved in the complex has a very important connexion with the way the work is done, *because it is an index of the amount of psychic energy which goes into the conation.*

The complexes corresponding with the great natural instincts may be regarded as charged with potential psychic energy in a way analogous to that in which an unstable chemical substance is charged with potential energy. The outstanding example is, of course, the sex complex, whose energy charge is the largest and the most intense of any of the great universal complexes. The discharge is often correspondingly violent, and the affect correspondingly intense. The combative instinct, at least in fighting races, furnishes another example of a specially intense energy charge. But in the normal civilized man, who is living comfortably above the margin of subsistence, there is a greater or less amount of free psychic energy available which can be turned into any suitable conative channel in which he is able to take an interest—his daily work, sport, a hobby, money-making, politics, religion, social activities of various kinds, and so on. The term *libido* may conveniently be applied to the psychic energy inherent in the great natural complexes, or becoming attached to any individual complex, and discharging itself along the appropriate conative channels.² It is difficult, and sometimes

¹ Exception may be taken to this instance on the ground that the *métier* of husband is not identical with that of lover.

² Jung uses the word *libido* almost in this sense, applying it, as he says, to the equivalent in the psychical sphere of the concept of *energy* in the physical sphere (*Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*, 1912, p. 120. Translated as *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, 1916). Freud and others employ the term with an exclusively sexual significance, but there is good classical authority for a wider meaning (see Jung, *loc. cit.*, p. 119). Slightly modifying Jung's identification of the concept with that of psychic energy at large, and retaining the etymological suggestion of *desire*, it seems best to define *libido* as psychic energy attached to a complex and discharging through a conative channel, as distinct from the conception of psychic energy at large, which is not necessarily attached to a complex. Objection

impossible, in dealing with a conception like that of the libido, to avoid using it as if the libido were itself a living thing with independent activities of its own, rather than mere energy flowing along defined channels. This is a difficulty frequently encountered in dealing with phenomena depending on living organisms. We need not discuss its philosophical basis. No confusion need result if we recognize the difficulty.

The libido inherent in a complex is potential psychic energy; when it is being discharged it is kinetic. As in the case of electrical energy the libido may be of high or of low potential; in the former case its action is very intense (passionate as we call it in ordinary language), and a given quantity is sooner discharged than is the case with energy of low potential. This is the expression in terms of libido of the familiar fact that passionate people generally tire soon and are often fickle, and is no doubt correlated with corresponding processes in brain cells.

Since we cannot obtain exact quantitative knowledge of the behaviour of the libido, it is legitimate to help out our conception by a consideration of the behaviour of physical energy in certain cases. Various physical analogies with the manifestations of psychic energy in conative channels are useful in this connexion. The most obvious of them are suggested by the word *channel* in its primitive meaning of a water course. Water, originally possessing the potential energy of position, flows along a channel and does work: it either cuts its channel deeper, or it may be made, for instance, to turn a mill wheel. If the flow is dammed by

is sometimes made to the use of the term libido because of its sexual suggestion. Claparède suggested to Jung (see Jung's *Analytical Psychology*, p. 348) the use of the word *interest* as an equivalent. This is a useful and appropriate word, but it suggests rather an attitude of mind towards the goal of a conation than the actual psychic energy involved in conation, and is therefore not wholly suitable to replace libido, which gives the suggestion of *force*. Both terms may be retained in their appropriate uses. The term psychic energy must in any case be kept, because of its objective significance and the analogy with physical energy.

an obstacle the water banks up behind the dam and acquires a new "head." The energy which, but for the dam, would have been doing work as kinetic energy remains largely potential, and is constantly fed from behind. If the obstacle cannot be removed by the accumulated energy of the banked-up water there is an overflow. According to the conformation of the ground the water either follows existing alternative channels, makes new channels for itself, or spreads out and becomes relatively stagnant. In the last case the energy is not lost, but becomes temporarily ineffective.

This behaviour of the energy of flowing water gives a fairly close picture of the behaviour of the libido in a conative channel. The initial energy of position is the potential psychic energy residing in a complex. The flow along the watercourse is the flow of the libido along a conative channel. If the libido can issue in the appropriate motor action the mill wheel is turned, but if the libido is dammed by an obstacle the energy increases, constantly fed from the inherent energy of the complex, and strives to remove the obstacle. Supposing removal to prove impossible the libido may either enter a pre-existing neighbouring channel, which may lead it to the same mill wheel by a different route, to another mill wheel, or in a different direction altogether: or the libido may cut a new channel for itself. In other cases the libido may fail to do any of these things and become temporarily ineffective, with results that we shall consider in a later chapter. In the case of the sex conation the analogy is obvious, because the intensity of the sex libido lends peculiar vividness to our realization of its behaviour, but the main outlines of the analogy apply equally to all strong conations.

A very high intensity of libido, accompanied by characteristic signs, gives rise to what we call passion. Passionate intensity may characterize any conation. There is the passion of religious faith, the passion of patriotism, the passion of the artist, the passion of scientific research, as well as the passion of the lover. We speak of passionate feeling as well as of passionate striving, and this emphasizes

the very close connexion between affect and conation : if conation is intense, affect will also be intense.

Another appropriate physical analogy may be drawn from the boiling of water, and this is already incorporated in common speech in such phrases as "his anger had reached boiling point." The rise of temperature is continuous, but there is little visible sign till the boiling point is approached, and then the state of the water suddenly changes to the eye, the whole mass vibrating with the rapidity of movement of the bubbles of escaping steam. Similarly in the case of anger or love, the intensity of emotion may rise continuously and for a long time without giving rise to conspicuous visible signs of emotion. But suddenly a change of state occurs : there is acute consciousness of violent internal agitation which, when not successfully repressed, is expressed externally, the whole body vibrating with emotion. Under the conditions of civilized existence anger, and very often love, are commonly repressed as long as possible. This repression corresponds with the heating of water under pressure, that is, in a confined space. Boiling then takes place at a higher temperature, the accumulated energy is correspondingly greater, and the work done by the energy discharged may burst the vessel in which the water is confined. Again the analogy is obvious. The boiling water analogy, though very close in most respects, clearly breaks down in one, because the heat is supplied from an external source, whereas the energy of the libido is inherent in the complex, the external cause of the emotion being merely the stimulus leading to the discharge of psychic energy from the complex.

If we possessed a more intimate knowledge of the changes in nerve cells accompanying psychical processes we should probably find that the physical energy changes closely reflected the processes we have been describing in psychological terms. In the absence of such knowledge we have to fall back upon physical parallels with which we are better acquainted.

The relation of libido to the fluctuating bodily energy

dependent on the condition of the central nervous system is interesting, though we know little about it. Generally speaking, it may be said that high physical energy and high psychic energy are correlated, and this applies more particularly to the libido attached to the primitive instincts. But the phenomenon of high psychic energy associated with a weak physical condition, especially in certain quasi-pathological mental states, is not at all uncommon. Psychic energy developed under such conditions does not ordinarily flow along the biologically normal conative channels issuing in motor action, and commonly it has no outlet or an abnormal outlet from the mental sphere. When health and physical energy are at their lowest ebb all the available psychic energy tends to be manifested in the complex with the strongest affect—"the ruling passion strong in death."

In healthy children psychic, like bodily, energy is very high, but is scarcely attached to specific complexes, which are mostly as yet undeveloped. Consequently young children's energy tends to manifest itself in aimless physical activity, such as running and jumping about—the affect being pure generalized *joie de vivre*. Games are well known to be an excellent education in directing this aimless energy into definite conative channels.

The essential primitive connexion of affect with conation has been frequently insisted upon. The relation of pleasure and pain to this connexion is particularly instructive. The theory of psychological hedonism, which supposed that human actions were invariably determined by the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, is now quite out of fashion, and there is nothing to be gained by discussing its flagrant inconsistency with the facts of experience. Human actions are certainly determined in the first place by the inherited mechanisms corresponding with the great primary instincts, and secondarily by mechanisms built up in the mind on the foundation of these instincts, as the result of factors which will be considered in the next chapter. Pleasure is primarily the characteristic emotional tone of

the affect which accompanies the *successful* discharge of libido along a conative channel and the attainment of the appropriate end. Psychical pain is the opposite tone which accompanies thwarting of the libido in its efforts to attain the appropriate end of the conation.¹ Many of the "pleasures of the senses," æsthetic pleasure, and the pleasure accompanying a feeling of physical well-being, as well as the pleasure associated with an exaltation or expansion of the personality, are to be referred to the libido of the ego-complex whose conations are self-maintenance and self-expansion (cf. Chapter XIX). These conations subtly penetrate all the activities of life. Much psychical pain is caused by the hampering or thwarting of them. Physical pain is, of course, in a different category. It is a unique and primitive sensation, and does not necessarily involve psychical pain. When physical pain induces a feeling of misery, this psychical component is to be attributed to the temporary shrinkage of the ego-complex involved.

The intensity of pleasure and pain depends upon the intensity of the energy developed in the conation, and therefore of the affect. In the pursuit of an end determined by a great integrated conation, the pain incidental to temporary thwartings may be absolutely neglected, as common experience shows. If the libido is adequately strong the end is steadily pursued, through whatever pain the path may lead.

How, then, does it happen that pleasure is often pursued for its own sake—as an end in itself? The psychological mechanism appears to be a *detachment of the pleasure felt in successful conation from the proper end of the conation*. The feeling normally associated with the conation is, when detached, taken as an end in itself, and pursued for its own sake. The actual cause of this detachment appears to be that, since pleasure always accompanies successful conation, the feeling of pleasure is taken by the mind as a guide to the forms of activity to be pursued in place of the proper ends. Thus, for instance, to take a very simple case, the

¹ This view of psychical pain was, of course, well known long before Jung published his theory of the libido.

pleasure experienced in eating good and wholesome food comes to be pursued for its own sake, and food is eaten, when it is known that the act will be pleasant without reference to the satisfying of hunger, because the pleasure instead of the hunger is taken as guide to the action. This is especially the case under artificial conditions of life, when the biologically normal guide, hunger, is seldom acutely felt. This detachment from one another of mental elements normally associated illustrates the phenomenon of *psychical segregation* which, as we shall see in the sequel, has very great importance in the life of the mind. This particular form of segregation, the detachment of the affect from the primitive end of the conation, is an example of *psychical displacement* (see Chapter XV).

The stronger the conation and the more intense the accompanying affect, the more ardently is the latter apt to be pursued for its own sake. The pursuit for their own sakes of sexual gratification, of the feeling of power, and, as a special example of the latter, of money for the sense of power which the possession of money gives, are the most widely dominant of these strong perverted conations which substitute the specific affect for the original object of the conation. A minor, but fairly widespread example, already alluded to, is the pursuit of the pleasurable affect associated with eating or with eating delicate food, which leads to the vices of the glutton and the *gourmet*. From the ethical standpoint, indeed, all these perversions of the libido which take the affect as an end are regarded as *vices*. The biological basis of this ethical judgment is the objection to the diversion of psychic energy from the proper object of the conation, a diversion which tends to damage the mental machine and to render it more or less incapable of its natural work. Civilization, however, renders meaningless the pursuit of the ends of certain primitive conations, and where the conation does not result in anti-social activities its pursuit for the sake of the affect may be harmless or even beneficial, for the expenditure of libido in a well-defined channel is always, as such and apart from collateral harm,

a healthy activity. Hunting and shooting for sport are excellent examples of this type of activity. The influence of the typical conative form, in which a concrete goal is the end of the conation, is seen, however, in most of these examples, where pleasure is admitted to be the main end sought. Thus, the sportsman must kill his game in a particular way, or he aims at the biggest possible bag; the mountain climber must not only reach the top of his peak, but must reach it by a particular route, and so on.

The principal instincts of the mind normally demand constantly repeated satisfaction, in so far as all the available psychic energy is not absorbed in some integrated higher conation in the service of which the instincts are harnessed, and upon which the whole attention of the mind is concentrated. So far as that is the case there is no room for the independent demands of the individual instincts. Such an ideal subordination and use of instinct is, however, very rarely complete, and so long as it is not complete the instincts continue to demand independent satisfaction.

These demands take the form of what may be called *recurrent conations*. When the 'libido has gained its immediate end in action, the mind is temporarily satisfied and at rest, but the energy inherent in the living complex will shortly accumulate afresh and again seek an outlet; and so on indefinitely. The strength of the demand will vary at different times according to the waxing and waning of the energy of the particular complex involved: in some cases the instinct concerned may notably weaken in strength, or almost atrophy, with advancing years, as is sometimes, though not always, the case with the instincts more especially associated with youth, such as the sex instinct and the combative instinct. But apart from such fluctuation or decay the individual instincts, working through the corresponding complexes, will demand perpetually renewed satisfaction. The tension developed in a complex by the accumulation of energy is released when the energy is discharged and the conation is completed in action. A state

of equilibrium is momentarily attained, with the accompanying feeling of satisfaction. But this satisfaction is transient. As energy accumulates afresh the tension again develops in the complex and presses for discharge.

Thus the vigorous mind never rests for long in a condition of equilibrium. There is a perpetual rhythm of energy tension and discharge, just as in the living body. In the primitive condition man finds perpetual satisfaction, and therefore happiness, in the constant opportunity of satisfying his various instincts. But in the developed state in which the mind is dominated by ideals involving the most long-continued, intricate, and varied conations, the instincts are subordinated to these ideals, finding their satisfaction, as it were, incidentally ; and only in this way can happiness be attained.

The ordinary life exhibits a mixture of the two conditions. The mind is not wholly destitute of ideals and entirely dependent on the separate satisfaction of the primitive instincts. On the other hand, it is rarely successful in subordinating the whole of its activity to the service of an ideal. Certain of the instincts will stand outside the ideal scheme, and will consequently demand independent satisfaction. Even when the instincts have been apparently satisfactorily harnessed they will be apt to break loose and demand satisfaction in direct and biologically primitive ways.

This will give rise to conflict, and will amply account for the unhappiness and discontent so frequently experienced, apart altogether from the barriers presented by the external world, both to the satisfaction of instinct and to the active pursuit of the ideal.

The human mind, then, is an organism, which like all organisms is continuously expressing the life that is in it by the discharge of energy. The form and direction which the discharges take are determined absolutely by the structure of the organism—in the case of the mind by the complexes which are developed as the result of the interaction of the instincts with one another and with the whole mental

environment. The discharges themselves continually react upon the complexes which determine them, and upon the mind as a whole. In the first place the constant discharge of psychic energy along given channels makes the flow of energy along them easier, wears them deeper in the metaphor of water flow; in other words, tends to make the conations *habitual*, just as the physical actions to which they lead become habitual by constant repetition. We can all recognize in ourselves and others how the excitation of a given well-established complex by an appropriate stimulus—a remark, a sense-perception, a situation—leads to a certain response with the inevitability of a chemical reaction; and the more often the response has occurred the more sure we are that it will occur again when the stimulus is repeated.

But this is by no means the only effect of the discharge of psychic energy along given channels. The mental complexes are so closely interwoven in the intricate psychic structure, that an object or situation often provides stimuli exciting more than one complex, and thus gives rise to more than one conation, and these may be incompatible or flatly opposed. If the line of least resistance leads to the discharge of energy along one of these channels, the effect of the stimulus on the rival complex, which if stimulated alone would have given rise to quite a different and incompatible conation, is not lost, but arouses a state of tension in the rival complex, which persists. After the first conation has become effective and is completed in action, this state of tension will initiate the rival conation which may issue in action directly contrary to the action already completed. Thus a woman, strongly affected by a man who pays her attention, but not ready, or from any cause unwilling, to accept him fully as her lover, is very often alternately kind and unkind in her attitude towards him, as the opposed impulses arising from the sex instinct and the ego-complex, or, again, from the sex instinct and morality, alternately gain control of her behaviour. Especially is such a sudden alternation likely to occur when the conation has *fatigued*

the channel by a particularly intense or quickly repeated discharge of energy. Thus the lover whose mistress has certain qualities which offend him is likely to quarrel with her soon after an intense display of passionate ardour.

Again, the first conation may itself lead to a situation which excites a second and opposed one. A man may feel pity for and hasten to the help of a fallen enemy : a display of over-generosity may result in a reaction to excessive meanness.

Such alternations of opposed conations are, in fact, so common that we may look behind their specific causes in individual cases like those which have been cited and find a general tendency of the mind to *compensate* for activity in one direction by corresponding activity in an opposite direction. This is one of the ways in which the mind maintains its equilibrium. It acts as if it were in perpetual fear of over-reaching itself by excessive action in some particular direction ; and the system of checks and counterchecks provided by the conflicting complexes of which the structure of the mind is so largely built up affords the means by which the checking or the compensation of such excessive action is carried out. A parallel is found in the physiological processes of the body, where automatic checks to processes perfectly normal and necessary in themselves, but which would lead to dislocation of mechanism and ultimately to death if they were continued beyond a certain point, are always present. If the physiological mechanism gets so much out of gear that the appropriate check fails to act or to be effective, pathological developments ensue ; and exactly the same is true of the mind. Every living organism, in fact, depends for its continued life upon the maintenance of equilibrium in this way. In the case of the mind this equilibrium is what is called sanity.

The *position* of equilibrium, the centre of gravity, so to speak, of the mind, may, of course, be shifted during life. This happens when, as it is said, a man's character changes with advancing years, but such a change is, in general, brought about slowly, and the whole mechanism of the mind

gradually adapts itself to the change. Sudden changes do sometimes occur, sudden shiftings from one possible position of equilibrium to another, as in "sudden conversions" and the like—perfectly real, though not very common phenomena. The explanation of these is that the original position of equilibrium, in which one complex or group of complexes was dominant, becomes more and more unstable because it involves neglect or suppression of powerful instincts which are not adequately represented in the system of dominant complexes, and which increasingly press for recognition. Thus a state of tension is developed, which increases till the limit of resistance of the old complex-system is reached and then results in an explosive change in which the old complexes are broken up, and new ones are formed by the insurgent instincts.

An example is the man whose mind has been dominated by complexes depending on self-regarding impulses, such as unscrupulous money-making, but whose altruistic instincts are strong enough to cause a continual increase of strain so long as he remains in his old course of life. Suddenly the old system collapses, and, often through the medium of religion, a new orientation of the mind to life supervenes. Even if he does not sell all that he has to give to the poor, the man's whole attitude towards money-making and the use of money is changed—the insurgent instincts have obtained recognition, and a new position of equilibrium is established.

Another instance is that of the man whose life has been led entirely in the daily routine of conventional channels, confined by the bonds of a narrow and artificial type of existence, and whose primitive desire for first-hand experience of nature, or simply for freedom, at length successfully asserts itself, and leads him to break all ties and start life afresh. He may simply go "back to the land," or, if freedom is his main desire, he may become a wanderer. Such examples might be multiplied almost indefinitely. It is hardly necessary to remark that these sudden transformations do not always prove successful experiments in practice

Sudden and complete readjustment of the mind in middle life is a difficult and perilous operation.

For one case in which such a sudden and violent change of equilibrium is actually effected there are a hundred in which the preliminary conflict is felt, but in which the bonds of habit are too strong for the libido to free itself, or in which the mind feels that the new departure would itself be a dangerous excess; and some compromise, not too far removed from the old position of equilibrium, is arrived at. The stable type of mind (described in Chapter VIII) rarely changes its position of equilibrium suddenly. If it does not lose most of its capacity for growth and adaptation at an early stage, as it commonly does, any change will be a gradual one, effected slowly and cautiously, with constant readjustment at every step to all the internal mental conditions and external circumstances of life. The unstable type, on the other hand, is constantly trying new experiments, compensating for excess in one direction by excess in another, oscillating to and fro about its centre of gravity.

Another important expression of the tendency of the mind to seek and maintain equilibrium by compensation is to be found in its reaction to external events which affect it more or less deeply. When, for instance, the mind is strongly affected by an unexpected benefit or injury it *reacts* to the impression, which disturbs its previous equilibrium in disturbing its former relation to the doer of the action.^{*} A sense of strain, of want of adjustment, is felt, and a tendency at once arises to repay the benefit or injury in kind, or, if that is impossible, in words. This is sometimes expressed as the desire "to get even" with the doer of the action, a phrase which recognizes the disturbance of equilibrium in this relation.

Gratitude, the feeling and corresponding conation of beneficence towards the doer of an action which has benefited the individual, and the desire for *revenge*, the desire to injure

* Injuries or benefits to which the mind has become used by constant repetition do not affect it to anything like the same extent because they form part of the expected relation;

one who has inflicted injury, are expressions of this tendency. When these conations have been carried out the mind is at rest, because *compensation* has been made. The "justice" of *punishment* has its root in this need for compensation, and the idea of justice is symbolized by the goddess with the *balance*.¹ Nevertheless, the inflicting of injury upon others is so strongly antagonized by the instinct of human tenderness that the plea for mercy to temper justice appears and gains a considerable degree of acceptance.² The conflict between these opposed mental tendencies is seen in the protest against capital punishment and all the more cruel forms of punishment, and in the counter-protest against the "weak sentimentality" that would give the criminal comparative impunity. Nowhere is the complicated system of checks and counterchecks which regulate the working of the human mind and maintain its equilibrium more fully illustrated than in this whole series of phenomena.

All the activities of the mind which result in the maintenance of its balance, like the activities of the instincts themselves, are fundamentally and primarily unconscious and non-rational, not conscious and rational. We do not say to ourselves, "I must not pursue this course of action beyond this point or I shall lose my mental balance": we feel the effect of a force inside ourselves which prevents the continued pursuit. We do not say, "I must show gratitude to this benefactor because compensation is needed." We feel gratitude spontaneously and try to express it by word or deed. The feeling and the conation may become conscious secondarily, but they have their springs deep in the primary unconscious. The need and the effort constantly to maintain equilibrium are fundamental properties of the human mind, without which, indeed, it could not continue to exist.

¹ This idea, of course, only reaches its highest expression when the injury is done to the herd, but the "justice" of private punishment is well recognized, though its infliction may be deemed inexpedient.

² Alternatively the practice of inflicting punishment is "rationalized," often quite legitimately, but sometimes illegitimately, by the theory of punishment as a deterrent (see Chapter XV).

CHAPTER VII

DIVERSION AND SUBLIMATION OF LIBIDO

THE total stock of psychic energy may be thought of as primitively distributed among the mental complexes corresponding with the chief instincts, but it is clear that a great deal of transference is possible. It is clear, for instance, that during the individual lifetime one channel of activity may largely atrophy while another may be greatly developed. Exactly how transference of psychic energy takes place is not at all clear. On the analogy of the relative development of the organs of the body, their increased or decreased activity and development according to the unequal incidence of stimuli and the consequent diversions of food supply, we may perhaps picture a stock of unspecialized psychic energy which flows into one or another channel according to the demands made by the stimulation of the different mental complexes. The plan, so to speak, of the complexes corresponding with the great primitive instincts is inherited, and the complexes themselves are built up under the normal conditions of mental development. Consequently the psychic energy finds these channels, so to say, ready made, and flows into them as soon as the complexes are stimulated. When we spoke in the last chapter of the high potential energy of a complex the phrase is to be interpreted, on this view, as meaning that the complex in question, with its conative channels, is so constructed that it readily absorbs large quantities of energy which is discharged at high intensity, while other complexes absorb energy with more difficulty and discharge it at a lower intensity.

An alternative view is that the bulk of the total stock

of energy permanently resides, under normal conditions, in the chief complexes, and is only diverted from them with difficulty. The latter view perhaps makes more readily intelligible the specific character of the affect attaching to different complexes, and the retention of this specific affect when energy is diverted to accessory complexes. Perhaps the view which best fits the observed phenomena is that part of the total stock of psychic energy is inseparably attached, to the complexes corresponding with the great instincts, that another part is normally attached to them but can be transferred, and that a third part is normally quite free and can be directed into any channel according to need. However, we may conceive of the mechanism of supply and transference of energy it is certain that the complexes corresponding to the great primitive instincts are normally most freely supplied with energy, which is often discharged with great intensity, that when their normal outlets are barred, accessory complexes and channels are constructed through which this energy finds an outlet; and finally that complexes apparently quite remote from the great instincts may come to absorb nearly the whole of the energy of the mind.

An animal or a human being living under the stress of hard conditions has little physical or psychic energy available beyond what is required to meet the daily needs of existence and to fulfil the sexual functions. In other words, practically the whole available energy is necessarily devoted to the essential conations—individual and racial—without which the species could not survive. It is important to note the word *available*, for every organism possesses reserves of energy which are called into play under the action of an exceptionally strong stimulus. But these reserves are *not* available unless the exceptional stimulus is forthcoming. If, now, the conditions of life become easier, *free surplus energy* becomes available and has to find outlets. In the young of the higher mammals, which are often fed and protected by their parents, and at any rate have not to meet the full rigour of adult existence, this surplus energy finds its motor outlets at first in aimless activity, and the affect

may be called *joie de vivre*. Later on, in more or less systematic *play*, the energy is employed in definite conative channels. In the young adult, and even in later life, the same affect is recognizable when the animal is in full vigorous health and particularly after an exceptional strain has been removed. But the aimlessness of motor activity diminishes or disappears as the conative channels become deeper and deeper in adult life. In the adults of primitive man surplus energy, when it is not employed in needless and aggressive fighting, is commonly occupied in primitive art-work, in personal decoration, in music and dancing, and in the elaboration of religious or semi-religious ritual. Some at least of these last activities are generally held to be closely connected with sex, and there seems good evidence that the energy devoted to them is derived from primitive sex energy. Some organized dances and other rites are, of course, directly and obviously related to sex activity, and may actually be said to be part of the sex function in the wide sense. But where the connexion is not so obvious and direct, and the function has a value apart from sex itself, we have an example of what has been called *sublimation* of energy, i.e. the employment of energy belonging to a primitive instinct in a new and derived, i.e. non-primitive, channel.¹ The high intensity of the energy belonging to the sex complex, and the fact that its employment in its own channel is necessarily intermittent, together with the fact that it is generally very strictly regulated by tribal law, would doubtless make it the most important source of sublimated energy; and this a priori consideration is borne out by the frequent evidence of actual connexion of these accessory activities with sexual excitement.

As man gained more and more control of his environment and became organized into powerful nations, so that peace

¹ It is better, perhaps, to confine the term "sublimation" to the use of energy belonging to a primitive instinct in what is commonly called a "higher" channel, e.g. of sexual energy in "intellectual" love or creative artistic work, and to use "diversion" for cases of energy transference in general. It is to be noted that Freud introduced the term "sublimation" (*Sublimierung*) for such use of sex energy only.

and security became the normal lot of large numbers of the human race, the psychic energy available for employment in channels other than the biologically necessary ones was greatly augmented, and at the same time the number and variety of these channels were largely increased. One great field was the development of every variety of handicraft directly relating developing man to his environment and giving him more and more power over it. But these utilitarian occupations by no means exhausted the field in which psychic energy could be employed. Of activities not directly utilitarian we have, on the one hand, the immense artistic developments of the ancient world—architecture, decoration, sculpture and painting; poetry and music: on the other the development of abstract thought—geometry, mathematics and philosophy. The activities belonging to the first group are more closely allied to the more primitive conations connected with handicraft, since the mental activity involved is inseparably linked with physical activity—the mind works in terms of material. Poetry and music, which use language and sound as their material and whose most notable developments belong to much later civilizations, are more remote from the constructive and decorative activity of primitive man—from which the former group are clearly derived—and on the whole are much more emotional. The effort of artistic creation in these spheres, especially in lyrical poetry and in music, is commonly charged, that is to say, with a more intense affect, and is very often quite clearly a sublimation of sex libido.

The group of activities belonging to the sphere of abstract thought are obviously developments of the faculty of cognition, and have no outlet in motor action. The diversion of psychic energy from primitive channels to the purely mental exercises involved in the elaboration of abstract thought is one of the most interesting phases of the evolution of the human mind. The mental processes involved appear to have been built up on the specific response model and to involve characteristic affect and perfectly typical conations, though these have no physical outlet. The goal of the

conation is confined to the development and rearrangement of mental material. The power of reason, which is the instrument of this development, seems to have had its origin in the elaboration of the cognition of objects and situations which surrounded primitive man.

The higher animals already show the beginnings of the power of reasoning about concrete things and situations which immediately concern their lives, based on the experience that objects which make the same or similar impressions on the senses have on the whole the same qualities, and that similar situations result in similar events. Many mistakes are made, but these are gradually corrected by further experience and thus the power of discrimination rapidly improves during the individual life. Primitive man, thanks to his large brain and the conditions of his evolution from the stock of the Primates (the group of animals comprising the large apes and man), enjoyed both the means and the conditions for carrying this process much further, and must in this way have acquired the power of induction about the objects and situations which concerned his life. Thus the beginnings of a knowledge of causation were acquired and the foundations of scientific knowledge laid.

It is remarkable that while geometry and philosophy were very notably developed among the Greeks, natural science, in spite of some striking but isolated developments among the Greeks and Arabs, showed no *general* progress until after the Renaissance of the western nations of Europe, and it is only during the last century or century and a half that its advance has been really rapid. The relatively rapid passage from the primitive reasoning of early man to the great developments of abstract thought in the ancient world, while what would appear the more natural transition to the development of an organized scientific knowledge of the laws of causation among material things was delayed for very many centuries, may be explained by the consideration that the method of most ancient philosophy—and indeed of most philosophy down to the present day—was not the method of analysis and induction, but rather a

rationalization and formulation of contemporary beliefs about the universe, beliefs which were essentially religious in origin, and "continued to circumscribe the movements of rational thought and to determine their main directions."¹ The tremendous generalizations of most of the great philosophers, from Plato to Kant and Hegel, were not inductions, but simply elaborations into more or less rational systems of the mass of formless and traditional belief diffused among contemporary mankind. The orthodoxy of their times did not object to such constructive rationalizations, but it did oppose—it repressed and persecuted—the use of reason as an analytical agent, as a solvent of belief.

The impulse to philosophy depends, like the impulse to scientific investigation, partly on the instinct of curiosity and partly on the instinct of construction in a sublimated form. These instincts employ in both cases a cognitive mechanism based on the comparison of presentations—the noting of similarities and differences. But philosophy and science, until very recently, have differed fundamentally in the real goal of their efforts. It is now claimed² that a very large part of existing philosophy is based on illusion and fallacy, that philosophy has never hitherto clearly recognized the distinction between the kind of knowledge that is accessible to it and the kind of knowledge that is not; that a new technique is required to attain real philosophical knowledge of the former kind, and that a sound metaphysic can only be built up by its aid. The notorious and fundamental disagreements between leading philosophers, the contrast between the accumulations of philosophy and the lack of that general recognition of their validity which is accepted as one of the tests of objective truth are certainly striking. No such contrast exists, or has ever existed, in

¹ F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, 1912. The author is indebted to his friend, Mr. S. K. Brown, for calling his attention to this book and for suggesting the line of explanation adopted in the text.

² Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*, 1914.

the field of natural science, which made an effective start relatively late in the history of civilization, but has shown continuous progress since the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, and whose general body of doctrine is not only accepted by all who are competent to form an opinion, but enables us to predict future events and the qualities and behaviour of unknown objects.

Besides the great artistic, philosophical and scientific fields already mentioned, the immense complexity of modern civilized life provides numerous other channels for the employment of psychic energy. The increasing security of daily existence, and the increased aggregate wealth of individual human communities have allowed an increasing number of people to occupy themselves in biologically non-essential fields, and there are many indeed whose psychic energy is devoted almost exclusively to ends which have little or no relation to the maintenance and welfare either of the individual or the community. The diversion of psychic energy from the primitive and even from the secondary (utilitarian) channels has in such cases been apparently complete—a sufficiently astonishing transformation, made possible, of course, only by the very high development and organization of social life. Consider, for instance, the activities of a celibate philosopher of private means! He does nothing, except eat, which in any way corresponds with primitive activities. But these transferences of the psychic energy to secondary complexes are not effected with such ease and completeness as might appear from an inspection of the surface phenomena or the conscious activity of the mind. The primitive instincts are not destroyed though they may be obscured, and the corresponding complexes often retain at least a large portion of their potential energy, which may seek an outlet in curious and often disconcerting ways.

In the history of the individual life we have the secular process of differentiation, diversion and sublimation of the libido repeated in a modified and abbreviated form, just as in the development of the body of the individual we have a condensed and modified repetition of the evolution of the

body from the primitive unicellular organism. During the first year of post-natal life and for some time longer the psychic energy is principally devoted to satisfying hunger—the nutrition libido.¹ This is what has been called the caterpillar-stage of existence. But during this period the reflex bases of the sex instinct and the rudiments of the emotion accompanying the instinct are laid down as a result of the infant's relation to its mother. This is one of the most important practical discoveries of Freud. During the next few years of life, long before puberty, the sex complex begins to develop, at first in a very undifferentiated but still quite unmistakable form.² The development of sex is, however, accompanied and very largely modified and masked by the development of the manifold relations of the growing child to its environment (particularly the relation to society) which form the foundations of other complexes and the channels for the increasing stock of psychic energy. Meanwhile the ego-complex, at first expressed mainly in the nutrition libido, develops and differentiates, employing more and more of the available energy.

Education, in the wide sense, is the most important factor in determining the actual particular complexes to which the psychic energy is attached. The healthy child has a large

¹ The close parallel between the conation of the sucking infant and the central sex conation—the striking similarity between the physical signs of craving and of satisfaction in the two cases—led Freud to approximate the two and consider the primary relation of the infant to its mother as a sex relation (*Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, Vienna, 1905). Jung contends (*Versuch einer Darstellung der Psycho-analytischen Theorie*, pp. 322 ff.) that this is illegitimate. Nutrition is at least as primitive as sex, and the sucking function is primarily nutritive. The resemblance in question is essentially secondary, and depends upon various factors which we cannot consider here. It must be noted, however, that Freud's conception of sex is far wider than the ordinary one, and that in his sense an important part of the relation between mother and infant is a sex relation. For a discussion of the sense in which the sex relation proper can be predicated between parents and children see Chapter XXIII, pp. 268–274.

² Cf. Chapter XXIII, p. 275.

surplus of free energy which can be directed into almost any channel not too inconsistent with the hereditary make-up of its mind. In the years before puberty, as is well known, almost any direction can be impressed upon the developing mind by appropriate and sufficiently severe training. Energy cannot, however, be wholly diverted from the primitive instincts; the sex complex, for instance, though it can be considerably modified in the most various ways cannot be made unrecognizable. Much of its inherent energy may be converted into forms not directly connected with physical sex, and of these art and religion are the most conspicuous, though there are many others. This is sublimation of psychic energy in the strict sense, diversion of energy recognizably belonging to a primitive complex to a "higher," i.e. a less primitive, one. Psychic energy is inherent in all the complexes based on primitive instincts, but of these the sex instinct and the combative instinct are by far the most energetic, so that they naturally provide the main sources of energy available for sublimation. Checks to the direct outflow of energy along the primitive instinctive channels, combined with relatively easy conditions of life, will send the stored energy into fresh channels, determined partly by the hereditary peculiarities of the individual, and partly by the varied conditions of life.

In the case of the growing child we have, then, a complicated process at work. There is the development of the primitive instincts charged with their inherent energy, and accompanying this a constantly growing stock of free psychic energy seeking outlets. The mind develops in an environment which perpetually provides material for the formation of complexes of all sorts, both those directly corresponding with the great instincts and others of the most varied kind, and also stimuli which excite and develop the complexes as they are formed. At the same time the environment establishes a chronic mental conflict (see Chapter X) between the purely egoistic impulses and sex, on the one hand, and herd instinct, which checks and thwarts these impulses, on the other. The attempt to divert the whole

available energy from the primitive outlets leads at the best to a one-sided development of mind and character and often to overt disaster in later life, for the primitive instincts, though they may be starved, cannot be destroyed. A certain amount of their inherent energy may be sublimated with safety and advantage, but the effort cannot be wisely pressed beyond the point at which desperate resistance is encountered. Balance can only be maintained and healthy mental life guaranteed by the moulding effect of the conflict in the absence of decisive victory on one side or the other. The function of education, in its widest sense, is precisely to secure that the complexes formed, varying, of course, with the hereditary disposition, are such as to secure a fairly balanced allocation of the psychic energy available.

PART IV
BY-WAYS OF THE LIBIDO

CHAPTER VIII
ON SUGGESTIBILITY AND SOME TYPES OF
MENTALITY

WE have now gained some idea of the mechanism of the human mind as seen in its fundamental type of activity—the “specific response” to a stimulus exciting one of its various complexes; of the nature and mode of development of these complexes; and of the behaviour of psychic energy in its discharge along the conative channels. If the mind were a perfect machine, an organism completely adapted to its environment in every detail, this would represent a fairly complete biological description of its structure and mode of action. But the human mind is very far from perfect, and the smoothness of its working is in fact constantly hampered by faltering purpose, mental conflict, and the refusal of the world to lend itself to the gratification of the heart’s desire.

Before dealing with the complications brought about by these difficulties, it is useful to consider briefly the important character of the human mind known as *suggestibility*, and also two pairs of strongly contrasted types of mentality which largely help to determine the reactions of the mind in given circumstances.

Suggestibility may be defined as the readiness to receive and adopt as part of the mental contents propositions of all

sorts, whether arising from within the mind or from some outside source independently of the rational faculty. There seems to be a *prima facie* readiness to accept suggestions of any sort and from any source; but this is limited in certain directions by a refusal to accept those arising from certain sources which the mind regards as hostile or suspect, and also others which definitely conflict with a strong well-marked complex already present; and the readiness is enhanced in the case of suggestions arising from sources which the mind regards as possessing *authority*, and in the case of suggestions in harmony with pre-existing complexes. In regard to suggestions arising within the mind these may arise from one complex and be adopted with great readiness by another into which they seem to fit.

The power of suggestion on the human mind is well known, and is deliberately employed by teachers, pastors and therapists, as well as by demagogues and advertisement writers—indeed by all whose desire or business it is to influence the minds of others. Their success depends precisely on the skill, conscious or unconscious, with which they connect the suggestion which they wish to see adopted with some complex pre-existing in the mind of their audience. In the hypnotic state the mind is peculiarly susceptible to suggestion, so that suggestions to actions made to the patient while in this condition are unconsciously and automatically carried out after hypnosis has ceased. Autosuggestion, the mind's own suggestion to itself, often takes the form of one complex working unconsciously upon another, and may also be consciously used in order to bring about a modification of mental content. Self-communing and prayer largely depend for their efficacy upon this process.

Professor Charles Baudouin has recently published an interesting book,¹ based on the therapeutic work of M. Coué at Nancy, in which it is insisted that the essential process in all effective suggestion is autosuggestion: in other words, that whether the suggestion originates inside or outside the mind is a matter of indifference, provided

¹ *Suggestion and Autosuggestion* (Allen and Unwin), London, 1920.

the intra-mental process which is essential to the effect is successfully carried out. For this purpose the mind must be brought into a quasi-hypnotic state, which the author calls "the outcropping of the unconscious," and in which alone the suggestion can take the necessary hold. This condition is notably present in the case of the penitent in the presence of a religious teacher, or of the patient desperately anxious to be cured by his trusted physician; but it can also be produced at will by anyone in his own mind through the use of a simple technique. Any desired suggestion can then be assimilated by the mind and new conations in accordance with it initiated. It has long been realized that the intra-mental process was the important part of suggestion, but, as Ferenczi pointed out in 1909, of the nature of this process we know practically nothing. Baudouin's book gets us no further in this respect, but his analysis of the conditions necessary to the process and his rules for treatment are clear and useful. Especially he points out that what is ordinarily meant by "willing," involving conscious effort, is not only of no use in establishing the desired result, but may actually have the reverse effect. This emphasizes again the distinction and often the antagonism between the superficial conscious activities of the mind and its deep-lying unconscious activities. The end, of course, must be "willed" in the first instance, but the actual process of autosuggestion is carried out without conscious effort.

M. Coué does not use heterosuggestion except as a preliminary example: he merely teaches his patients to practise autosuggestion. It appears that his therapeutic results are very remarkable, and this should cause no surprise when we consider the striking effects of earlier treatment by heterosuggestion, for it is clear that the substitution of autosuggestion for heterosuggestion immensely widens the available field and facilitates the deliberate practice of the process. It may be doubted whether some of the extreme claims made will eventually be substantiated, but there is no doubt that M. Baudouin has done very

good and useful service in publishing his book, alike to psychologists, psychotherapists and the public at large.

The affinity of the autosuggestion propaganda with the claims of "Christian Science" will occur to everyone. However little "Christian Science" may appeal to the psychologist as a desirable or possible form of faith, many cases of great practical benefit to individuals from its adoption are within the experience of most of us. The religious aspect is essential to one type of mind in order that the process of influencing conation through deep-seated conviction may come into play. On the other hand, the genuinely scientific, if only partially successful, attempt of Baudouin to explain the process of autosuggestion, not only throws light on the success of "Christian Science" itself but will attract many, to whom the latter is merely repellent, towards the attempt to obtain a more active control over their own lives.

The relation of autosuggestion to psychoanalysis in therapeutic treatment is an interesting question on which we require further light. M. Baudouin states that in cases where a morbid symptom is due to suggestion by a "simple idea," psychoanalytic treatment can never compete with autosuggestion in rapidity of cure, but where it is due to a complex, psychoanalytic treatment may be necessary. The danger here is in mistaking the causation of a symptom, which may superficially appear to be due to a perfectly "simple idea" when in reality it is inextricably bound up with a deep-lying complex.

Suggestion, then, is a non-rational process, the real nature of which is unknown, but playing an immense part in the building up and modification of mental complexes. Though the origin of suggestibility is not at all understood, its great importance in human affairs is closely connected with the influence of the herd on the mind of the gregarious individual. The herd is one of the most potent sources of suggestion to the individual mind, and it is by herd suggestion that many of the most important complexes which determine the opinions and conduct of the individual are

fashioned (cf. Chapter XX.). The imitativeness of man and his respect for authority are connected with his suggestibility.

The first pair of contrasted types that we have to consider is given by the two opposed mental tendencies of *extroversion* and *introversion*.¹ Extroversion is the thrusting out of the mind on to life, the use of the mind in practical affairs, the pouring out of the libido on external objects. Introversion, on the other hand, is the turning in of the mind upon itself, involving a withdrawal from the external world, and the cultivation of an internal mental life. The process of extroversion is the primitive biological function of the mind. Biologically the mind and its powers only have significance so far as they can be *used* in life. They were developed in relation to the world in which the organism lived and their nature was determined, as we have seen, by the environment of the species, to which they are intimately adapted. The process of introversion is primarily a sign of lack of such adaptation. For one reason or another the psychic energy of the mind fails to find its natural outlets, and being thus cut off from the external world it develops an internal world of its own. In the sequel, however, this internal development has proved of immense value in enriching human life by its secondary reactions with the external world.

For satisfactory mental development under the existing conditions of civilized human life a certain balance is required between these two opposed tendencies, and any marked departure from this balance leads to the extreme types of personality known respectively as the *extrovert* and the *introvert*. The extrovert lives in and for the world, his interest is always projected upon it, his thought and feeling are always at its service, but he has little or no internal life of the mind, whose cultivation is always superficial. The introvert, on the other hand, is absorbed with his own mental processes and is notably cut off from the life of the world around him. He generally has a profound knowledge of himself, and though he always shrinks from contact with the world his habit of intense mental concentration gives him

¹ See Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, chap. xi.

remarkable powers of penetration in any sphere to which he can successfully devote himself. Indeed "he is capable of being an authority on an aspect of life that he has never witnessed or felt."¹ Unless he can find some means of extroversion the introvert's mental life may be confined to a fantastic world of his own ideas and feelings, completely divorced from external reality. He does not extrovert spontaneously and unconsciously like the opposite type, but can only do so of more or less set purpose, and through the medium of his own ideas. But if he is successful his intervention in life is marked by a quality which the activities of the natural extrovert never possess.

Owing to the higher mental quality of the introvert it is often possible for him to come more fully into contact with reality, to face and meet the demands of the external world at a later stage of development, while it is very difficult for the natural extrovert to develop an internal life, to enrich his mental personality, after the period of adolescence. But it is only during the periods of childhood and adolescence that the best balance between the two tendencies of which the individual mind is capable can be attained. The basic mind-structures on which the two types respectively are based are no doubt inherited, and are easily recognized in childhood, but the extrovert can then be taught to reflect, to weigh, to judge, and to pause before taking action, while the introvert can be encouraged by every means to come into the open, not to fear contact with the world, to use his mental powers for practical ends.

The other pair of contrasted types of mentality we have to consider is that described by Trotter in his very valuable work on the psychology of herd instinct,² as the *stable-minded* and *unstable-minded* types. The stable-minded or resistive type is to be regarded as the normal type among

¹ Maurice Nicoll, *Dream Psychology*, p. 147. For a vivid and interesting description of the minds of the extrovert and of the introvert, see chaps. xiv and xv of that work.

² W. Trotter, "Sociological Application of the Psychology of Herd Instinct" (*Sociological Review*, 1909, reprinted as chap. ii of *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, London, 1916).

primitive peoples. The possessor of this kind of mind is full of energy and activity and of strong will, but relatively resistant to the effects of experience. His opinions on most topics are comparatively fixed, and he is generally contented and of a placid disposition. He has a number of well-marked complexes with well-defined conative channels allowing of the strong and smooth outflow of psychic energy. Such a mind is well adapted to a primitive and relatively simple state of social organization. The actions resulting from its conations are not opposed but are favoured by the society in which the owner lives, because they are in accordance with its laws and traditions. The possessor of a stable mind, therefore, fits well into his place in the social organism. In the complex modern societies he still exists in large numbers, and notably among the governing classes. The rigid organization of his mind makes him relatively insensitive to experience of a type that cannot easily be dealt with and assimilated to his fixed and stable mental complexes. He is unadaptable and ill-fitted to cope with the rapid and far-reaching changes which are taking place in the structure and spirit of the modern world. Consequently, as Trotter points out, the stable-minded type, perfectly adapted though it was to a similar state of society, has become a real danger in the modern polity, because it cannot react suitably to changed conditions. The regular soldier of the "old school" is perhaps the most typical and extreme example of stable-mindedness, but the same type is met with among many classes of society which pursue old and well-established modes of life, for instance among clergymen, country squires and government officials.

The unstable-minded type, on the other hand, has the opposite characters. Its great positive quality is extreme sensitiveness to varied experience, and this facility of reaction naturally carries with it the characteristic instability. Weak will and want of persistence in effort are marks of the type. The opinions of the unstable-minded man are often heterodox, and he is rarely consistently happy or contented. He has constantly shifting mental complexes, and therefore ill-

defined conative channels. The extremely unstable-minded person is often of the type known as "decadent," and is then unsparingly condemned by the stable-minded. He would find short shrift in a primitive society, but the security, variety of conditions, and formal tolerance existing in modern civilized societies enables him to survive, and it seems probable that he is actually fast multiplying in numbers. The great merit of the unstable mind is flexibility and adaptability to new conditions, and for this reason it has a general intellectual superiority to the stable type. The unstable-minded man is often charged with immorality, owing to his frequent refusal to be bound by the opinions and lines of action laid down by society, but his ethical sense may, in fact, be highly developed, though his morality is likely to be experimental. The real weakness of the unstable mind is its changeableness, which commonly renders its possessor unsafe to depend upon, and rarely capable of the prolonged effort necessary to considerable achievement.

It is, of course, possible to conceive of an ideal mind which would combine the flexibility of intellect and readiness to be taught by experience of the unstable mind with the resolution and persistence of the stable. Such a combination may actually occur within a limited sphere. Thus the manufacturer, merchant, soldier, man of science or statesman may possess within his own special occupation a perfectly flexible mind, completely willing to be taught by every new experience, combined with energy and resolution in action. Given natural ability such a combination is certain to lead to success. But to find it in the whole mental attitude towards life is rare, if not unknown. For instance, the merchant who is far-seeing, imaginative, adaptable, and always willing to learn in the conduct of his business may in a matter of private conduct show himself a mere slave to a stable mental complex built up by herd suggestion through early training, and completely unable to look at the facts of the case fairly and without bias, or to show the least imagination or appreciation of new factors. In both spheres his *action* may be equally resolute and persistent.

As Trotter remarks, neither type of mind represents the completest development of human personality, and so long as the two remain separate man's control over his social environment must remain incomplete and inadequate. The constant association between rigidity of mind and resoluteness in action, which implies persistence of energy in a given conation, may appear inevitable. It may be thought that extreme sensitiveness to experience is necessarily inimical to the resolute pursuit of a given end, because the reactions to new experience are constantly raising doubts and distracting attention from the end. But if the combination is possible in limited spheres there seems no reason why it should not be equally possible in the mind as a whole. The necessary condition seems to lie in a modification of early education, so that the faculties of sensitiveness and imagination, and the habit of employing reason in all departments of life may be developed in the growing mind, and the formation of rigid complexes as far as possible avoided.

Trotter is inclined to attribute the appearance of the unstable type to the conflict within the mind of the opinions and beliefs inculcated by society with naked experience of life. This conflict is generally successfully avoided by the stable mind through the process of rationalization (see Chapter XVI), but the intellectually acute mind cannot resort to such a method of escape and is consequently shocked and injured by the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting elements. There seems little doubt that sensitiveness to experience is hereditary, and that the sensitive mind is often unable to make headway against certain experiences of life, so that its psychic energy becomes largely ineffective. But it may be conjectured that the characteristic mentality of the unstable type is often at least contributed to by an actual defect in the stock of psychic energy available at the outset of development. Whether such an inherent lack of psychic energy is definitely associated with the quality of sensitiveness to experience must remain an open question. As we have seen there seems no reason to suppose that it is; but in practice it is often hard to distinguish between

actual defect of energy and paralysis of the libido which is a result of mental conflict.

The combinations of the types of mind above described can be recognized without difficulty in everyday life. The stable-minded extrovert is the typical herd-man, immersed in the conventional activities of the herd, generally contented and placid, untroubled by doubts or questionings. The stable-minded introvert will be a weaver of fine-spun and illusory philosophies, built upon the ideas of his more imaginative predecessors. The unstable-minded extrovert, when he is a man of ability, may be found in a certain type of brilliant and unreliable politician, sensitive to new ideas, and to every wave of popular feeling, easily influenced and influencing others, but always conveying the impression that he cannot, at bottom, be trusted. The unstable-minded introvert is often a gloomy, unhappy individual, the most conspicuously ill-adapted to his surroundings of all the four combinations, perpetually perplexed with life and with himself. Such extreme types are, of course, the exception. Most people have a tendency to one or the other member of each pair, but more or less considerably modified in each case by the opposite tendency. The ideal mind would be introverted but with complete powers of extroversion, and would combine the perfect sensibility of the unstable with the energy and resolution of the stable type.

CHAPTER IX

FAILURE AND REGRESSION OF THE LIBIDO

THE failure of the libido to carry a conation into action is sometimes due to the inherent weakness of the psychic energy of the individual. At the point of junction, so to speak, of the mental and the physical channels there is a certain resistance experienced, an obstacle to be passed, such as is experienced in learning any new accomplishment involving physical action, for instance, riding a bicycle or skating. In simple and easily acquired arts of this kind the effort of will required to overcome the obstacle is not very serious, and once the physical paths have been smoothed the conation passes smoothly and unconsciously into the action. But in the case of complicated activities involving constant interaction of mental and physical factors, and especially where failure will involve humiliation or disgrace, the will-power available is sometimes found insufficient to surmount the obstacles, even where the physical powers are quite capable of the task set before them, and the breakdown usually occurs at some point where a preliminary mental process or conation has to pass into action. There is, in fact, a dislocation between the mental and physical paths, and the psychic energy of the conation refuses to pass into the necessary muscular innervations. This is particularly seen in the case of those types of mind which are largely introverted, that is, where interest is mainly turned inwards, and which are consequently unused to translating thought into action. This kind of weakness is also encountered in spheres in which "action" does not involve skilled physical movements, and tends to arrest the carrying

out of any plan whatever. In such cases the conative channels themselves become defective, "the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," and, in the typical introvert, the psychic energy becomes entirely devoted to the perceptive and cognitive processes, with their accompanying emotions, and is incapable of any action except those which have become automatic from long habit.

When the libido fails to complete a conation in action owing to inherent weakness, or when it is stopped by an obstacle which cannot be surmounted by the energy at its disposal, it frequently exhibits what is called *regression*, i.e. the libido takes some channel belonging to an earlier phase of mental development. This substituted channel may represent a modified conation of the same form, or it may, on the other hand, be merely the easiest outlet for the thwarted energy. The typical example of this latter course is the exhibition of violent anger when a conation is thwarted. Children show this quite normally when their desires are checked. It is often accompanied by rationalization or defence reaction (see p. 118) of the crudest sort, as when a child who has failed to do something or get something it desires angrily blames its little brother or sister, or its parent, who is, in fact, quite guiltless in the matter. The regressive nature of this behaviour of the libido in grown people is recognized in ordinary language by its designation as an "exhibition of childish temper." Regression implies a failure of the libido to adapt itself to reality. Complete adaptation to reality involves either renewed efforts adapted to overcome the obstacle or conscious abandonment of the conation and transference of energy to another channel. But absolutely complete adaptation to reality is rarely attainable, and in the case of the thwarting of a primitive instinct through inherent weakness or an insurmountable obstacle it may be impossible to bring about a satisfactory transference of the energy to a fresh channel. Disappointed love is a typical example, in which the transfer of the libido to a fresh channel is often found difficult and sometimes impossible.

A class of cases conspicuous in the practice of psychiatrists is furnished by the failure of the sex libido to emancipate itself from the bonds of parental love. If a young man or a young woman fails to take a normal interest in the opposite sex, or if, being sexually attracted or having become engaged or even married, he or she shrinks from following the normal course and undertaking the obligations of sex in the normal way, and develops extreme nervousness or hysteria, it is very commonly found that the individual in question has had a particularly intimate sentimental bond with his or her parents, and that it is the failure to break this bond which has led to the shrinking from marriage. The normal sex impulse is here seen in conflict with an infantile form, and the libido tends to revert to that form instead of carrying out the normal conation.¹ In such cases the libido has never really emancipated itself from the infantile channel. But even where emancipation has apparently been complete an unexpected check or obstacle of a different nature, such, for instance, as being jilted, or finding some unexpected reluctance or unsuitability in the prospective mate, may throw the libido back into the infantile channel.²

Freud has compared regression with the behaviour of a river whose main channel becomes blocked, leading to the waters returning to an old channel cut by the stream during an earlier phase of its development, but which has since become dry or has retained only a trickle. The case in which the libido fails to take the normal course owing to its having remained tied to the infantile complex would correspond in this analogy with the case of the new channel never receiv-

¹ Cf. Chapter XXIII, pp. 270-272.

² A simple case of the sex libido momentarily faltering in its course as the result of not quite complete adaptation to reality, and taking refuge in the infantile type of anger, is neatly illustrated in the old limerick:—

There was a young lady of Bicester :
One day when her lover had kissed her
She felt much perplexed,
And to show she was vexed
She gave such a slap to her sister.

ing more than a small proportion of the stream owing to the volume of water being insufficient to cut it deep and broad enough, so that the old course retains the greater part of the stream throughout. In other words, the libido has been insufficient to ensure normal psychical development.

The general key to all these cases of abnormal behaviour of the libido is to be found in the tendency of energy to be expended along the line of least resistance. The line of least resistance is normally the line of a primitive conation whose plan is laid down by heredity and developed by a normal environment, but free energy must be abundant (as is normally the case in youth) or the newly developed channels, which offer at first a certain resistance, cannot be successfully entered. If big obstacles or big conflicts hinder the flow along these normal channels, the libido may be diverted and take an easier channel, which is commonly found in an infantile outlet already established in the mind. The greater frequency of the outlet by way of anger in the child is largely due to the fact that the child's conative channels are not yet fully developed, as well as to the fact that he has not yet learned self-control.

The contrast between psychical regression and progression clearly corresponds to a large extent, though not of course wholly, with the contrast which moralists and spiritual teachers have always insisted upon in the conflict between the "lower" and the "higher" sides of our nature—a conflict of which every human being is at least vaguely conscious. This is often represented as a conflict between the pursuit of "pleasure" on the one hand, and spiritual effort on the other. And Freud has distinguished a "pleasure principle" and a "reality principle" on somewhat the same lines. But regression is rather a seeking of release from mental tension by the shortest and easiest route, an immediate satisfaction without regard to the future, and it is this, in the last analysis, that Freud means by "pleasure." Psychical progress, on the other hand, does involve a continuous adaptation to reality, and also the creation of an ever widening environment.

CHAPTER X

CONFLICT

THE mind, like the body, establishes a certain co-ordination or harmony between its different activities. It will be remembered that the orderly discharge of energy was taken to be the principal mark of the healthy organism. Without co-ordination of movement the body could not carry out any of its normal motor activities, and similarly without co-ordination of mental activity the various conations which, as we have seen, are the normal outcome of mental life, could not be carried out. The simplest conations—those concerned, for instance, with the common tasks of daily life—are the most completely co-ordinated. In the first instance we have those involved in the performance of the necessary biological functions. These are perfectly adapted to what is required and most of them become automatic—nearly or quite unconscious. Next there are the conations concerned with the simpler functions of civilized existence—putting on one's clothes, attending to small household duties, and so on. These also become more or less perfectly adapted, together with the motor actions which accompany them, to the tasks in hand. In the same class are the routine actions connected with daily work and many of the activities subordinated to carrying out larger conations, such as those involved in the example of buying an article in a shop discussed in Chapter III. The proper co-ordination of all these minor but essential activities of life, which form the building material, so to speak, of the most complex activities, becomes completely habitual and more or less automatic, with a minimum expenditure of psychic energy. The

harmony between them is complete except in cases of definite functional derangement.

It is when we pass to the more complicated phases of mental activity dependent on larger complexes that we can no longer take consistent and unvarying harmony for granted. A certain amount of harmony subsists between the different larger complexes of the normal healthy mind. There is mutual adjustment and rearrangement constantly going on to bring about greater smoothness of working, and this seems to be a continuation in the higher sphere of the process which has already brought about the co-ordination of the routine actions. But in this higher sphere the process is much less complete. The mind is no longer compelled, as it is in the former case, by the very fact that it "inhabits" a highly differentiated body, working in a highly complicated environment, to complete co-ordination of conations. It is quite possible to carry on everyday existence and yet to possess mental complexes prompting to incompatible conations in conduct, which are pursued alternately. We cannot mount an omnibus and at the same time walk along the pavement owing to a conflict between a desire to get to the office quickly and a desire to take exercise on the way; but we can and very often do desire to get as much work as possible done in a given week and actually work as hard as possible during one day, but yet by the evening's dissipation seriously impair our capacity for the next day's work. The possibility of this want of harmony between such conations of larger scope depends upon the intermittent character of the activities to which the conflicting complexes prompt us. Life is notoriously full of such conflicts, though the "efficient" man is one who has succeeded in reducing them to a minimum. The more complete the integration of his activities into a few purposes which do not conflict with one another the more harmonious and effective his life becomes.

Nietzsche has compared the mind to a directing committee of the principal instincts, and the comparison is apt. The committee may be united in its desire to get

the work it has to do well and quickly accomplished. It may be an efficient committee, which knows when to adopt a wise compromise between the conflicting views of its various members, and when to decide that one set of views must prevail and override the opposing ones. It may, on the other hand, consist of unruly and self-willed members who are not primarily actuated by public spirit or by a desire to get the work in hand done promptly and efficiently, and it will then present a scene of perpetual conflict, leading to waste of time and inefficiency. Some of its decisions will be unwise or disastrous, owing to the collapse of the saner members before the energy displayed by their headstrong opponents; other decisions will be halting and ineffective as the result of unsatisfactory compromise between two conflicting and incompatible views, one of which ought to have given way.

The analogy is apt in its primary application—the mind presents precisely such contrasts—but it is obviously inexact in one particular. We cannot attribute “public spirit” in the sense of a desire for the general welfare of the individual to the instincts which make up the “personnel” of the mind. We must suppose some other mechanism of co-ordination. We often say that the various elements of the mind are under the domination of the ego, although we mean nothing more by the ego in this connexion than precisely that something which brings about co-ordination. Whatever be the nature of this ego we can represent it in our analogy of the committee by the chairman, who may, and often, in fact, does, make up his mind as to the right policy to be adopted, the right decisions to be taken, and persuades the committee to follow his advice; while in other cases he leaves a decision entirely to the members. These two modes of procedure represent in the decisions of the mind, first, the case in which the decision is taken in accordance with some guiding principle, such as a moral principle, which exists beforehand and tends to govern all the decisions of the mind; and, secondly, the case when the mind is allowed, as it were, to come to its own decision as the result of the free play of the forces at work within

it on the particular circumstances presented to it. The ideal chairman may be said to embody the spirit of the committee as a whole, as the ego represents, or is supposed to represent, the mind as a whole. Whether there is in fact any such thing as the ego in this sense, or whether the possibility of harmonization of the conflicting elements of the mind is not rather the result of some process of interaction between them, of the nature of which we know little or nothing, it is impossible to say. The latter alternative is, perhaps, on general grounds the more likely to be true.

Mental conflict, then, is the struggle which takes place between two complexes whose conations would lead to incompatible actions. Trotter defines it as "the antagonism of two impulses which both have instinct behind them, and are both, as it were, intimate constituents in the personality."¹ And it is certainly true that the major conflicts are always between complexes which have the force of the great primitive instincts at their back. The classical examples of major conflict are those between sex and religion, between sex and morality, between patriotism and the family, religion and the family, and so on. All these may be generalized as conflict between the strongest individual instinct, that of sex, and that other great instinct which rivals sex in strength and significance, the instinct attaching to membership of the herd. In many cases a major conflict may take place between differentiated and segregated complexes derived from one great primitive instinct, for instance the conflict between religion and patriotism, which in some forms at any rate represent different aspects of herd instinct, conflicting loyalties to two different "herds." Minor conflicts may occur between any two complexes of sufficiently strong affect whose conations are incompatible, but they are of little importance in the general mental life.

The major conflicts have always been the favourite themes of dramatists and novelists, and it is not necessary to describe instances here, nor to dilate upon the devastating effects on the mind of a long-continued major conflict. An

¹ *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, p. 82.

acute major conflict throws the whole of the higher machinery of the mind out of gear, so that only the routine functions can be efficiently performed, and even these may suffer from the physical weariness which acute mental conflict often entails. The two antagonists monopolize the stage, so that the stream of consciousness is perpetually occupied by them except when the attention is forcibly distracted. Not only is the libido of each prevented from issuing in its appropriate actions, but the immense quantity of energy constantly thrown into the conflicting and abortive conations, and as constantly used up in the conflict, leaves none for anything but the most perfunctory activity of any of the other higher complexes, which refuse to react normally to the ordinary stimuli.


We may distinguish between *acute conflict*, in which the opposed complexes are consciously prompting to their respective conations, and *chronic conflict*, in which their opposition is not necessarily apparent to consciousness, though latent hostility is always felt. It is chronic conflict which so profoundly moulds the mind during childhood and youth, and maintains a state of equilibrium between the strong inherent opposing tendencies that persist throughout the adult life. Acute conflict cannot continue indefinitely, and the mind uses every effort to put an end to the exceedingly uncomfortable, even agonizing, emotional tension involved. Acute conflict may be brought to an end by the definite victory of one of the antagonists, the choosing of a course of action, or, where a decision can be refused, by the decadence of the acute phase of the struggle owing to the weakening of one of the antagonists. External events, of course, also often bring acute conflict to a close by removing the possibility of action corresponding to one of the conflicting conations. But none of these things necessarily happens, and the mind has other ways of dealing with an intolerable situation.

The first and simplest is the separation of the two complexes in the mind. When the one is stimulated and active the other is *ipso facto* inhibited. An instance of this, men-

tioned by Hart, is the business man whose private morality is unimpeachable but whose commercial morality conforms to quite a different standard based, of course, on pure greed. If the "private morality" and "business morality" complexes were not kept in "logic-tight compartments" the mind would be distressed by the flagrant contradiction of the two codes. The private morality code is sanctioned by the general moral beliefs of the herd; the business morality code, besides having the driving force of a purely egoistic instinct, is covered by the sanction of the partial herd whose members have entered into a sort of tacit unholy alliance and which takes for its motto "business is business" in the more sinister sense. Each has its own separate sphere of action, and thus the two sets of conations are normally kept quite distinct. But suppose a "shady" business transaction of size and importance unexpectedly threatens to bring serious disadvantage to a friend. The conation belonging to the business morality complex will at once clash with private morality reinforced by affection, and acute conflict arises. A decision is necessary, and one of the two complexes will have to give way.

Another similar instance is that of a man with a wife and family to whom he is attached, who carries on a serious illicit love-affair. Each of the contending complexes is charged with the powerful affect of the sex instinct, which is here seen expressed in two distinct complexes (see page 64 and Chapter XXII). The two sets of conations are kept quite distinct, the stimulation of each complex inhibiting the other, but an abiding sense of emotional strain will almost certainly be set up, owing to the intensity of the affect, and a chronic conflict is the result. If, now, circumstances arise which cause the two sets of conations seriously to clash, acute conflict will arise, and one or other of the complexes will have to give way, temporarily or permanently.¹

¹ All reference to the feeling of guilt or the fear of exposure, both of which would probably enter into such a case, has been omitted, in order to illustrate the principle of mutual inhibition between two segregated complexes both deriving their energy from the same instinct.



The acts resulting from a complex which is not in harmony with the mind as a whole, and of which one is ashamed, are generally *rationalized*, that is to say, some reason is given for the acts which has nothing to do with their true cause, but which is intended to satisfy the mind, or some outside enquirer, that the acts are justified. This form of rationalization (for a fuller treatment of which see Chapter XVI) is called a *defence reaction*. Defence reactions, like hypocrisy, are often "the homage which vice pays to virtue," that is to say, they are a concession to morality, to the moral code of the herd, and as such are due to herd instinct; or they may be a defence against the higher ethical self of the individual. Examples of defence reactions are of everyday occurrence, and it is quite a mistake to suppose that they represent conscious hypocrisy. Thus a miser will excuse his parsimony on the ground that he has to provide adequately for his children, whereas his children are already more than adequately provided for on any reasonable standard. An employer or foreman will excuse the petty tyranny which he shows towards his workpeople on the ground that they are unruly and that discipline must be maintained, whereas the real motive is the love of exercising power over others. "A bad workman," as the proverb says, "finds fault with his tools," and he does it, of course, to conceal the incompetence which he will not recognize.

In all these cases of defence reaction it will be noticed that the mind may be unconscious of the real motive of the action defended.¹ If it were otherwise no such defence, apart from conscious hypocrisy, would be possible. This leads us on to the most drastic method of avoiding conflict, namely the *repression* from the foreconscious of the offending complex, which is forgotten and becomes unconscious.

¹ All gradations in respect of consciousness, from complete unconsciousness in which the plea is advanced in perfect good faith, to full consciousness in which the statement is made to others with full intent to deceive, may be met with. Only those near the completely unconscious end of the series, which are by far the commoner can be considered as defence reactions in the sense here used.

The possibility of this procedure depends upon the universal tendency of the mind to ignore, avoid or forget what is disagreeable to it. The mind tends to avoid pain because pain, however slight, involves friction and the impairment of smooth working, and because pain is taken by the mind as a warning against an undesirable conation (cf. page 79). In terms of the doctrine of psychic energy the libido tends to follow the line of least resistance. The tendency to take the line of least resistance is best illustrated in weak characters and in children, and it is the most important function of education in character formation to build up complexes endowed with sufficient energy to enable the mind to pursue its proper course regardless of pain and unpleasantness. Among these the complexes toned with moral affect are naturally very important. In small things the avoidance or forgetting of whatever is disagreeable is easy enough, and causes no disturbance of working capacity. Such a process can hardly be called repression. But when a strong complex with an intense affect is involved the case is far otherwise. The subject of forgetfulness and repression will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XI

FORGETFULNESS AND REPRESSION

WE saw at the end of the last chapter that the most drastic way of avoiding or putting an end to conflict is what is called *repression* (Freud's "Verdrängung") of the offending complex, which is forgotten and becomes unconscious. In the case of material which is of little importance to the mind this may result in the break-up of the material, which troubles the mind no longer, and gives rise to no demonstrable consequences. In some cases, as we shall see, the complex is repressed before it is born, i.e. before it has entered consciousness at all,¹ but very often a repression from the foreconscious is involved. Repressed complexes constitute what we called in Chapter IV the secondary or Freudian unconscious, as distinct from the unexplored primary unconscious which is the centre or core of our psychic being.

The elucidation of repression and of its profound significance in everyday life, as well as in many cases of mental pathology, is one of Freud's greatest achievements. The mechanism of repression involves the cutting off of the obnoxious complex from the rest of the mind, so that it no longer has normal access to consciousness and the conflict is automatically brought to an end. The process of repression is itself in most cases unconscious—the mental elements of the complex are simply forgotten—but the forgetting may sometimes follow a deliberate effort to banish the complex from

¹ This is sometimes the case when the complex springs from a great primary instinct such as sex, whose plan is laid down in the mind by heredity but whose arising into consciousness is inhibited under certain circumstances by the pressure of a powerful conflicting force such as morality.

the mind. The repressed complex is not destroyed, as is clearly shown by its subsequent vitality. It is not allowed to manifest itself directly in consciousness, it is *dissociated* from the rest of the mind, but may find its expression in indirect, symbolic, and often curiously distorted forms.

Repressed complexes always bear a strong affect of painful tone—otherwise they would not be repressed—sometimes because they relate to inherently painful occurrences, but usually because of the painful conflict to which their presence in the foreconscious gave rise. To the former class belong disgraceful acts of the past, complexes coloured by resentment at ill-treatment, disappointed love, and so on ; to the latter, for instance, sex love for a forbidden person, or anything else which, while not painful in itself, causes painful conflict with other mental complexes and is eventually repressed. In both classes conflict is at the root of the psychic pain involved ; in the former case conflict with an outside force in the first instance, in the latter conflict entirely within the mind. In the result the conflict is always mental, and this it is which originates the psychic pain.

It was noted at the end of the last chapter that the power of repression depends upon the universal faculty of ignoring or forgetting what is unpleasant, and this, in its turn, upon the tendency of psychic energy, as of all energy, to be expended along the line of least resistance—all pain, however slight, involving some friction and resistance. While the complete repression of a strong complex is distinctly a pathological phenomenon and leads to a more or less grave disturbance of the mind's well-being, the forgetting of unpleasant things is a common, indeed an everyday occurrence. A consideration of ordinary cases of forgetfulness leads up to and helps us to understand the facts of repression, and the whole series of cases illustrates the thesis laid down in Chapter I that the phenomena of grave mental disturbance and insanity are merely extreme and unbalanced developments of normal psychical functions.

Professor Freud has collected a number of instances of forgetting unpleasant things in his *Psychopathology of Every-*

day Life. The losing of unpaid bills, the forgetting of the dates and times and even of the existence of appointments to which one is not looking forward with pleasure, and of the names or situations of places with unpleasant associations are common cases, some of which must be within the experience of everyone. A similar forgetting takes place in regard to things in which one has a complete lack of interest. These last are simply dropped out of memory because they have not originally made a sufficiently vivid impression on the mind. No interest is involved in them, scarcely any attention has been given, and they fall into oblivion. This is *passive forgetting*. But when a thing is unpleasant interest tends actually to avoid it, and this is *active forgetting*. The process is generally unconscious or only half conscious. Take the case of a man who forgets the date of his wedding day or of his wife's birthday. Unless he has quite an abnormally bad memory for dates, due to some other and more general cause, or a constitutional dislike of celebrating any domestic anniversary due to some more remote cause, it may be safely concluded that his relations with his wife are not wholly satisfactory. He may be merely indifferent to her, or he may, consciously or unconsciously, generally the latter, wish to avoid being reminded of the anniversary of the event. Certainly he does not feel any lively satisfaction in contemplating it.

The effect on the memory of fluctuations of interest caused by the reaction of the mind to changing external events is prettily illustrated in a case given by Freud.¹ A man was married to a wife who did her duty by him, but in whom he found no charm or intellectual companionship. On one occasion she brought him a book which she had bought because she thought it would interest him. He was touched at the time, but put the book away, and afterwards entirely forgot where he had put it and was quite unable to find it. Some time later the wife occupied herself in nursing his mother, who was ill, and the man was very grateful and experienced a certain flow of affection towards his wife.

¹ *Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens*, p. 62.

On coming into his room he went straight to a drawer, opened it and found the book. This is a case of very active forgetting. Clearly the man normally repressed the complex represented by his relation to his wife because of the unpleasantness involved in his lack of tender feeling for her, and the book, which, because of his wife's motive in buying it, symbolized the relation of tenderness that should have existed between them, was involved in the repression. When the tone of the affect was improved the repression was removed, at least temporarily, and what he had done with the book was recalled.

Another case described by Jung¹ may serve as a typical instance of forgetting associated with a repressed complex. A man was unable to remember the words "mit weisser Decke" (with a white covering) in Heine's poem *Ein Fichtenbaum steht einsam*. When the words were recalled to him, he was asked what were his associations with them. They suggested to him a shroud, a shroud the funeral of the brother of a friend who had been stout and had died of apoplexy, and this the fact that his family, and, finally, he himself, were of the same habit of body and might die in the same way. The mind had shrunk away, as it so often does, from the thought of death, and the words in the poem, which had been taken up into the repressed death-complex, shared the oblivion to which the complex had been consigned.

Closely connected with the forgetting of words, phrases, names of places, etc., are cases of mis-reading, mis-writing, and mis-speaking. We need not try to interpret all such lapses, any more than all forgetting, as psychologically significant.² To many lapses of speech and writing we cannot,

¹ *Psychologie der Dementia Praecox*, p. 64.

² Some modern psychologists hold that every slip of the kind has some psychological significance and that every dream has a psychological interpretation. But this seems unjustified by the evidence and *prima facie* improbable. Psychological causation is, of course, involved in every psychical phenomenon, but it does not follow that repressed libido enters into the chain of causation. The cause of the slip may often be a mere temporary failure of mechanism with no psychological significance.

however, deny psychological meaning, for they bear its marks plainly written upon them. In such cases repressed mental elements either directly connected with words spoken, read or written, or merely suggested by them, force their way into expression, resulting in modifications or alterations of the correct words. A simple case is that of the President of the Austrian Lower House, who announced that the sitting was closed when he should have announced that it was opened, because he expected no good from the sitting and would have liked it to be closed. Another instance is that of an examiner who had been "convinced against his will" by his colleagues that a certain candidate ought to be placed in the second class. When he came to write the class against the name of the candidate his mind "went blank" for a few seconds, and he found that he had written "Class III." Generally speaking, when a repressed idea expresses itself indirectly it is the psychic energy or libido attached to that idea struggling for expression.

Repression varies, of course, very much in degree according to the importance and intensity of the affect attached to what is repressed. In some cases, as we have seen, where the affect is not particularly strong, repression may be completely successful, in the sense that the repressed material troubles the mind no further. In many cases which betray themselves in mis-speaking, for instance, the mind is perfectly conscious of a feeling or thought and merely has to avoid expressing it in speech. The feeling or thought in question may not be at all unpleasant to the mind of the speaker though he knows it would be to his hearers. But if the mental elements never become more than half conscious, there is always a feeling of shame or distaste of some kind attaching to them. It is only vitally important painful complexes with very strong affect which are repressed and dissociated altogether and sink into the unconscious.

In all cases of repression, however, whether slight or profound, and whether the repressed mental content is conscious or unconscious, the effort of the complex to escape from the repression and express itself is the same, and its modes of

expression are indirect and often symbolical, symbolism being a very frequent resort of the mind which has to express itself indirectly.¹ In his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* Freud gives a number of instances of involuntary actions symbolically expressing mental complexes with characteristic affects and conations, actions which appear on the surface as merely instances of clumsiness or absence of mind. Among the simplest of these are those in which an object taken as a symbol of some hated person is destroyed, and among the most remarkable are those in which some valued object is destroyed as a propitiatory sacrifice.

A case of the symbolic expression of repressed mental content may be cited here, in which repression was brought into play before the complex had developed in the fore-conscious. A married man had unconsciously developed a deep love for a girl with whom he was frequently thrown into contact. He could not avoid her altogether without remark, but he unconsciously restricted his personal intercourse with her to a minimum. Sometimes she had occasion to see him in his office on business, and on these occasions, though their business was not in any sense private, he used to get up, shut the door, and stand with his back against it while they talked—evidently symbolizing his unconscious desire for exclusive possession of the beloved object. All this was done quite unconsciously and with no subsequent memory or appreciation of the peculiarity of his behaviour until it was recalled and pointed out to him.

While comparatively mild cases of forgetfulness and repression, such as those which have been cited, are common enough in everyday life, modern psychopathological practice, following the work of Janet and Freud, has revealed abundant cases of strong complexes with powerful affect, which have been repressed altogether, and have become completely unconscious, with results disastrous to the mental health of the patient. Such repression often gives rise to hysteria, which may take the form of a somnambulism or other

¹ The rich and varied symbolism of dreams will be dealt with in the next chapter.

hysterical symptom, or may bring about a more complete rupture of the self, as in cases of double or multiple personality,¹ or even a definite type of insanity.

It is beyond the scope of this book to enter into details or to discuss such distinctively pathological cases, but certain of their general aspects may be noted. In the first place it is clear that the mind uses the same mechanism of repression, and that the repressed elements make the same attempts to rise into consciousness as in the mild cases of forgetting we meet with in everyday life. But when the painful complex is of very intense affect, and is correspondingly strongly repressed, it cannot be kept permanently quiet in the unconscious, and the imprisoned libido, sooner or later, breaks out to the surface with violence, generally as a result of the accidental disturbance of the precarious balance which has been initiated and maintained by the repression. Its expression then either takes the form of some hysterical delusion or somnambulism, or it may lead to an arrangement of the conflicting complexes in mutually exclusive groups, each containing only harmonious complexes, and thus to the organization of a double or multiple personality.

The origin of the psychical pain which gives rise to repression of the painful complex in a certain type of mind depends, as has been said, on the thwarting of one of the great instincts, either through purely external circumstances or through conflict with another instinct of comparable power. The sex instinct provides many of the most striking examples

¹ For a description of a striking instance of dissociation following on the repression of the complex relating to the death of a mother, see Hart's account, quoted from Janet, of the case of Irène (*Psychology of Insanity*, pp. 28-30, 46-48, 99). Morton Prince's *Dissociation of a Personality*, New York, 1906, gives a very full and most fascinating account of one of the most striking cases of multiple personality on record. Unfortunately for a full understanding of this case very little information is given as to the events which led to the origin of the extremely intricate phenomena described, though there can be little doubt from what is said that it was connected with the repression of a painful complex relating to episodes of a sexual nature.

because of the intense psychic energy with which it is endowed, and because the conditions of life in organized communities, with fixed moral codes, frequently lead to the refusal of satisfaction. But the thwarting of the two other great groups of instincts—those connected with the objective self, and those connected with the herd¹—furnish not less important cases.

Sex may be thwarted simply by what we call disappointment in love, a want of response in the object of desire, or it may be thwarted by an effort at satisfaction which is successfully carried to a certain point, but which ultimately fails because it leads to a relation in conflict with the moral sense, or from some other cause. In any of these cases the intense affect of the sex complex becomes of very painful complexion. The repression of sex may show itself in a tendency to avoid or to show lively disgust in the presence of anything relating to it. Excessive prudishness is a frequent symptom. Side by side with this sometimes goes extreme sentimentality and a morbid interest in details relating to the external accessories of the sex relationship: these apparently contradictory manifestations representing the avoidance of the reality on the one hand, and an effort at indirect expression on the other. Instances are so common that many cases must be well known to everyone.

The non-attainment of "success in life" owing to external circumstances or to want of the necessary qualities frequently hampers or spoils the proper growth and development of the ego-complex necessary to mental health, and it may be suspected that the repression of parts of this fundamental complex is responsible for the characteristics of a certain type of "disappointed man." This subject has not, however, received the attention from modern psychologists which its interest and importance seem to deserve, and but little is known concerning it.

Finally, Hart has pointed out that in certain cases of insanity in which the patient loses the gregarious tendency altogether and becomes "slovenly, filthy, degraded and

¹ See Chapter V, p. 65, and Chapter XX.

shameless " it is likely that herd instinct has been repressed.¹ It would be interesting to know the nature of the conflict in such cases as these, in what way, that is, the herd complex has come to acquire a painful affect. The repression of herd instinct seems, indeed, to be responsible for the characteristic mentality of the hermit. On the other hand the repression of that aspect of it which is specialized and consolidated as moral principle may be taken as leading to the very different mentality of a certain type of adventurer or libertine, whose repressed moral impulses occasionally break forth in morbid sentimentalism. This is a type which may be put side by side with that of the ascetic whose repressed sex betrays itself in equally distorted forms.

Painful complexes which are repressed do not necessarily correspond directly with one of the three great instincts referred to above. They may relate to any intensely painful episode in life, though such episodes are always traceable in the last analysis to one of the three universal complexes, which seem to cover between them almost the whole range of intense affective life. For instance, a case in point is that of a man who had embezzled some money and had completely forgotten the fact and the whole of the circumstances connected with it. Following upon " shell shock " he showed symptoms of severe mental disturbance, and his condition did not improve till the buried complex was unearthed.² Here, of course, the original conflict was between a self-regarding impulse and herd instinct.

An interesting class of case which has been conspicuous in the psychopathology of soldiers in the Great War is the repression of fear, the affect corresponding with a primitive instinct of all human beings. Fear is the great inhibitor of action, of dangerous action in the first instance, but when it is developed in great intensity, of all action ; and cowardice,

¹ *Psychology of Insanity*, pp. 169, 170.

² The " shell-shock " in this instance served as the force which upset the equilibrium of the mind and thus destroyed the effectiveness of the repression. The same result might have followed any other sufficient disturbance of equilibrium.

the mental disposition in which fear dominates the mind, is the unforgivable military sin. The fear which often accompanies the preliminaries of going into action is normally held in check by the opposing tendencies till it is sunk in the excitement of action. But just before action the great emotional strain which may be experienced is often due, not to the conflict between fear and the rest of the mind, but to the repression of the realization of fear. As one soldier expressed it :—" When you realize it's just funk, it's all right." If the mind does *not* realize this because of fear of the result if it shows fear, or because of shame at admitting to itself that a soldier can feel fear under such circumstances, the resulting strain is immensely increased and may bring about collapse. It is this refusal to face the reality of fear which has been called " the fear of fear," far more dangerous than fear itself. Repression is always actively dangerous when the repressed mental elements have an immediate practical significance, because the energy used in the sudden repression being diverted from the task in hand, smooth action is impossible, and the stronger the affect involved the more energy is needed for repression.

What, now, is the actual means by which a complex is driven into the unconscious? Judging from the simple cases of forgetting considered at the beginning of this chapter, it would seem to be the complete refusal of attention to any of the elements of the complex, thus cutting it off completely from the life of the mind. This explains the forgetting of mental elements at first sight unconnected with the complex, but which have, in reality, been taken up into it, such as, for instance, the words " mit weisser Decke " in Heine's poem, which were taken up into the death-complex (p. 123) to which attention was completely refused. Many similar cases are recorded.

The process of remembering depends, in the first place, on a sufficiently vivid impressing of the thing remembered upon the mind. When that has once been done the thing remains automatically " in the memory," with its proper associations. It remains normally in the foreconscious,

i.e. it can be recalled by direct stimulation of the element itself, or of any one of its associated elements. But the co-operation of attention is required to bring it into consciousness. So long as full attention is refused the element never becomes fully and vividly conscious, and if attention is completely and systematically refused it never becomes conscious at all, though it is present in the mind all the time. It can then only be recalled when the resistance to giving attention has been broken down.

- The stable and unstable types of mind described in Chapter VIII have very different ways of dealing with mental conflict. The stable-minded man finds outlets for his conflicting instincts by constructing complexes which, with their corresponding conations and actions, are separated by "logic-tight" and "emotion-tight" barriers and are thus able to exist side by side in the same mind without too much inconvenience. The unstable-minded man, on the other hand, cannot do this with any success because his barriers are never secure against the percolation of reason and emotion. He therefore frequently resorts to the drastic method of repression, and this accounts for the frequency of "neurotic" cases among the unstable-minded, the "neurosis" being the result of the repressed mental content which is unable to find an outlet in action, and therefore upsets the proper balance of the mind. There is, of course, a more excellent way of dealing with conflict than either of these. If the mind is flexible, and can *adapt itself to experience* as well as being sensitive to it, if it can *endure* conflict, even involving the most acute and long-continued psychic suffering, until the conflict has fought itself out, then it will eventually attain a harmony and peace which is impossible either to the stable type, with its rigid barriers separating the mind into compartments, or to the **unstable type, with its repressions and neuroses.**

CHAPTER XII

DREAMS

DREAM life occupies a specially important place in modern psychology, because it can be shown that in dreams the mind is freed from some of the limitations which restrict it during waking life. Dreams consequently enable us to supplement our knowledge of the mind derived solely from the waking life, they throw much light on the by-ways of the libido, and give us a much more complete picture of the contents of the mind as a whole. Certain functions of the mind, such as symbolization, the activity of which is restricted in the waking life of the ordinary individual, have, for instance, much freer play in dreams, while in dream life the repressions of waking life are in a certain sense, though by no means wholly, removed.

Professor Freud's work on dreams¹ may justly be considered the foundation of our modern knowledge of the subject. Up to the date of its publication there existed no consistent scientific theory of dreams and their relation to the waking life. The very voluminous literature was strikingly full of inconsistent interpretations and conflicting views, though here and there was a fragment of insight or interpretation which anticipated our modern knowledge.

In conspicuous contrast to the low psychic value attributed to dream life by pre-Freudian philosophical and especially by most "scientific" and medical writers stands the high estimation which dreams have always held in the popular mind. This has found a very large measure of

¹ Freud: *Traumdeutung*, Vienna, 1900, and later editions. Translated as *The Interpretation of Dreams*, by A. A. Brill, London, 1913.

justification—as in the case of so many other popular beliefs—in modern scientific knowledge, though naturally not in the exact form held by the popular mind. From the earliest times the popular mind has believed that dreams are symbolic, and susceptible of interpretation in terms of waking life, and there are two main forms which this interpretation has taken. The first is the interpretation of the dream as a whole without analysis. No rules could be laid down for such interpretation, which was clearly arbitrary and had to be carried out by intuition, and was often a function of the priesthood in the wide sense. The second is what may be called the “code” method, in which each dream picture has a definite significance in terms of waking life. “Dream books,” or dream dictionaries as they may be called, are very old in oriental countries, and western imitations are common enough to-day, having a wide vogue among the uneducated. In popular belief the dream generally has a *prophetic value*—it relates to future happening, not to the past. The significance of this will be discussed in the sequel.

Certain definite and indisputable characters of dream life have long been well known. Prominent among these is dream memory, which has the power of recalling pictures and events that have long dropped out of the waking memory. Another feature is that some of the material of every dream is based on quite recent experience, usually that of the preceding day. A third is the fact that external sense impressions during sleep often actually initiate dreams. Perhaps the best known instance is the initiation of dreams of insufficient clothing by the sensation of cold due to the sleeper having become exposed. Another common case is an external sound, such as the ringing of a bell, the rattle of an alarm clock, etc., being translated in the dream into similar sounds, though with a different significance, which form the culminating point of the dream story, the whole of which must therefore have been dreamed after the sound was first heard. : One of the most striking examples recorded of an external sense stimulus initiating a long dream, to the culmination of which the stimulus corresponded, is Maury's

dream, quoted by Freud, in which the dreamer was summoned to a tribunal during the French Revolution, tried, condemned, led to execution and actually guillotined, feeling the knife sever his head from his body. He then woke to find that the top of the bed had fallen on to the back of his neck. Besides external sensations there can be no doubt that internal organic sensations from different parts of the body, particularly from the sympathetic nervous system, play an important part in the initiation of dreams. Finally, we have what we must for the present call purely endopsychic stimuli, i.e. stimuli originating from the contents of the mind of the sleeper. A general and one of the most obvious characteristics of many dreams is the apparently chaotic and often absurd nature of the dream stories, with their ridiculous concatenations, illogical sequences and preposterous identifications, which give the impression, as many writers have remarked, that the dreaming mind is that of a madman. No consistent and intelligible psychological theory had ever been put forward which would explain these apparent absurdities or introduce order into this seeming chaos.

Such a consistent and intelligible theory Professor Freud enunciated in 1900, and whatever criticisms we may make in regard to certain aspects of it, there can be no doubt that his work was the first real step in the scientific explanation of dreams. Briefly, Professor Freud's theory is that the dream represents the fulfilment of a wish, often of a concealed wish repressed from consciousness during waking life, and expressed in the dream symbolically by a series of dream pictures, thoughts and actions. When the dream is dreamed, and when it is recalled or repeated after awakening, the meaning, in the case of a *repressed* wish, is often quite hidden, and can only be discovered by means of a special technique, which is quite simple in essence, though there are many pitfalls in its application. The dreamer takes each dream picture or action in turn and lets his mind play freely round it, carefully recording every mental association that occurs to him. It is of the greatest im-

portance that he should reject nothing that enters his mind during the process. The criticism or selecting power that the waking mind normally exercises during reflection on any subject must be completely set aside. In the case of strongly repressed mental content, i.e. of thoughts and memories buried in the Freudian unconscious, resistances will be encountered, and these can only be overcome by persistence in the method and by the will to elucidate the dream. This method of determining associations, which is called *psychoanalysis*, is also extensively used by Professor Freud, and by most modern psychiatrists, in the analysis and treatment of certain pathological mental states such as hysteria, and it may be successfully employed, with proper precautions, in bringing to light repressed mental content in general. By the method of psychoanalysis, if the resistances are successfully overcome, it is possible to reconstruct the meaning or latent content of a dream, as distinct from the manifest content or dream story itself.

Not all dreams, according to Professor Freud, are the expressions of *repressed* wishes. Children, for instance, who do not normally repress their desires during waking life, often dream that their overt wishes are fulfilled; and the same thing may happen to grown people. But in the case of grown people, a large proportion of whose wishes, and those, too, which have taken a deep and strong hold on their minds, have perforce to remain not only unrealized, but unexpressed, dreams are very frequently indeed the highly symbolized expression of wishes which are more or less repressed or kept under during waking life. As we saw in the last chapter there are all degrees of repression, from the extremest form, in which the repressed mental content is completely unconscious and cannot be brought to consciousness in the normal manner, to the slightest form in which the mind is perfectly conscious of the content in question and is merely somewhat unwilling to direct attention towards it. It is certainly possible for any "wish," whether overt and conscious or more or less repressed, to become the subject of a dream.

We need not enter here into a criticism or discussion of Professor Freud's often very skilful and ingenious attempts to show that all dreams are really the expression of unfulfilled wishes as fulfilled, no matter how unplausible such an interpretation may appear on the surface. But we must express the view that the Freudian theory is conceived on too narrow lines. The study of dreams by modern methods is still quite young and there is yet much to be learned about them. It seems certain, in the first place, that many dreams are mere mental fragments, just as are many waking thoughts ; and this is no cause for surprise if we grant, as we must grant, that the activity of the dreaming mind does not *essentially* differ from that of the waking mind, though certain mental processes, such, for instance, as reasoning, are largely suspended, and others are proportionately enhanced. In sleep, as in the semi-conscious (" hypnagogic ") condition that precedes sleep, we may, for instance, seem to continue some strenuous and long continued pursuit that has occupied us during the day, especially if it is of a mechanical routine nature. This is the simplest of all forms of dreaming, if, indeed, it is worthy of the name. Again, we may see dream pictures which are clearly more or less altered representations of things we have seen in the day, unaccompanied by emotion or action. In other cases we may dream snatches of stories—situations or actions—which are again clearly fragmentary and do not form wholes capable of complete interpretation, though they may sometimes be partially interpreted. In general, many dreams are fragmentary representations derived more or less directly from waking life, and it does not seem possible in the present state of knowledge and with the technique at our disposal to follow all the vagaries of the dreaming any more than of the waking mind in the reproduction of such fragments.

But when we come to consider dreams which are more or less complete and rounded wholes, we must admit that the Freudian method of interpretation is very often quite valid and its results quite convincing. It does not seem, however, to be true that all such dreams are the expressions

of wishes, whether repressed or unrepressed. We saw in Chapter V that all complexes are tinged with affect or emotion of some kind, however slight. A complex may be represented in a dream, usually in a more or less symbolized form, if one or more of its constituents have been aroused in the mind during the preceding day, because of the influence of the affect on the dreaming mind; but it is not by any means always true that the representation takes the form of a realized wish relating to the complex. The cause of so many dreams representing "wishes" as fulfilled is that the typical mental process, as we saw in Chapter III, results in a conation, i.e. the mental striving to *do* something, to find some issue from the given mental situation. Every complex has an appropriate conation, or set of conations, in which the mind strives to find an issue, be it a simple issue from a simple situation, or be it an issue from a tangled plexus of thoughts and emotions as conditioned by external circumstances; and this issue is identifiable with the Freudian "wish." In dreams the conation is very commonly shown completed in action, i.e. the unrealized or unrealizable "wish" of waking life is realized in the dream. But this is not necessarily the case. The dreaming mind may be occupied with the complex without formulating a way out of the situation. An example or two will make the discussion clear.

A lady dreamed that she was in bed and had put on an extra blanket because she was cold. Touching the blanket with her hands she felt grubs upon it, and realized they were the grubs of the clothes moth. They smashed and felt slimy in her hand, and she had the sensation of deep disgust.

The associations of this dream were two. In the afternoon the dreamer had been harvesting potatoes in the garden and had lifted some which were infested with millipedes and occasional slugs—this experience made no noticeable emotional impression. The same evening the dreamer had wanted to put an extra blanket on her daughter's bed. She had gone to a drawer and had taken one which had come

from another house without being washed. She decided, however, not to use it because she knew that that house had not been well looked after, and she slightly disliked the idea of putting a blanket from such a house on a bed before the blanket had been washed.

The dream structure is clearly a synthesis of these two experiences. The underlying motive is the dreamer's strong dislike of vermin closely associated with the human body. The strong visual image of the vermin on the potatoes is transferred by means of the blanket episode to the association of vermin with blankets and beds, which carries the emotion of disgust felt in the dream. There was no conscious thought of clothes moth grubs or any other vermin on the blanket she had intended to put on her daughter's bed, but there was no doubt a subconscious association of the sort.

This interpretation seems both satisfactory and exhaustive, and there is no trace of the fulfilment of a wish. No way out of the situation reveals itself in the dream, which is simply an expression of the house-bed-vermin complex with its associated affect of disgust. Many dreams are of this nature, but many others include the representation of a conation realized in action. An example is the dream of a girl of thirteen, in which, with two companions, she was walking along a road near her home, when they came to a tramp scrubbing his horse with soap and water. They thought he was being cruel to it, and the dreamer remonstrated with him. The tramp scowled, and they were frightened and went away. The dreamer then took a book out of the hedge, as it might have been from a bookcase, opened the book (she was now alone) and saw in it a beautifully coloured picture of two young men standing side by side. They were finely dressed like Elizabethans, with long pointed collars and no head coverings. Suddenly the scene in the picture was real, the young men were standing before the dreamer, who was a boy, dressed in the same way but very untidily, "everything," as she said, "was undone." She thought of herself as a poor person, while the young men were

great people and were being very kind to her. They were then all three on a bare heath in a red tent or pavilion with gold hangings belonging to the young men, and the dreamer was kneeling before them. She knew in her dream that this scene was also reproduced from a picture in the dream book, which she had taken out of the hedge. The dreamer offered the young men some of her lunch, a coarse biscuit such as she eats at school, but they refused it, having dainty biscuits of their own. She had the impression that, though kind, they were rather bored with her. The actors in the dream then changed. The rest was occupied with the terror motive again in another form.

The tramp suggested a picture of Haselden's in the *Daily Mirror*, which the dreamer had looked at on the top of an omnibus in the company of her grandfather some time before. She remembered feeling very sick when looking at the picture. The tramp scrubbing the horse suggested her grandfather's man grooming a horse she knew very well: also (especially the scrubbing brush and the soap and water) a picture at a cinema show (seen in the company of her grandfather) of elephants at the Indian Durbar being washed. The tramp also suggested a farmer in a story who was cruel to animals and again a picture in another book by the same author of a man who had just struck a boy. The book she took from the hedge suggested that she would much like to have a book of her own with beautiful pictures like the one in the dream. The two young men suggested Palamon and Arcite in Chaucer's *Knight's Tale*, which she had just been reading. Their costume, she thought, must have been taken from pictures of Elizabethans she had seen. Her own dress as a boy was evidently suggested by the fact that she always plays a boy at school when they act; it also suggested a girl dressing up as a page. The red pavilion was taken similarly from pictures and descriptions of the tents of knights, especially of the Field of the Cloth of Gold. Her relation of humility to the young men suggested Thackeray's *Esmond*, which she had recently read.

It is noteworthy that nearly the whole of the dream

material is taken from pictures—the first set from a series connected together by her grandfather, who serves as the associative link between them, the second determined by her love for romantic mediæval scenes from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, the period the dreamer likes best to read about in connexion with such scenes.

The motive of the dream is clearly fear and the seeking of protection, the tramp symbolizing the source of fear and the young men the source of protection. The feminine sex impulse of submission and protection-seeking is clearly apparent in the dreamer's relation to the young men. Here a conation is certainly involved. With Freud we might speak of a realized wish, though the dream motive, so far as could be told, had no relation to any concrete facts of the dreamer's actual life, but rather to imagined scenes suggested by pictures and literature, and the conation itself is somewhat halting and ineffective. The pictorial and affective elements are the dominant ones, and both have the remoteness from life characteristic of day dreaming. It is to be noted that the determination of associations, though it reveals very fully the sources of the dream material, does not help with the understanding of the dream motive, which is, in a general way, clear from the mere narration of the story.¹ Many of the dreams of children have similar characteristics: they are rearranged representations of actual scenes derived from life or from stories, more or less charged with affect, and may or may not include conative elements.

Maurice Nicoll² writes of the welling up of the libido from what we have called the primary unconscious and its use in dreams of pictures derived from the waking life to embody and symbolize its vague strivings to fulfil the destiny of the individual, and Jung emphasizes the effort of the libido in dreams to find a way out of a given situation, a

¹ It is obvious that the associations determined for this dream are quite superficial, and it may be that a more thorough application of psychoanalysis, which in the circumstances was impossible, would have revealed a deeper interpretation.

² *Dream Psychology*, London, 1917.

solution of a given life puzzle. Both of these activities as well as Freud's "wish," are essentially conations. These characteristics of the dream activity of the libido account, as Jung points out, for the prophetic value attributed to dreams by the popular mind. The *material* of dreams is taken from the past, their psychological *meaning* often points to the future. The dreamer may actually realize in waking life the solution of his problem indicated in the dream. If the solution be a good one, the dream was heaven-sent, according to the popular classification; if it leads to disaster, the powers of darkness are responsible. Similarly, a dream may be a "warning" to avoid a certain course of action which is shown symbolically in the dream to lead to disaster. The dreamer's unconscious mental processes have arranged material relating to the proposed future action to indicate disaster as the outcome, because he has unconsciously feared that this is likely. The seer, priest, or oracle, deeply experienced in the ways of the human mind, though on a purely empirical basis, interprets the dream in a corresponding sense. While we must, of course, remember that the opportunities for mistake as well as for chicanery and charlatanism are manifold, yet in the light of our clearer modern knowledge as to the working of the mind in dreams we cannot refuse to admit the underlying basis of reality in such divination. .

Interpretation of the dream as a whole, as an allegory relating to future events is, as we have already remarked, necessarily intuitive and uncertain. The occurrences of the dream may have a wrong significance attached to them and the interpreter go wholly astray. In psychoanalysis another method is followed, that of determining all possible associations of each dream picture or occurrence, taken separately, in order to find out from what it actually sprang. When this has been successfully carried out, the meaning of the dream may become clear at once because the relations between the mental elements indicated are known. The significance of the whole often flashes into the mind with startling suddenness and convincing vividness. Freud

points out that psychoanalysis has something in common, in so far as the pictures and events in the dream are interpreted one by one, with the popular method of interpreting dreams crystallized in "dream books," where each picture or occurrence has a fixed symbolic meaning. In fact the symbols used in dreams have no fixed meaning. The same thing may be symbolized in a dozen different ways by different dreamers according to their experience and temperament and the circumstances of the dream. For instance, in the writer's experience, the conception of "the herd" (see Chapters V and XX), or rather of its expression as hostile public opinion, has been symbolized in dreams by two different people, in the one case by a crowd of armed savages on the warpath, in the other by an angry town mob. But it is true that certain symbols constantly recur in dreams with the same significance; for instance, failure to catch a train, and having to sit for an examination, repeatedly symbolize respectively the fear of missing altogether something of supreme importance, and the necessity of facing some ordeal which the dreamer fears he will not successfully pass through. And Freud, as well as other writers, quote a number of material symbols which, we cannot doubt, repeatedly signify, within their experience, the same material things. The natural recurrence of particular symbols for particular things among dreamers with a fairly uniform experience and fairly uniform habits of mind is no doubt the basis of the dream-book codes, which have been given a rigid uniformity as a result of the human tendency to adopt precise formulæ and believe they are of universal application.

We are compelled, then, to replace Freud's "wish theory" of dreams by a broader statement. A dream is a more or less altered reproduction of psychic material at least partly derived from recent experience, sometimes very fragmentary and difficult to explain causally, but often representing a complex carrying a marked affect. The expression of this affect by the sleeping mind may be the sole motive of the dream, but conative elements are very often present,

and the dream may show the conation realized in action. When this corresponds with a waking "wish" of the dreamer, whether fully conscious or more or less repressed, we have the very common case which Freud would regard as universal. Where the wish is repressed, denied full access to consciousness, the dream is generally highly symbolic, the dream pictures having little or no obvious relation to the dream motive, which is unsuspected; and the relation must be elucidated by psychoanalysis of the individual dream constituents, the dream motive being automatically revealed when the process is complete.

The most scientifically valuable part of Freud's work on dreams is his very full elucidation of what he calls the "dream work," i.e. the methods employed by the dreaming mind in constructing the dream pictures and the dream story. The dream work is most elaborate and results in the most complete transformation of the psychic material employed, so that the result is superficially unrecognizable as having any relation to the real motive, when that motive is most completely repressed in waking life. This transformation Freud attributes to what he calls the dream "censor,"¹ which only allows of the expression in the dream of thoughts repressed during waking life, provided they are clothed in symbolic form so as to be unrecognized.

A simple instance of an emotion often strongly repressed and highly symbolized is fear. In the course of a long dream a child dreamed she was in the company of a friend near the steep bank of a stream on which was an overhanging tree, with a railway line on the other side of the stream. She ran to the stream to see a train pass, slipped on the steep bank and clutched at the tree to keep herself from falling. Then she and her friend were entering a big building near the stream which turned out to be their gymnasium. The dreamer was in front, and looking back over her shoulder to talk to her friend stumbled down the steps.

¹ The action of the "censor" is the inhibiting action of one "psychic instance" upon another; for example, that of the moral sense upon some forbidden desire, or of shame upon fear.

The stream suggested a brook with a bridge over it near her home, on the other side of which is a railway line, but out of sight. The railway line in the dream suggested a railway at a village where she had once stayed with some friends, and here there is also a brook and a bridge. The clutching at the tree to keep herself from falling suggested that at the village one of the friends with whom she was staying had said it was dangerous to go too near a passing train as one was likely to be attracted by it and fall under it. It was then suggested to the dreamer that she was really frightened by what her friend had said about the train. This the dreamer indignantly denied, at the same time blushing vividly, and on the suggestion being pressed she became very angry and ran up to her bedroom, locked the door and cried. She afterwards admitted that she *had* felt frightened at the bottom, but had been ashamed of the feeling because her reason told her that she ought not to be frightened by such a thing. On being questioned as to the closely following dream event of stumbling on the steps of the gymnasium the dreamer admitted that at a recent gymnastic demonstration she had got out of step and been distressed while marching into the gymnasium, and that on other occasions she had momentarily feared beforehand that she would not do her gymnastics well. Stumbling is a very well-known sign of fear. It results from the nervous inhibition which is the physical expression of fear, and it often accompanies the preliminaries of an action in regard to which there is repressed or half-repressed fear or anxiety. This, as Freud points out, is probably the meaning of the old belief that it is a bad omen to stumble when setting out on an enterprise. The stumble may, it is true, be purely accidental, but it may be due to nervous inhibition leading to clumsiness and resulting from the fact that the person, whether from fear or any other cause, is not wholly and single-mindedly set upon the object of the enterprise. In the case of this dream it is the symbolic expression of the fear inspired by the idea of falling under the train, which is concealed as the fear of falling down the bank, resulting in

clutching at the tree. Apparently this fear immediately brought another fear recently experienced into the mind of the dreamer, and she saw herself entering the gymnasium and again stumbling, this time "explained" by the fact that she was at the time talking over her shoulder. The intensity of the fear and of the repression, much greater in the first instance than in the second, is evidenced by the dreamer's sudden anger when the suggestion of fear was made to her. To meet the objection that anyone would naturally be angry at an accusation of fear it may be mentioned that this dreamer does not ordinarily resent the imputation of fear, but takes it quite objectively and dispassionately.

In none of the dreams described above, however, is the symbolism very remote from the things symbolized. The more extreme forms of symbolism are met with in the dreams of adults when the affects are very deep and very strongly repressed as the result of conflict. Very many such dreams are concerned with sexual relations, and a great number are recorded in Freud's book, and in other works. A good example of such symbolism is contained in the dream of a man who dreamed that, armed with a rifle, he was alone in a sub-tropical country, separated from his friends and surrounded by a tribe of savages armed with spears and shields, who, however, remained quite passive. Psychoanalysis showed that he knew in the depths of his mind that he was in conflict with the public opinion of his fellows, which separated him from his beloved, and that while he thought much more highly of his own mental equipment (symbolized by the rifle) than of that of the "herd man" (symbolized by the spears) who typifies public opinion, he was quite aware that he was powerless against them on account of their numbers and unanimity. The savages did not actively threaten him—they merely surrounded him: there was no overt conflict with public opinion—only a potential one. He was in no danger where he was, provided he remained there.

It is one of the commonest characteristics of dream pictures that any one of them generally gives manifold

associations, or, in other words, many remembered images are *condensed* in one dream picture, e.g. the tramp scrubbing the horse in the fear-protection dream recorded above. The result is a symbol (in that dream of the source of fear) which in the case of a dream motive strongly repressed in waking life has to pass the dream censor, and can only do so by being something of very different nature from the thing symbolized. If that condition is satisfied, however, the replacement of one material object by another is a straightforward operation. The dream motive, as Freud insists, must be capable of representation by a series of pictures derived from experience, and where the dream motive is a mental situation the work of translation into pictorial symbols is often subtle. It becomes, in fact, closely akin to the work of a poet. The imaginative poet can only work with images based on his experience, and any one of his images is probably based on many experiences, but its significance in the poem is something quite different from the experiences themselves. The more subtly true the symbolism the higher the work of the poet and of the dream artist. The man with a rifle surrounded by savages and unable to break through them is a true poetic symbol of the man in conflict with the herd, which separates him from the object of desire. In this dream the actual origin of the symbols was quite indirect, though clear, and depended much more on chains of association than on recent sense impressions. If the thought had to be represented in a dream because of the power of the affect, the dream artist was forced in this dream to go far for material fit to represent it.

The affect in dreams commonly corresponds in quality with the affect of the dream thought, but is often, as Freud remarks, much diminished in strength. This he suggests, with much probability, is due to the conflict which is responsible for repression, the opposition of two impulses causing the cancelling out, so to speak, of much of the positive affect. For instance, if fear is repressed owing to shame at the feeling, the fear will be present in the dream, but of much weaker intensity than the real fear.

To summarize this brief account of the work of the dreaming mind, we have seen that dreams reproduce complexes and their affects from the waking life. They use all sorts of material in the way of experience as the basis of the dream pictures, but this material is all connected by mental associations directly or indirectly with the complex embodied in the dream. When the complex is the subject of conflict in the mind, and is therefore more or less repressed, the dream material is modified in such a way that its direct relation to the complex is obscured and the complex itself can only be recognized by psychoanalytic treatment of the individual dream pictures. In this way the pictures become symbols and the dream an allegory, in which the affect is all that remains comparatively unaltered of the original complex reproduced in the dream. The symbolism employed is often the symbolism of mythology, of folk-lore, or even of "slang"—essentially the symbolism of the popular mind. In reproductions of mental situations in the dream pictures it is strictly analogous to the symbolizing work of the imaginative poet.

Dreams, then, give us important insight, both into mental content and into mental processes. They throw light on the unconscious and half-conscious contents of the mind because they are able to express, owing to release from the *conscious* inhibition of the waking state, what cannot be expressed in waking life. But they cannot attain to perfect freedom of expression because the dreaming mind itself has to work under the conditions imposed by the "dream censor," which is simply another name for the psychic instances that inhibit the free expression of the libido in dreaming, as they do in waking life. In this way the work of the dreaming mind illustrates very beautifully the methods employed by the libido to express itself when it is forced to indirect mental expression.

CHAPTER XIII

MIND WANDERING, DAY-DREAMING, AND CRYSTAL GAZING

WHEN we are engaged in any occupation to which we are attending with full mental control, the objects of cognition involved successively come into the focus of consciousness in the order we desire—in other words, our “conscious stream” is directed entirely with reference to the occupation. But we are all familiar with the condition in which this desirable state of things is not maintained throughout the occupation, in which the mind “wanders” from the subject on which it is engaged. This loss of control may happen in one of three ways. In the first case external sensory impressions may distract our attention, and the necessary concentration on the subject may be lost. The barking of a dog, the sound of a piano in a neighbouring room—a hundred sensations unrelated to the occupation—may obtrude themselves on consciousness and impair or destroy attention to the subject in hand. Where no interest is involved in the interruptions, this type of distraction is, however, the easiest to combat, unless indeed the sensory impressions are exceedingly violent. In the second case the distraction may occur by the mind following up side lines of association which branch off from the main thread which it is our object to maintain. For instance, if we are reading a serious book, words or phrases used by the author may serve as starting-points for chains^of associations not involved in the author’s argument. Especially if greater interest attaches to these side lines it is difficult to prevent consciousness from wandering down them, and it often has

to be brought back with a jerk to the main track. In original or quasi-original thinking the exploration of side lines is often exceedingly useful or even essential to progress, but that is rather a different case, for there is often no sharply defined "main track" to which our purpose is confined. In the third case some distinct complex, to which greater interest attaches than to the thread of our occupation, intrudes upon consciousness, owing to an external sensation, to a chance mental association, or to some endopsychic process which we cannot identify, and the mind becomes entirely occupied with that complex to the exclusion of our proper occupation.

When the mind is unoccupied by definite purposeful attention, it is given over to this kind of wandering, directed sometimes by sense impressions, sometimes by complexes. This is the state commonly known as a "reverie" or "brown study," and depends on what Bleuler¹ called "autistic" thinking, which we may oppose to "realistic" thinking, which is directed by purposes rooted in reality. "Autistic" thinking, which may also be called "affective" thinking, though neither term is quite satisfactory, is of the same type that we became acquainted with in the last chapter as characteristic of the dreaming mind. It is also a necessary part of the mental activity of the artist, and is carried to a length in which the mind becomes quite divorced from reality in types of insanity such as paranoia and dementia præcox, where affective complexes from the unconscious continuously dominate the mind. In the normal waking mind it finds its completest expression in day-dreaming, the subject of the day dream being often remote from reality, though elements of reality may be interwoven with it, and the mind, unlike that of the paranoiac or dement, is always able to distinguish clearly between thought related to reality and purely fantastic thought.

Dr. Varendonck has recently published the results of several years' study of his own mind wandering and day-

¹ Bleuler, "Das autistische Denken," *Jahrb. f. psychoanalyt. u. psychopath. Forschungen*, 1912.

dreaming thought processes.¹ The mental processes which occupied his attention were, on the one hand, those originating while reading, when the mind is distracted from the thread of the author's argument by a word or phrase which sets up an independent train of thought in the reader's mind, and on the other the fantasies which arise, most generally in bed, as soon as deliberately controlled thinking is abandoned in preparation for sleep, and also in the morning during waking before full consciousness is attained. He found that these two types of mind wandering were essentially of the same nature, though the former is initiated by a read word or phrase, the latter often by an external sense impression which is immediately associated with a thought or occurrence of the day just ended, or with some more remote recollection. In both cases a memory trace in the foreconscious is aroused, and this memory trace is *emotionally emphasized*, or, as we should say, belongs to an emotionally toned complex.

When the fantasy has once started, it may be carried on almost wholly by means of connected visual pictures, even when the person concerned is not of the visual type,² thus recalling dream thinking; but it may, on the other hand, consist almost wholly of "verbal" thinking, with occasional visual pictures like the illustrations of a book. There are all degrees of variation between the preponderance of pictures and the preponderance of "verbal" thinking. Such a combination may be compared with a cinematographic film, in which the story is told in pictures connected by verbal explanations of the transitions between them.

When the day-dream is carried out mainly or wholly by means of visual pictures, it is close to the thought activity of a dream; but when it consists mainly of verbal thinking, it is close to the method of directed thinking which has been evolved through spoken language with the help of

¹ J. Varendonck, *The Psychology of Day-Dreams*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1921.

² The "visual type" of mind is one which tends to think in visual images or pictures.

consciousness and the sense of reality, and which depends essentially on concepts and the words which are their symbols. It differs from this, of course, because it is directed by an affectively toned complex rather than by a conscious purpose.

The day-dream may have a single theme, or it may consist of successive themes connected by transitions. In the latter case Dr. Varendonck found that the change from one theme to the next was marked by the occurrence of a vivid memory picture which occupied the mind and stopped the concatenation. This was often succeeded by other memory pictures reproduced in the original sequence in which they had occurred—a process he calls “memory drifting.” Some element in the last of these memory pictures then starts a fresh concatenation of thoughts, either on the original theme or on some other quite distinct theme, till this is again interrupted by the occurrence of a new vivid memory picture. Sometimes the concatenation may be stopped, not by pictures, but by a series of verbal recollections, but this only occurs if the motive of the original theme is relatively weak. Varendonck found that the course of his day-dreams could be represented by a series of questions and answers, or hypotheses and rejoinders, a series of attempts, as it were, to find the solution of the problem with which his day-dreaming mind was engaged.

In some cases, at least, the whole fantasy is directed, as in the typical Freudian dream, to the fulfilment of a wish. Such a fantasy may be divided into sections, each break or change to a new section corresponding with a doubt or rejection of the efficacy of the preceding effort at fulfilment, and the beginning of a new effort, the whole series being directed by the dominant conation. The pictures in such a fantasy differ from the memory pictures referred to above as interrupting the chains of association, in that they are new creations, active and essential parts of the concatenation, though formed, of course, with the help of memory elements, and the day-dreamer realizes himself as an active agent in the drama, in contrast with

his passivity as a spectator in the pure memory pictures. But even here the constructed pictures may lead to a certain deflection of the current of constructive ideas, though the new direction taken is only another expression of the main motive. Sometimes the new direction is a reversion to an association chain which had been previously developed.

The type of construction of these day-dreams shows, as Dr. Varendonck points out, a strong resemblance to the speeches of an ill-educated orator, whose discourse is constantly changing its direction, and often reverts to points already dealt with, owing to chance associations starting fresh or previously exploited chains of ideas. The conversation of discursive talkers is governed by the same mechanism. They constantly abandon one topic for another without logical transition, as chance stimuli, external or internal, start their minds on fresh chains of association. They often express their half-conscious realization of the lack of connexion and apologize, so to speak, for their discursiveness by introducing each new chain with a "By the way. . . ." The classical example of this tendency is Miss Bates in Jane Austen's *Emma*. Her conversation also exemplifies memory drifting in an extreme form. But she, unlike the day-dreamer, remorselessly expresses her memory drifting in a flood of words.

The day-dream is terminated at a moment of passivity corresponding with the occupation of the mind by a recollection or memory picture, sometimes as the result of an affect which connects with well-established consciously directed processes, sometimes as the result of a sense stimulus which brings the mind back to the external world.

Dr. Varendonck is the pioneer in a field of investigation which is of great importance to the New Psychology, because it connects the deep-lying mental processes of the dream proper with the directed consciousness of waking life.¹ In the second half of his book he calls attention to

¹ Apparently for this reason Dr. Varendonck calls the mental processes of day-dreaming "foreconscious thinking," but, as Professor

the advantages and disadvantages of freely wandering as opposed to consciously directed thinking. Its first great advantage is that it works without the friction and strain involved in conscious attention, and thus the whole available psychic energy can be employed—none of it is used up in inhibitions. Further, in the absence of these inhibitions, it has much fuller access to memory than has consciously directed thinking. Its disadvantage, on the other hand, is that it is entirely uncritical, it cannot pause in its course to correct errors: it lacks the power, which consciously directed thinking gives us, to adhere closely to the requirements of reality. If it is to serve conscious purpose, its results must be subjected to conscious criticism in the waking state.

This is what actually happens in constructive scientific thinking. The new idea is arrived at by allowing the mind to wander freely round the points of the problem to be solved. Success in arriving at the new idea is signaled by the emergence of an affect of jubilation which stops the wandering process and brings the mind back to the fully conscious state. The idea thus brought into the searchlight of consciousness must then be consciously criticized, related to all the relevant knowledge available to consciousness. After all, it may have to be rejected as out of harmony with established relevant knowledge. But sometimes it represents an actual valid new discovery. This is the mechanism of all "inspiration," and it is seen, of course, not only in scientific thought, but, very conspicuously, in all artistic creation. Very often the mind is not consciously set to wander in search of inspiration, but wanders of its own accord round the points of the problem to be solved—the explanation of freshly revealed phenomena, the right means of expression of a freshly

Freud points out in the Preface he contributes to Dr. Varendonck's book, the essential characteristic of the type of thinking in question (Bleuler's "autistic" thinking) is not its relation to the foreconscious, but the fact that it is fantastic, "freely wandering," and not the result of conscious direction.

conceived æsthetic idea. And this voyage of discovery may be pursued in the daytime, unconsciously during sleep, or in the semiconscious condition preceding or following sleep. It is in this last condition that a successful result of the search very commonly rises to the surface and emerges into the arena of consciousness—in other words, “bright ideas” often occur in bed in the morning.

Before closing this chapter brief mention may be made of the phenomena of crystal gazing, or the parallel technique of looking fixedly into an illuminated bowl of water. This technique serves the double purpose of bringing the mind into the “hypnoid” semi-conscious condition, closely similar to the condition preceding or following sleep studied by Varendonck, and of providing a clear brilliant field for hallucinatory visual images. Silberer showed, several years ago,¹ that the visions obtained in the case he investigated were symbolizations from the unconscious, somewhat similar to dream pictures, except that at first they resembled single fixed lantern slides rather than the cinematographic film of a dream. The images so represented were type symbols which frequently recurred in successive experiments with the same subject. At first, as has been said, they were fixed and immobile, with intervals in which the field was blank between successive images. Later on in the experiments, however, the blank intervals tended to diminish and disappear, and the images moved and changed, developing a connexion with one another, thus approximating to the typical dream story.

The lecanoscopic² images, like dream images, revealed their symbolic character on psychoanalysis, and a considerable knowledge of the repressed mental content of the experimental subject was thus obtained, with good therapeutic results. It is probable that all genuine images

¹ H. Silberer, “Lekanomantische Versuche,” *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. II, 1912, and “Zur Charakteristik des lekanomantischen Schauens,” *ibid.*, Bd. III, 1912.

² Gk. λεκάνη, a bowl.

obtained by crystal gazing and lecanoscopy are similarly derived by symbolization from unconscious mental content. Though obtained in a hypnoid condition, they are clearly much closer to symbolic dream images than to those of day-dreams, which are for the most part much less symbolic and closer to the memory pictures of reality.

CHAPTER XIV

PROJECTION AND IDEALISM

THE importance and universality of the processes by which the mind seeks, more or less successfully, to escape from the discomforting realization of its own weakness and from the conflicts engendered by opposed instincts, as well as from the disharmony of a chaotic world, have been abundantly illustrated in the preceding chapters. There is, however, one process which we have not yet considered, and which plays an extremely important part—perhaps the most important part of all—in the universal effort to arrive at mental harmony. This process is known as *projection*, and consists in attributing parts of the mental content to outside entities. In projection, as in repression, the mind refuses to acknowledge part of its own contents, but instead of refusing attention to the existence of the content in question, it recognizes the existence, while denying the ownership. The ownership of the content in question is too painful or too sublime to be compassed within the limits of its weakness, and an external substitute is sought, whether as scapegoat or support.

More or less simple cases of projection are very familiar to psychiatrists, and a number of these are cited by Hart in his *Psychology of Insanity* (Chapter IX). "People who possess some fault or deficiency of which they are ashamed are notoriously intolerant of the same fault in others." In blaming these others they are indirectly blaming themselves, and thus betray an effort on the part of their unconscious to compensate for their own sins. In cases of insanity based on projection, this attribution to others of the patient's

own complex rises to the status of a persistent delusion. Thus a chronic alcoholic will invent a story of the ruin of his life by his wife's habitual drunkenness; a middle-aged or elderly unmarried lady who is suffering from repressed sex instinct will attribute to some perfectly innocent man a sexual passion for her, or perhaps the intention of forcibly abducting her.

Closely allied to such cases of projection are those of *identification*, in which our own desires are projected upon occurrences in real life or in fiction, and our own personality temporarily identified with one of the actors in these occurrences. Most of us have at some time of our lives identified ourselves in imagination with the performer of some heroic action which we ourselves would have liked to perform, or have dreamed that we ourselves in another shape were experiencing some pleasure unconsciously desired but unattainable. Day-dreaming, especially in adolescence, very constantly takes this form. A common pathological case is that of the sexual hysteric who projects her own desire upon some case of outrage about which she has read in the newspapers, and deludes herself into the belief that it was she who suffered, the moral obloquy involved in even an imaginary illicit gratification of the desire being covered by the representation of herself as an involuntary victim of outrage. Another instance is that of the man who falsely accuses himself of having committed a murder which has actually occurred, but with which he has no connexion whatever. He is unconsciously impelled to an act of violence, but is incapable of carrying his desire into execution, whether from fear or from moral restraint or from both together. His identification of himself with the alien murderer to some extent satisfies his unfulfilled desire. All these cases are unconscious efforts on the part of the libido to obtain an illusory mental gratification, because the normal gratification springing from action is denied.

A very common form of projection is *idealization*, in which the mind projects an ideal of personality upon some real person—hero or beloved. The suggestion is generally

taken from the actual person, and upon this, often the slenderest, foundation the ideal is constructed and its features attributed to the living individual. The elements of the construction are of course furnished from the idealizer's own mind, and the whole represents a picture of what he admires. The case of the lover, who falls in love, not with a real woman, but with his ideal woman whose image he has put in the place of the living personality, is well enough known. Sometimes he goes through life contentedly in love with his ideal, which he still mistakes for a real person, but the shock of intimate contact with the real person whom he has thus idealized often shatters his illusion. For the same reason we should beware of close personal intimacy with our heroes if we would preserve our ideals of them.

The tendency to projection arising from the mind's need of harmony, of internal harmony or self-consistency, and of harmony with the external world, is, however, of universal occurrence. It is impossible to over-emphasize the overmastering desire of the human mind for some kind of unification—for having a single consistent or seemingly consistent scheme which appears to include and reconcile contradictory things. The mind is aware of internal discord arising in reality from the co-existence within it of conflicting instincts, of instincts giving rise to mutually incompatible conations, and also of external barriers to their satisfaction. The strong sense of unity of the self arising from the firm bonds of the ego-complex (Chapter XIX) prevents the immediate recognition of the separateness and necessarily conflicting nature of these instincts, and unity is projected also upon the external world because it is necessarily seen as a whole through the eyes of the individual. The attempts at unification represented by systems of philosophy have their psychological cause in this necessity of the human mind, and so has the belief in a moral order of the universe.

In a primitive state of culture man projects parts of his own personality upon the forces of nature and thus personifies and often deifies them. He does not understand the nature of these forces, which sometimes work to his

advantage, and sometimes to his disadvantage, and he attributes to them the only nature of which he has direct first-hand knowledge, the nature of the human will and the human passions. Thus he creates gods in his own image. A particularly strong power with an obvious individuality, which concerns most intimately his everyday life, is his tribe, and this he personifies as the tribal god, which he may project upon the image of an idol or of an invisible spirit. His personal freedom is so limited, he is so completely under the domination of the tribal rules of conduct, that it is not surprising should he not be quick to assume complete personal responsibility for his actions, good or bad. When his actions, prompted by egoistic impulses, which he may attribute to the influence of a demon or evil spirit, come into conflict with the commands of the tribal or herd god, he recognizes that he has "sinned," and accepts punishment as his due, because of his intense realization of the predominant claim of the herd. Thus he explains to himself the conflict within himself, by projecting one or both sets of impulses upon external personalities.

At a later stage of development the process of projection is gradually simplified, in accordance with the persistent need of unification, and finally crystallized into a dualism, a personification of good and evil, of what is beneficial or harmful to the human race, and instead of polytheism we have the antithesis of God and the Devil.

God inspires the human being with good impulses, the Devil tempts him to sin; the internal conflict is represented in the mind as secondary, as caused from without, and direct personal responsibility is escaped. Here we have exactly the same mechanism, set at work from the same motive, as in the simple cases of projection discussed at the beginning of the chapter. With the weakening of the originally irresistible pressure of the social code, with the increase of personal freedom and autonomy, the moralists felt, however, that personal responsibility must not be entirely disclaimed, or the most powerful motive to right

action would be destroyed. Hence arose the doctrine of the possibility of co-operation of the soul with God and its power of resistance to the Devil through the grace of God, and the constant injunction to submit the will to the Will of God. The Devil is nearly always represented as subordinate to God, because a universe in which "good" and "evil" are equally potent is too painful to contemplate, and would lead to despair. Alternatively we have the insistence upon original sin, the human heart being represented as wicked, but redeemable by the grace of God—again the power of good is supreme.

At a later stage still we have a further unification, the Devil is banished from the cosmology, and God is represented as responsible for everything—even for the evil in the human heart. Evil is only apparent, or is a means to good, and the uncomfortable facts of human life are thus rationalized. But it is doubtful if this phase of religious belief, though it perhaps satisfies more completely the desire for unification, is so effective a stabilizing influence as the older fashioned dualism.

The projection of the most diverse human qualities upon God is well illustrated by the different aspects God takes according to human preoccupations. He is the great Creator or the stern Lawgiver, the God of Justice or the God of Mercy, the God of Battles or the God of Love, as different human needs and passions wax and wane. In recent centuries, since Christianity became dominant, He is most universally the God of Love, because the oppressed majority must have consolation, and also because more and more the tender instinct is felt to be the hope of humanity. God always stands for what is felt to be in the interests of humanity.

So far God is essentially a social God, a concentrated projection of all the qualities useful to the herd in a supreme supernatural personality—the supreme herd leader of humanity, just as the old tribal gods were the tribal leaders. He is the creator of man and of the whole of man's environment. He gives laws to the herd, fights its battles, protects it from

harm, punishes its evil-doers, and rewards the righteous. But with increase of the individual's spiritual autonomy God has another function to perform. The individual demands the right of entering into personal relations with God, no longer through His servants the priests, but directly and intimately. God then becomes the centre of the individual's own struggles towards unification, the repository of his highest hopes, the confidant of his deepest troubles. The more intimate the communion, the more frankly and simply the individual "casts his burden upon the Lord," the more useful God is to him and the more real his personal religion. In this relation God is simply the projection of what we have called in Chapter XVI the ethical self, the highest standard conceived by the individual, and it is then that "His service is perfect freedom."

Sometimes the God of the herd comes into sharp conflict with the God of the ethical self. There can be no doubt, for instance, that in the Great War the God of the herd demanded unrestricted and self-forgetting service to the country, whether in fighting or in some other national activity. But the personal God of the conscientious objector as emphatically forbade such service. It cannot be said that the God of the conscientious objector was a false god, because the individual is the only possible judge of his God's commands. Nor can it be said that the herd God was wrong, because the herd alone can be the judge of its God's commands; and the personal God of many devout and sincere individual citizens gave the same command to service.

The individual mind, in accordance with its need of the greatest possible unification, ordinarily identifies its personal God with the social God, the God of the herd, but they can in truth only become completely identified when the herd has reached its highest state—the brotherhood of man—and the ethical self completely recognizes its obligation to serve the herd. Till that condition is reached there is always the possibility of conflict. Each complex may deny the God of the other, but neither will be right, for each God has complete validity in His own sphere.

It cannot be doubted that God has been a necessity to the human race, that He is still a necessity, and will long continue to be. If all religious tradition had been destroyed at any given moment and a new generation brought up in ignorance that it had ever existed, it can scarcely be doubted that a new religion, of substantially the same type, though varying in form according to the epoch, would have appeared. If this be so, we cannot deny the "truth" of the substance of religion, though we may criticize many of its forms. All universal and self-consistent expressions of the activity of the human spirit have a claim to the name of "truth." It is clear, of course, that religious truth is incommensurate with scientific truth, just as for instance mathematical truth is incommensurate with artistic truth. Though each may be abused and show themselves in unworthy or childish forms, projection seems to be as inevitable a function of the human mind as rationalization (see p. 190), and we cannot look forward to a time when either will fall into disuse.

We have seen that *idealization*, in which the mind projects its own ideal of personality upon a real person, is a common frailty of the human mind. It is fair to call it a frailty, because idealization confuses the ideal and the real, and such confusion can never form a sound basis for action or opinion. On the other hand, the *faculty of idealism*, the ability of the mind to form ideals, is one of its most valuable powers. It may, indeed, be considered the highest faculty of the mind, without which human progress would be impossible.

The formation of an ideal is the creation of an end toward which an extended conation can be directed, and in the service of which the instincts and powers may be harnessed. It is formed on the model of the primitive instinctive mental process, though its end is not determined by instinct alone, but by the interaction of instinct with more or less complicated cognitive processes. Hence the ideal conation is altogether outside the primitive channels of the instincts, and enables the mind to escape from their tyranny. The ideal may be projected upon God, represented as the Will

of God, and when it is thus definitely externalized an added feeling of its security is often felt—the treasure is safe in a supernatural sanctuary. The mind, like the Indian juggler, can climb up a rope the end of which it has thrown into the heavens. But the mind may recognize the ideal as its own creation, into the likeness of which it tries to fashion reality, whether it is concerned with an ideal of conduct or personality, with a social ideal, or with something of more limited scope and more easily attained. Psychologically, the formation of an ideal always involves a passing beyond the primitive ends of the instincts, *the creation of secondary ends and values*, apart from the primary values attaching to the ends of instinctive activities; and the formation of these secondary ends, representing as they do all the higher mental, æsthetic, ethical, and spiritual values, is an indispensable condition of the higher development of the mind and personality and of what is called human progress.

CHAPTER XV

PSYCHICAL SEGREGATION AND DISPLACEMENT

It was shown in Chapter III that hand in hand with the gradual evolution, the increase in complexity, of mind there goes a building up or integration of simple conations into more and more complex ones, and that this process marks the progress of the race and of the individual alike. Progressive integration is, as we saw, the key process in the evolution of animal and human behaviour. It is the process which has enabled the bee swarm and the wolf pack to become such efficient mechanisms as they are because of the subordination of individual to herd conations. It is the process which has enabled man to acquire his vast and complex control over the external world. And practised deliberately in the individual human life, it is the only process which will procure for the individual any considerable measure of success, or for the highly developed mind, any semblance of happiness.

We have now become familiar with many examples of the reverse process, disintegration, the breaking up of mental processes or of mental structure into constituent parts, and the more or less complete separation or segregation of these parts from one another or from the mind as a whole. The first example we had occasion to notice (Chapter VI, p. 79) was the separation of affect from the original conation with which it is associated, and the making of this affect the end of a new conation which is a truncated form of the original one. We saw then that pleasure, which is the normal tone of the affect accompanying successful conation, may become detached or displaced from the proper end of the

conation and be pursued for its own sake. In later chapters we have seen how, as the result of conflict, we get dissociations of complexes from the rest of the mind and their more or less complete segregation from one another or their burial in the unconscious, and how in extreme cases this process leads to the dissociation of the entire personality, and the establishment of alternating partial personalities which in turn usurp the dominance of the normal integrated ego.

Psychical segregation is thus of two kinds, involving - respectively mental structure and mental process. The first, to which the term *dissociation* is generally restricted, is seen in the dissociation of complexes, and is a consequence of the existence within the psychic organism of a number of instincts which frequently conflict with one another, and whose adequate satisfaction cannot be attained within the limits of a unified life. The result is that the mind either separates the incompatible complexes in different compartments, or, if that is impracticable, and the mind is unable to bear the pain of the conflict, thrusts one or other of the conflicting complexes into the unconscious, cutting it off from direct outlets, with the consequences we have traced.

These consequences only ensue if the complex cut off is endowed with psychic energy. Everyone experiences the natural dying away of interest in a pursuit, the complex corresponding with which gradually falls into oblivion and atrophies. Such a process has no effect on the well-being of the mind as a whole. The mind is the poorer, it is true, for the loss of the particular complex, but it is probably the richer by some other to which the energy has been transferred, and it may well happen in a healthy vigorous mind that the loss of the old complex is more than compensated for by the gain of the new. In the case of a complex highly endowed with energy, in full and vigorous life, which is suddenly cut off because the pain involved in its conscious existence is intolerable, the results are far otherwise. In the former case the complex was dead or moribund, in the latter it is vividly alive. And it is a fact of experience that

driving a living complex into the unconscious does not kill it, but renders the transference of its psychic energy to other parts of the mind very difficult, because the channels of communication are severed. The outlawed complex, still *in* the mind, but no longer *of* it, acts like a bandit or pariah in the mental society. Or, to vary the metaphor, it becomes a parasite, constantly tapping the fresh energy produced in the mind and thus diminishing the supply available for the rest of the mental mechanism. A great deflection of energy also occurs, it is true, in acute conflict (see Chapter X), but in the absence of segregation, some sort of *harmony* is generally re-established, and even if the "committee" permanently retains unruly members, at least it knows with what it has to deal, and some sort of *modus vivendi* is attained. In the normal case harmony is ultimately reached, and the mind is the richer and sometimes the stronger for the experience. But if the offending complex is completely repressed, it is a constant unseen menace, and the result may be harassing dreams, neurasthenia, hysteria, or, at the worst, a definite insanity.

As we saw in Chapter X, a common and less drastic method of avoiding conflict is the erection of what Hart calls "logic-tight" barriers between incompatible complexes. Where the cognitive elements are predominant the word is apt, but the barriers have to be "emotion-tight" as well as "logic-tight," where affect is important. Here the dangers of repression are avoided and the mind does not lose any part of itself from the sphere of its conscious being. Naturally, however, the conations are generally as incompatible as the purely mental systems on which they depend, and since to be completed they involve the external world, practical difficulties are apt to ensue. The secret practice of "vices" by reputable people, and in general the leading of a "double life," are the commonest instances. In all such cases we are dealing with psychical segregation; though of a less dangerous kind than in repression. The psychic mechanism is not so seriously damaged, but the intellectual honesty and integrity of the mind is impaired whenever "logic-tight"

barriers are put up; its emotional integrity is brought to naught by emotion-tight barriers, and anything like unity of action is made impossible because of the conflict of conations.

The other kind of segregation, which may be called *displacement*, is the (biologically) artificial separation of mental processes which naturally belong together. We saw in Chapter III that in the typical complete mental process there were three elements—the cognitive, affective, and conative, which naturally belong together, each having its place in the process as a whole. If we think of the typical mental process as flowing from the perceptive to the motor end of the mind, the first kind of segregation, the separation of complexes, corresponds to a longitudinal division of the mind from one end to the other. The second kind, with which we have now to deal, corresponds with a cutting across or arrest of the normal chain of mental process in any given complex, resulting in the transference of the end from the external world to the mind itself (Fig 9).




FIG. 9.—DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING PSYCHICAL SEGREGATION (IN A SEPARATE "COMPARTMENT" OF THE MIND) OF A COMPLETE MENTAL PROCESS BELONGING TO A SEGREGATED COMPLEX, AND ALSO DISPLACEMENT OF THE NORMAL END IN ACTION TO PURELY MENTAL ENDS FALLING IN DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE MENTAL CHAIN.

We have already seen in Chapter VI that the affect may be put in the place of the proper end of the conation

and pursued for its own sake, or, in other words, be given an independent value as the object of interest, the goal of the libido, and here we must deal further with the subject.

The tendency not to follow a conation to its proper end, and to set up some other end short of this, is a very general result of weak psychic energy or of the meeting of difficult or insurmountable obstacles in the path of the conation. Sometimes the diversion, or rather the modification, of the original conation, is due to another cause. The original goal of the conation may become meaningless as the result of the changed conditions of human life, as in the instance of hunting for sport instead of hunting for food referred to in Chapter VI. Many such changes of end are legitimate enough, as we have seen, and may be set alongside the construction of artificial conations which at least partially satisfy primitive instincts, for the satisfaction of which on the original lines there is no room in the conditions of civilized life. Hunting, shooting, and fishing for sport, many kinds of games which satisfy the combative instinct, and many "hobbies," such as those which spring from the "collecting instinct" (one variety of the instinct of acquisition, see Chapter XVIII), are all examples of this kind of activity. In these cases the conation is carried to an end in action, thus involving the external world, and it may be taken that so far as its form is concerned any conation thus completed is a healthy activity.

But there is another class of process in which the end sought is not an end in action but a purely psychic end. Such a psychic end may belong either to the region of affect or to the region of cognition. Let us take first the cases in which the end falls in the region of affect.

These have already been briefly glanced at in Chapter VI, where the pursuit of the pleasure carried by the sense of power, by sexual indulgence, and by indulgence in eating and drinking, were mentioned as examples. The affects involved are of very different nature in the different cases, but the pursuit of pleasure, or more strictly of the specific pleasurable affect, is common to all. At one end of the scale

we have the pursuit of power for its own sake,¹ a pursuit which, if successful, makes possible incidentally the accomplishment of various ends involving the external world, ends which may be not only legitimate but exceedingly useful, though they may equally be harmful and selfish. At the other end we have the pursuit of repose, legitimate as a release from fatigue due to excessive activity, but when habitually sought for its own sake leading to the characteristic vice of slothfulness—the negation of all activity. It is clear, then, that the harm done to the mind by the pursuit of pleasurable affect varies infinitely in kind and in degree according to the affect pursued. Nevertheless, *whatever the affect pursued, its pursuit has the result of removing the end of the conation, the object of desire, from the external world, and identifying it with something which should be a mere accompaniment of the successful pursuit of an external end.* This is true even of the highest types of affect when pursued for their own sakes. A good example is the mental state of a certain type of lover who is sometimes said to be “in love with love” instead of with a person. The emotion he experiences may be of the finest quality, but the concentration of his interest in the emotion of love rather than in the person loved is generally felt to be unhealthy, and sometimes has disastrous consequences. He is, in fact, a “man of pleasure” equally with the pure sensualist, though the emotion whose enjoyment he seeks is of a “higher” type.

A distinction is often drawn between “sensual” and “intellectual” pleasures to the detriment of the former. But here we must carefully distinguish between the pursuit of an “intellectual” pleasure for the sake of its purely intellectual elements, which belong to the realm of cognition, and not to the realm of affect, and the pursuit of “intellectual” pleasure for its own sake. The latter pursuit has the same kind of effect on the mind as the pursuit of “sensual” pleasure, and apart from collateral harm which may arise

¹ This generally involves the pursuit of ends in the external world, and in that case does not strictly fall under the pursuit of affect; but cases exist in which the affect accompanying power is alone pursued.

from indulgence in certain sensual pleasures, is equally to be deprecated. An example will make clear the distinction. Discussion about abstract questions gives keen "intellectual" pleasure and excitement to a certain type of mind. This kind of excitement may be sought for its own sake apart from the nature of the subject discussed and apart from the objects to be attained. That is pursuit of intellectual pleasure for its own sake. On the other hand, the discussion may be entered upon and pursued in order to arrive at a solution of the problems discussed, or for the more modest object of exploring the subject and arriving at the grounds of difference between the disputants. Those are purely intellectual objects, and the pleasure and excitement of the discussion are incidental and therefore legitimate.

It is not, of course, urged that it is *never* right to pursue pleasure for its own sake, but that affect is primarily an aspect of a complete mental process whose end is in the external world, and that to pursue affect for its own sake is a diversion of psychic energy from its natural ends. The same proposition is true of the pursuit of purely cognitive ends, but, as we shall see presently, mental activity in which cognitive elements are the main interest stands on a different footing. It is quite safe to say that to make a habit of the pursuit of affect is bad, and indeed disastrous for the mind, whatever the nature of the affect, and this is certainly not true of cognition. The cause of the distinction appears to be that while neither cognition nor affect are primitive ends of conation, and therefore neither kind of end gives the primitive satisfaction of a conation whose end lies in the external world, yet the attainment of a cognitive end gives a starting-point for further cognitive activity, or for activity which has an external end, while an affective end does nothing of the kind, since it leads to nothing by itself.

It has already been said that the tendency to stop short of the proper end of conation is often a consequence of weakness in psychic energy which does not allow of the carrying of conation into action. The attainment of pleasurable affect requires as a rule less mental energy than either..

the conquest of ends in the external world or the attainment of purely cognitive ends. This is why pleasure-lovers are often of weak character, except indeed where the pursuit of pleasure is merely the diversion or relaxation of the man of action or of the man of intellect, the expression of his superabundant energy released for a time from its normal channels.

One of the clearest examples of successive truncations, as we may call them, of a typical conation by the shifting of the end to the affective region is found in the universal instinct of sex. The complete conation involves a more or less permanent mating, and, especially for the woman, the rearing of offspring. Short of this the sexual act may be, and very often is, made the end of conation. It involves external action, and is a natural term intimately bound up with physiologically conditioned increase and culmination of affect. It cannot be considered a purely affective end, though the intensity of affect is so great that the pursuit of this end is frequently reckoned as the pursuit of pleasure. Short of the sexual act, however, we are in the region of practically pure affective ends, and these are often made the subject of infinite elaboration and diversification, as the libido, unable to pursue the conation to its proper end, seeks hither and thither for an adequate outlet. Thus we pass down through various kinds of love-making and philandering to the most superficial flirtation. Any of these may be taken as ends when the complete process is truncated. Otherwise they appear as preparatory stages in the complete process. On the physical side, as Freud has convincingly shown,¹ there are similarly a series of actions, many of which appear as caresses preparatory to the sexual act, but which, when taken as fixed ends in themselves, at which the sexual activity stops short, are of the nature of sexual perversions. In just the same way we may regard flirtation and philandering, taken as ends in themselves, as sexual perversions in the psychic sphere.

A very definite and very common case of segregation of

¹ *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie.*

affect is met with in the pursuit of what is commonly called "sentiment," as seen particularly in "sentimental" people. Every well-defined strong primary emotion directed to a definite object tends to have an outer fringe, as it were, of weaker affect, which may be called sentiment,¹ attaching itself to everything connected in the mind with the object of the primary emotion—in other words, to everything which has been taken up into the complex to which the primary emotion belongs. It is perfectly normal for the emotional fringe to coincide with the fringe of the complex, and sentiment is in its right place when this is so. But if the normal working of the complex is destroyed, because, for instance, the proper conations and their translation into action are rendered impossible by the removal of the concrete objects corresponding with the heart of the complex, the whole of the affect is likely to become attached to the fringe, which is the sole concrete remnant of the complex. The typical example is the death or removal of a beloved person in the relation to whom a large part of the emotional life was centred. The end of conation being removed, the flood of affect loses the normal channel of its discharge, and becomes attached to objects and associations connected with the beloved person. The disproportion between the volume of affect and the intrinsic importance of the objects to which it is attached becomes obvious and marked. The affect is really pursued for its own sake, not for the sake of these objects, which are merely of interest because of their historical connexion with the former end of the central conation in which the affect was originally centred. Diversion of the affect to new objects of primary interest requires

¹ This use of the word "sentiment," which is perhaps, on the whole, the commonest use in current English, must not, of course, be confounded with its use, of at least equal linguistic correctness, by McDougall and others for the concrete "sentiments" such as love, hate, etc. (see Preface, p. 9), which are organized round definite objects, and are the affective constituents of definite complexes. The ambiguity illustrates the dangers involved in the scientific use of words from common language, dangers which in psychology cannot be wholly avoided.

the lapse of time, and can only be effected by a vigorous and healthy mind. When psychic energy is weak and at the same time the mind is of the "rigid" type the transference never takes place, and the affect remains in the form of "sentiment" attached to the fringe of the old complex.

In the case of minds which have never been satisfactorily adapted to reality, perhaps from lack of opportunity to satisfy the great instincts, and in which strong, biologically normal, complexes have never been formed, nearly the whole of the available emotion is likely to be attached to complexes motivated by primary instincts which have not found their normal outlets but have constructed substitutes, whose intrinsic value is obviously quite disproportionate to the interest and affection lavished on them. Thus a lonely woman will give to a pet dog the devotion normally belonging to a child: others will give it to furniture, others again to places. The affection in these cases may be perfectly real, and strong complexes may be formed about its objects. The abnormal thing here is the unsuitable nature and want of intrinsic value in the objects on which affection is lavished.

In all these cases the mind may fairly be called "sentimental," but the *sentimentalists* proper, those who naturally make a cult of sentiment, without the excuse of deprivation of the natural objects of love, are people of weak libido and hence incapable of strong conation or affection. Their affective nature is sufficiently satisfied by weak feeling, which plays round various objects more or less connected with normal objects of affection. A man or woman who never falls seriously in love, but who is attracted slightly by person after person of the opposite sex, in whom libido is never strong enough to fulfil the central sex conation, but finds sufficient satisfaction in mild philandering and in sentimental attachment to places and objects connected with the numerous objects of mild affection, is a typical sentimentalist. The goal of the sentimentalist is certainly the affect itself, and among the pursuers of affect for its own sake—all of whom are more or less despised by the

herd, which dislikes the pursuit of any goal but the normal biological one of an external end—sentimentalists are the most despised, more even than the sensualists.

Just as affect may be given an independent value and pursued for its own sake, so may cognition. The whole of the purely intellectual life—the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake—may be considered as the independent cultivation of the faculty of cognition. It is the peculiarity of the faculty of cognition that it can be isolated from the rest of the mental processes with comparative safety, and with positive constructive results. The immense enhancement of the faculty of cognition, the development of the powers of reasoning and of criticism, are the peculiar characteristics of the human mind, and specialization upon them, so to speak, is not only a legitimate pursuit but a necessary concomitant of and agent in human progress. The comparative safety with which the cognitive faculty can be isolated is related to the fact that it belongs, so to speak, to the perceptive rather than to the motor end of the mind. Affect is the natural concomitant of conation, cognition of perception (which is really a form of cognition), and though the typically complete mental process leads uninterruptedly from perception to conation, there is no doubt that the chain is more readily and can be less damagingly broken in the middle than near either end, or, to use less metaphorical language, the biological process can be satisfactorily modified by making the end a purely cognitive one. Cognitive ends also, as we have seen, form the bases of further cognitive activity or of activity directed to the external world.

Such a modification of the biologically normal process is not, of course, entirely free from danger to the mind as an instrument of life. The disabilities of the man whose mind is absorbed in pure thought are well enough known. His power of action, and consequently his relation to objective life, are often impaired or even nullified. He falls, as Kipling implies in writing "if you can think, and not make thoughts your aim," something short of ideal man-

hood, for he does make thoughts his aim. But he has his own justification and, if he is single-minded in his devotion to the things of the mind, his own glory—"This man decided not to Live, but Know . . ." and "Here, here's his place, where meteors shoot, clouds form, lightnings are loosened, stars come and go . . ."—a glory of the mind, to which the man of action cannot attain.

Broadly, there are two lines of development of the cognitive activity. First its development in direct connexion with relations to the external world. This is the primitive line (see Chapter VII) which was in its earliest beginnings directly useful to primitive man by giving him the beginning of the means of understanding and therefore of controlling nature. In its later evolution it is the basis, *in conjunction with action*, of all development of human industry and later of "applied science." However elaborate its development, this type of cognition is always directed to action. Knowledge is sought solely for what it will enable us *to do*.

Such knowledge, in its first stages, is purely empirical. Certain kinds of objects in the external world are always found to have certain qualities or to act in certain ways. Certain phenomena always occur in a particular sequence and have certain consequences. According to these observed qualities and sequences man directs his action towards the objects and processes of the external world, and so protects himself, feeds himself and later clothes and houses himself. The basis of this kind of empirical knowledge is found, of course, in the animals. Man has carried it to a far higher pitch by the immensely greater development of his cognitive faculty, and upon it primitive industry is everywhere based. The knowledge of the farm labourer, which enables him to perform his daily work with a skill and certainty impossible of attainment except by years of experience, is still almost wholly of this kind. It is essentially knowledge which is not only being constantly applied in action, but is actually learned only through that application, with which observation goes hand in hand at every step. *It is the basis and type of all human knowledge, the*

sort of knowledge for which and through which the cognitive mechanism of the human mind has been developed.

In the next stage the purely cognitive elements gain greater importance, and obtain a certain temporary independence of action. Knowledge ceases to be purely empirical, and science in the strict sense comes into existence. A more accurate acquaintance with the sequences of causation enables exceptions to empirical rules to be understood, and the control of nature becomes correspondingly wider and more certain. But the knowledge is still sought solely for its usefulness, for what it will enable man to do. This is the basis of the development of *applied science*.

The independent grouping of the cognitive elements necessary to enable advance to be made in the understanding, and therefore in the control, of nature leads naturally to a tendency to shift the object of interest from the external end to which knowledge is applied to the knowledge itself. This marks the birth of *pure science*, of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and it is found by experience that the free development of such knowledge, pursued for its own sake, eventually gives a much greater and more comprehensive power of dealing with practical problems on effective lines than if the pursuit is narrowly tied to single utilitarian ends. Nature must be studied for her own sake if she is to be thoroughly understood, and only if she is thoroughly understood can she be effectively controlled.

At the same time this step from ends in the external world to ends in the sphere of pure knowledge marks a modification, a truncation, of the biologically complete mental process which always has its end in the external world, comparable with, though widely different in results from, the shifting to purely affective ends which we have already considered. In the development of purely abstract knowledge such as metaphysics and the higher mathematics, we have a further shutting off of knowledge from the external world. Natural science takes nature as the sphere of its study—the perceptions which form its raw material are derived from the external world and the possibility of its

application to external ends is never excluded. Philosophy, at least in the middle phases of its development, began and ended in the mind, and represented the most extreme form of seclusion of the mind from its natural contact with the world. Modern philosophy, however, tends more and more to take its material from nature and from the results of science and thus to re-establish the severed connexion on the perceptive side.

It is not, of course, intended to infer that the actual development of knowledge has taken, chronologically, the logical order followed in the preceding paragraphs. The primitive knowledge, in which the faculty of cognition is developed always in the most intimate relation to doing, certainly came first, since, as has been pointed out, it is the type of knowledge for which and by which the mind was developed. But the other phases have arisen at various times and in various degrees according to the circumstances of the evolution of the human race, pure science notably during the last century or two, and applied science on the large scale during the same period, mainly as a secondary result of the development of pure science.

The creative artist's conation is directed to an end in the external world, though not to a utilitarian one. A consideration of the idea of beauty in relation to creative art and of art as the expression of libido is outside the sphere of our present discussion, but we may note that the mental process of the artist is biologically strictly typical, though specialized in relation to beauty rather than to use. No segregation is involved. This applies in a certain degree also to cognitive activity which has an outcome in the written or spoken word. These are intended to appeal to other minds, and thus have ends in the external world.

The last instance of segregation of part of the complete mental process to be considered is the most extreme of all. It is the concentration of interest in perception itself, the first link in the normal chain of mental processes. The cultivation of sensitiveness to external impressions in particular spheres is a necessary part of the equipment of the

successful worker in all branches of human activity—no less to the man of science and the man of affairs than to the artist. But the cultivation of sensitiveness to impressions as an end in itself is quite a distinct thing, very far removed from the typical mental process, with its end in external activity. Perception cannot avoid including some cognitive elements, so closely is the process linked with cognition. Interest is often concentrated in the distinctions between impressions, and this is essentially a cognitive process. On the other hand, interest may be centred in the affect associated with the act of perception itself, and these two types of interest share the general characteristics of interest in cognition and interest in affect which have already been discussed. Examples may be taken from the most various fields. The faculty of perception may be cultivated for its own sake by the artist in relation, we will say, to atmospheric effects (provided he has no intention of putting them on canvas !), by the art critic in relation to pictures, by the connoisseur of wines, by the judge of animals. In all these different types of perception there are necessarily cognitive elements, and either these or the affects of perception may be the main objects of interest.

The most fundamental of all types of psychic disintegration is the exact reverse of the process of integration described in Chapter III. In the process of building up more and more complex processes from simple ones in pursuit of more and more distant ends, the simple constituent processes become increasingly automatic and thus demand less and less *attention*. That is a condition of the progress of integration. In states of extreme fatigue the mind loses the power of concentration on a distant end, and attention returns to each single act as it is carried out. We must all be familiar with the condition in which, after hard and fatiguing work, we suddenly become conscious of every movement we make, the pressure of our feet on the ground, the turning of a door handle, the noise of the fire, and so on. When interest in a distant end is lost it returns automatically to the single act. The sequence of acts no longer matters,

nor even in many cases their nature. The doing of each act becomes an end in itself, whether it is an act of perception, a thought or a movement. The frame of mind in which this disintegrated psychic condition is most enjoyed is characteristic of a country holiday with no "integrated" purpose. The sights and sounds are pleasant, movement is pleasant, rest is pleasant, and there is no large purpose to strain the attention. In such a frame of mind the closely knit sequences of conations of normal life are deliberately abandoned and the mind becomes completely relaxed. This state of mind is entered upon voluntarily in such a case, but it results involuntarily from a condition of extreme fatigue, and it is equally characteristic of the child, the imbecile and the senile, who all live, with varying degrees of energy, exclusively in the moment

To summarize the results of this chapter, we have seen that psychic segregation is of two kinds. First, the segregation of psychic structure or mental content involving the more or less complete separation of complexes from one another or from the mind as a whole. Segregation in separate "compartments" destroys unity of purpose and action, but scarcely damages the psychic mechanism. Segregation from the mind as a whole (complete repression) leads, on the other hand, to serious consequences for the whole psychic mechanism, and the more important the separate complex and the more complete the separation the more disastrous the effect upon the mind. The causes of both these kinds of segregation are conflicts between instincts to which the complexes correspond. Secondly, we have the separation of parts of the typically complete mental process, or more strictly (since the mind is so constructed that every completed mental process must take the form of the direction of psychic energy to some end) the diversion of the process from the normal end of definite activity in the external world to some secondary end within the mind itself. This displacement of end involves the truncation, as we have called it, of the typical process, the cutting off of the proper

end in motor activity, and the consequent impairment of the biological mechanism. The effect on the well-being of the organism varies greatly, however, according to the secondary end which becomes the goal of conation. In the case of certain forms of cognition such secondary ends are essential to human progress. The causes of the second class of segregation are, in the first place, failure of the libido to carry conation into external activity, owing to weakness of psychic energy or of physical energy, or to imperfect correlation of the two; secondly, the tendency of psychic energy to concentrate in any region of the mind, such as the region of cognition, which has undergone great development, and to place its ends in that region.

Finally, the most extreme example of segregation—or rather disintegration—is seen in conditions of fatigue, as in imbecility and senility, when the mind loses the connexion of single acts into large conative sequences with the accompanying characteristic automatism of the constituent acts, and returns to the primitive condition of attending to each act individually.

PART V
REASON AND RATIONALIZATION

CHAPTER XVI
RATIONALIZATION

It is no part of the scheme of this book to describe in detail the nature and working of the rational function. Those topics are fully dealt with in the ordinary text books of psychology. We need only note that historically the rational function has its beginnings in the mental processes of the higher animals, and that reason is developed in the human mind first of all in strict relation to useful external ends. It has become almost a commonplace that man is not primarily a rational being, though it is by the use of reason alone that he can attain in any degree to the mastery of his destiny. He still relies on reason only where its usefulness is forcibly and immediately brought home to him. For the most part he is a passionate and credulous creature, the slave of his instincts and of the suggestions arising from his instincts, or from the most dubious external sources which may simulate authority. It is remarkable, when these plain facts are considered, how widespread in much of the writing supposed to instruct and direct us is the tacit assumption that man *is* primarily a rational creature, that he may contentedly neglect the study of his origins, of the real nature of his instincts and of the devious paths they pursue, of the hidden motives by which he is generally driven, and that he may safely face the world and the complicated problems of modern life relying upon the childish belief that his

mind is simple, rational and straightforward. Such writing completely ignores the fundamental fact that the human mind is built up of a bundle of instincts, which, it is true, are kept in check, and therefore often masked, by their interactions, but which are just as much alive and just as vigorous as they were in the days of Neolithic man, which indeed furnish the sole driving power that enables man to do whatever he does do, good or bad. A particularly gross example of this pernicious *naïveté* may be taken from the pages of the *New Statesman* (August 14, 1915, p. 451), from a review of Professor Gilbert Murray's essay on "Herd Instinct and the War" in *The International Crisis in its Ethical and Psychological Aspects* (1915). "Professor Murray," the reviewer writes, "unanimistically sees in it a resuscitated herd instinct. We distrust all explanations which attempt to refer the activities of twentieth-century man to the re-awakening of primitive instincts." It is not a question of "resuscitation" or "re-awakening." Herd instinct in "twentieth-century man" is just as active and vigorous as it was in his remotest human ancestors and as it has been continuously throughout the development of the human race. It is a direct cause of the whole of his social organization, beliefs and activities, which cannot be understood without reference to it. This grotesque misunderstanding of the nature of the human mind is, however, only an extreme example of the mentality, ignorant and suspicious alike of biology and psychology, which pervades the writings of too many of our "progressive thinkers."¹

But non-rational as all the springs of conduct indubitably are, and absurdly overestimated as is the part actually played by reason in human life, it still remains true that reason is *the* characteristic endowment of man and that its possession has given him most of his past triumphs and contains most of his future hopes. Before we can attempt to estimate the

¹ These aberrations on the part of highly intellectualized minds would be disconcerting if we could not often trace the unadmitted non-rational complexes to the distorting effects of which their perverse contentions are due.

part reason can play in conduct we must consider that universal exercise of the rational function, often illegitimate but ultimately, as we shall see, unescapable, which is called rationalization, a very useful term introduced by Dr. Ernest Jones.

Rationalization may be defined as the production of a "reason" for, as distinct from the true cause or motive of, an act or conation. The complex responsible for the act or conation is not recognized by the mind as a legitimate ground of action, either because it is an unconscious complex and therefore cannot be recognized at all, or because, though the mind may be conscious or half conscious of its existence, there is conflict with some other important complex, which is felt to have a prior claim in determining conduct. A ground in harmony with this last complex is then unconsciously sought.

The commonest example of rationalization is the "defence reaction," of which examples were given in Chapter X. Here the conflict is generally between some complex determined by a primitive instinct and the moral complex dependent either upon herd instinct or upon a highly developed self-regarding sentiment.

A very simple and very common class of defence reaction is that in which a failure of the libido to carry through some action owing to fear—the great instinctive inhibitor of action—is falsely attributed to the inherent difficulty or impossibility of the task. An instance cited by Jung is that of the alpine climber whose libido is inadequate to enable him to overcome some obstacle in his path, though his physical powers are in fact adequate to the task. If his mind is adapted to reality he recognizes both facts, and confesses that he "funks" the obstacle. Otherwise he takes the easy path of rationalization and declares the ascent to be physically impossible. He refuses to recognize the failure of his will to make the ascent, the baffling of his conation by fear, because he is ashamed of it, and prefers to attribute the failure to physical factors over which he has no control. Very likely he grossly exaggerates the actual physical difficulties. Here we have a case of regression in a generalized

form—the infantile habit of blaming the wrong thing when an obstacle is encountered, because the mind cannot or will not recognize the true cause of the failure. Such a mind is incompletely adapted to reality. We expect this state of things in a child, and try to teach it the better way, but in an adult we expect the better way to have been attained, and we are not slow to charge with dishonesty a man who resorts habitually to false defences of such a nature. This is a fair charge if the man is really conscious or even half conscious of the true cause of failure, but it can hardly be sustained if, as is often the case, he is unconscious of it.

Another common class of defence reaction is that in which the motive of an action is some impulse or desire universally regarded as base or immoral. Most minds simply cannot tolerate a straightforward recognition of such a cause of action, and they expend untiring ingenuity in inventing some more respectable “reason” for the offending conduct. For instance, suppose a big passionate conation has been ruined by the quite legitimate activity of some outside person. A great flood of libido is checked in its normal course and seeks an outlet. The associated affect is turned to anger, and a new conation directed to the injury of the offending person is initiated. Such revenge conations would, of course, be unhesitatingly condemned both by the individual’s moral sense and by public opinion, but they are, for a time at least, very persistent, because the libido cannot be turned all at once into a fresh channel unconnected with the ruined original conation. The mind then seeks persistently for some justification and will frequently resort to the most unplausible rationalizations, for instance, that of representing the legitimate action of the other person as immoral and deserving of punishment, or again of representing the injuries aimed at as really benefits! This, of course, is an extreme instance in which the forces at work are very violent. But everyday life furnishes numberless cases of the defence attribution of mean actions or indefensible opinions to respectable motives.

The rationalization which represents punishment, the

satisfaction of the desire for revenge, i.e. for compensation for an injury by infliction of a corresponding injury, as justified by its deterrent effect on the criminal or on others, has already been alluded to (p. 87). This is sometimes an entirely legitimate, but in other cases a purely illusory and false justification.

Defence reactions are sometimes involved with difficult problems in casuistry. For instance, a woman who permits or encourages the attentions of a lover whom she does not propose to marry probably acts as she does because the society of her admirer gratifies her feminine sex instinct—flatters her vanity, as we say. But she very likely justifies the action by representing it to herself as kindness on her part, since the man is wretched if he is not allowed to see her. The true instinctive motive is not recognized because to act upon it in such a case is felt to be immoral—at bottom probably because the action cannot lead to the proper biological goal of the sex conation. She therefore brings the action into harmony with her moral sentiment by attributing it to kindness, although it would usually be the truest kindness to dismiss her lover at once. She may also attribute the action to another motive—her own desire for the man's friendship and society apart from any sentimental relation. The insidiousness of this kind of rationalization lies in the fact that both the assigned motives—the desire to be kind to the man and the desire to enjoy his friendship and society—may quite conceivably be actual motives, and in the case of people of a certain temperament the action may even be legitimately justified on those grounds. Nevertheless the affect attached to the sex instinct is normally so much stronger than that attached to the altruistic impulse of kindness or to the gratification of the desire for friendship, that the assigned motives must always be suspected as rationalizations which are allowed to blind the woman to the true significance of what she is doing and to its actual effect upon the man. The more vivid her pleasure in the man's society the more likely that it is mainly a form of sex gratification.

Such problems in casuistry cannot, of course, be solved

on general principles. All that psychology can do is to insist that mental complexes corresponding with the primary instincts are endowed with by far the greatest amount of energy and the strongest affects, and at the same time are the most likely to be unconscious; and to call attention to the danger of assigning motives dependent on secondary complexes when primary instincts are certain to be at work.

A very important class of rationalizations are those in which the rationalized action or opinion has for its actual cause some specialized and highly consolidated complex dependent on herd instinct, such, for instance, as religion, morality, patriotism or party politics. In such cases the complex which actually dictates the action or opinion affords at least a respectable sanction, and is often not felt to need justification; nevertheless, rationalization is not infrequently resorted to when the action or opinion is felt to conflict with reason or common sense. The effort of rationalization is always to bring about that harmony and equilibrium of the mind as a whole discussed in previous chapters. In the previous examples of rationalization the conflict was between an instinct of egoistic origin and morality. In those we shall now discuss it is a case of conflict between a well-consolidated complex dependent on herd instinct and that desire for objective truth which forms one of the most important purely mental conations of the highly developed self-regarding complex (see Chapter XIX, pp. 216 ff.).

The rationalizations of religious beliefs that are to all appearance contradicted by experience of life constitute a regular system which we call Christian apologetics. The religious complex is not in itself an unconscious complex. On the contrary it is stated and expounded openly and explicitly as the foundation of the particular beliefs which are supposed to form the dogmatic mental equipment of the religious man. The religious creeds draw their immense power partly from the fact that they satisfy, wholly or partially, real spiritual needs of the individual, and partly because they are the direct teaching of the herd as represented by the Christian Church. The apologetic system by which

they are made to harmonize with the facts of life forms a necessary part of the organization of religion. When the system becomes too rigid, and tends to lose its hold owing to the growth of knowledge and the widening of mental outlook, instinctive attempts to meet the danger by timely concessions result in the development within the churches of such movements as those of "liberal churchmanship," the "new theology" and "modernism." Religious belief is, in fact, constantly striving to adapt itself to human progress, but owing to its inherent conservatism it is always very late in the attempt. Nevertheless, it does not lose its hold on the great mass of people because the vast majority are practically unaffected or only very indirectly affected by general mental progress, and because the satisfaction of universal spiritual needs is, after all, independent of the exact form of belief.

There is no need to discuss examples of the innumerable rationalizations of apologetics. Perhaps the most striking of all are those which deal with the old fundamental dilemma that human suffering puts to dogmatic Christianity—God cannot be at once all-powerful and all-good, or he would have made the universe differently.

When we consider the moral code apart from its religious sanction we recognize that its authority is drawn wholly from the teaching of the herd. Morality, much more than religion, in the modern world at least, has the whole force of herd instinct behind it, because some form of morality is essential to keep the herd together and is felt to be so by every normal individual member. Though the moral codes of modern societies are not absolutely definite and rigid and may be modified within limits, yet the code actually accepted by the individual has as a consequence instinctive force, and correspondingly the action of the moral complex is often unconscious. Ideally, the moral code of a particular society should be exactly adapted to the current needs of the society, and the process of adaptation does, in fact, proceed continuously. Nevertheless, like human codes in general, the current code is always too rigid to fit all the circumstances of life, and not infrequently it conflicts rather sharply, in

special cases, with the dictates of common sense. Rationalization may then come into play to harmonize the action dictated by the instinctive impulse of morality with the opposite impulse of common sense.

Let us take as an instance the question of the maintenance of a marriage in which one of the partners has ceased to discharge the ordinary obligations of married life through becoming, we will suppose, drunken and cruel. Let us suppose that as a result the life of the other partner is made almost unendurable, and that the children are growing up under thoroughly bad conditions. The innocent partner is faced with the alternative of maintaining the miserable married life, or of arranging a separation. To simplify the case we will suppose that the direct religious sanction is absent, that all love between the couple has disappeared, and that there is no reasonable prospect of reforming the delinquent. Even under these extreme circumstances the decision may be to continue the married life, though common sense would clearly counsel a separation. And the cause of the decision may fairly be attributed to the instinctive force of the moral complex, one of the fixed ideas of which is that marriage is, under all circumstances, except perhaps in the case of adultery, a lifelong institution, to be maintained at every cost. The innocent partner may simply say that he or she feels separation to be impossible, and thus implicitly admit the instinctive nature of the decision; but very likely the decision will be rationalized. The scandal of the separation, the isolation of the separated life and the cowardice of giving up the struggle may all be exaggerated, while the wretched circumstances and hopeless nature of the life together are minimized and an appearance of reason thus given to the decision.

The rationalizations of conations arising from the complex of patriotism have naturally been very conspicuous during the Great War. Justification for hatred of the entire German race, inspired by the fire of militant patriotism,¹ has been

¹ It has often been pointed out that this has been much stronger in those who took no part in the actual fighting or in any useful national

sought in the records of German atrocities. Bad as these atrocities have actually been, they have been in some instances exaggerated, and have often been insisted upon with a satisfaction ill concealed by moral indignation, while recorded acts of kindness on the part of Germans have for the most part been minimized or ignored.¹ The German race has been represented by typical organs of English opinion as a race of evil-minded persons, every member of which must share the responsibility of the misdeeds of their government and of many of their soldiers.

Similarly, the non-rational German opinion that the English are a race of cold-hearted, selfish, calculating money-lovers, who instigated the other Allies to bring on the war in order to destroy England's great commercial rival, has been supported by every kind of sophistry and misrepresentation. Both these examples of rationalization are attempts to bring the beliefs associated with the hostile emotion involved in the great war conation into harmony with morality and common sense, which forbid the belief that either nation could justly be indicted in the way desired. As in the case discussed on page 184 this type of rationalization is specially insidious, because it always has some basis of objective truth. The deliberate policy of terrorism of the Prussian command, joined with the docility of the German soldier and with the primitive passions set free by victorious occupation of conquered territory, has produced a very considerable crop of outrages, and their apparent uniformity over all the areas involved lends colour to the charge of universal devilry. Similarly, the extraordinary success of England in establishing a world-wide empire, and developing world-wide com-

service. The fighting conation having no outlet in action causes more mental tension, a more painful affect, and hence a greater need for harmonization with conflicting complexes.

¹ It is not argued that German misdeeds do not in fact justify hatred, if hatred can ever be justified, but that the evidence of them, instead of being received with reluctance and sorrow, has been eagerly welcomed as justifying a pre-existing emotion lavished on an entire nation and derived from a complex of instinctive origin.

merce and maritime supremacy without apparent effort, and in the absence of deliberate and systematic organization to that end, was bound to arouse jealousy and envy in a rival newly entered upon the same field and whose strength lay in very different qualities. Taken together with the past success of England in profiting by the quarrels of her continental neighbours without using more than a fraction of her own potential military strength, and with her general aloofness from continental concerns and interests, it is not difficult to see how there arose the myth of the cold, calculating, selfish islander, so grotesquely at variance with the facts, but so admirably calculated to rationalize the hatred of England in German minds.

The rationalizations of the party politician have been referred to by Hart. The "good party man" is politically dominated by that form of the herd instinct which finds its expression in a political party; and the party complex determines his whole attitude towards politics. The complex consists of "certain constant systems of ideas and trends of thought" and "causes him to take up an attitude towards a proposed measure which is quite independent of any absolute merits that the latter may possess. If we argue with our politician we shall find that the complex will reinforce in his mind those arguments which support the view of his party, while it will infallibly prevent him from realizing the force of the arguments propounded by the opposite side . . . the individual himself is probably quite unaware of this mechanism in his mind. He fondly imagines that his opinion is formed solely by the logical pros and cons of the measures before him. We see, in fact, that not only is his thinking determined by a complex of whose action he is unconscious, but that he believes his thoughts to be the result of other causes which are in reality insufficient and illusory." * That these causes are actually insufficient and illusory is, of course, sufficiently shown by the fact that the equally honest and intelligent party man on the other side, whose political complex is of the opposite

* B. Hart: *The Psychology of Insanity*, p. 65.

complexion, believes that *his* view of the measure—a precisely opposite one—is determined solely by its logical pros and cons.¹

In so far as rationalization puts false legitimate motives in the place of real base ones, and in so far as it blinds the mind to the true causes of its conations and thus renders it incapable of perceiving their real significance, rationalization must, of course, be condemned as a form of unconscious or half conscious moral or intellectual dishonesty, which can be combated by proper training and the cultivation of the love of truth and clear thinking. Yet it must not be supposed that the formulation of "reasons" justifying a course of action which is actually prompted by instinct has no legitimate place in the work of the mind. Such a process is indispensable to the mind directly the moral life passes beyond the stage of instinctive obedience to the edicts of the herd, for which no further sanction is required—as soon, in fact, as the mind acquires a measure of moral and intellectual autonomy. Some kind of harmonization between the conations resulting from different instincts is a necessity to the developed mind. The most satisfying and complete harmony can only be attained by combining conflicting conations in a higher conation, by the process of integration whose nature was described in Chapter III. But the conditions of life may make impracticable the establishment of harmony by integration; or integration may, from the nature of the case, be impossible. Nevertheless, conflicting instincts still go on prompting to various conations, and it is neither desirable nor possible for all actions involving conflict to be suppressed. The attempt to justify such actions is then inevitable.

We must recognize that it is perfectly possible to have valid *reasons* for a course of conduct entirely distinct from the psychical *causes* of the conduct. But the formulation of such reasons is the same mental process (rationalization) whether the reasons be valid or invalid. The danger of the process lies, of course, in the strong desire of the mind to

¹ See also Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*; and Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.

justify itself, i.e. put an end to conflict, for this desire will very frequently lead to the acceptance of reasons as valid which are not valid. The danger can only be combated by a persistent effort to discover the actual cause of a conation, and a resolute determination to consider it from all points of view, its causal relations as well as its moral or rational justification. Only when this has been successfully accomplished is the mind really in a position to estimate how far a course of action is justified or not.

CHAPTER XVII

RATIONAL CONDUCT AND THE RATIONAL LIFE

It is a fundamental tenet of the New Psychology that all actions and the conations leading to them are motivated by, and gain their energy from, instinctive sources. This is not a conclusion susceptible of rigid proof. Like the doctrine of determinism in the psychic sphere, it is merely a working hypothesis which fits the facts better than any other. We have already considered many mental phenomena in which the working of instinct is disguised in a variety of ways, and in succeeding chapters we shall see that the primitive instincts group themselves into complexes whose workings, direct and indirect, actually cover the causation of all the most important human actions, aspirations and opinions. But if the actual motives of human actions are always instinctive, what part is left for reason, that most distinctive of human powers, to play in the drama of life? What do we mean when we speak of "rational conduct" and the "rational life"? Can our reason really control conduct, and, if so, how precisely can it do so?

The clue to the answer to these questions is to be found in the nature of the function of rationalization dealt with in the last chapter. We saw that while rationalization is often employed illegitimately to cover up an actual base motive with a manufactured legitimate one, yet the effort to attain mental harmony by the assignment of valid "reasons" for conduct which is actually instinctive in origin is a necessary function of the mind. This particular use of the rational function, the *ex post facto* justification of conduct, whether the justification is real or illusory, naturally does not suffice to secure a rational ordering of our lives.

Reason must play its part *before* action is taken if real harmony is to be secured, and it is only by the work of reason that harmony can be attained.

If we are right in supposing that the impulses to action are derived only from instinctive forces, it is clear that incompatible conations are certain to be initiated. What we need, then, is a selective agency which can choose between them, as well as a force capable of inhibiting some, while giving free passage to others. Where are we to find such an agency?

Some would point to the moral law,¹ which is supposed to tell us that such and such a course of action is enjoined, that another is permitted, while a third is forbidden. Now it is true that the moral law has a very special kind of authority, the nature and causes of which will be discussed in Chapter XX, and that such a code may be used as the selective agency that decides which of our instinctive conations may be allowed to continue to their goal in action, and which are to be diverted or inhibited. The moral law may also be used as the actual repressive force which arrests certain conations, because it has the force of herd instinct behind it. It is actually so used in both these ways in current practice—it is the agency which in fact keeps the vast majority of us “straight” in everyday life. It derives its “sanction” from herd instinct, one of the most powerful of our instincts, often strongly reinforced by fear.

But in itself the moral law is nothing but a code, with the defects and limitations shared by all codes. In the first place, of course, the moral code is not infallible, because its source is very far from being infallible, and, in fact, parts of it are constantly becoming obsolete with the changing conditions of human life. Then it does not fit all the cases which actually arise. The moral code is far less ready with promptings to positive action than with prohibitions, because

¹ By “the moral law” is here meant any moral code which draws its authority from the herd and is accepted by the individual, not, of course, the moral law deriving from the ultimate authority of our “ethical self” (see below).

it is of greater importance to the immediate safety and well-being of the herd that the individual should be prevented from doing certain disruptive things than that he should be enjoined to do things of positive value, so that the doing of these last is largely left to the chance working of his instincts. Hence as a guide to conduct the moral law is both imperfect and incomplete.

Furthermore, in obeying it, in so far as our reason does not assent to the obedience, we are obeying something arbitrary and external to ourselves, as we may obey, for instance, the law of the state to which we belong. We may indeed succeed in completely identifying our "will" with the code, but in doing so we certainly surrender our spiritual freedom and tend to paralyze our initiative. The highest development of the direction of conduct can only be attained if we preserve this freedom and initiative by preserving our spiritual autonomy instead of blindly obeying an external code.

In practice we must usually obey the moral law, because its dictates will often correspond with those of our own minds, which are largely fashioned by herd suggestion, and sometimes because it is expedient to bow to the authority of the herd. Also we find that the current moral code is supremely practical, exceedingly well adapted, for the most part, to the actual conditions of life, though there is a certain slowness in adaptation to changed conditions, and of course an entire absence of provision for special cases. On the whole, and broadly, the adaptation of the current moral code is very wonderful and arouses the same sort of admiration as the adaptation of the body and habits of an organism to its environment—though there, also, the adaptation is not complete and perfect in every detail. The moral code, of course, is part of the herd organism, and it has been slowly built up, modified and adapted to the actual conditions of herd life. That is why moral codes differ so much among different races, and even among neighbouring nations, according to the different conditions, circumstances, and temperaments of each. Hence, in obeying the moral code

the individual is obeying a practical rule of life which has been evolved in relation to the needs of the social organism to which he belongs. From that standpoint his obedience is fitting and his herd instinct supports it.

But we must, nevertheless, reject altogether the ultimate authority of the moral code to govern the individual life. The ultimate authority must be sought within the individual's own mind. In enquiring as to the nature of this authority we find that we must have a standard to replace the herd standard, an ideal to which we strive to conform, and this can only be represented by what has been called "the higher moral self." For convenience we will speak of it as the *ethical self*. The nature and origin of this ethical self are dealt with in Chapter XVIII. Here we must assume its existence. The ethical self not only gives the standard by which conduct is judged, it provides the necessary instinctive force required to enforce right conduct, to turn the other instincts to its purposes, to inhibit, where necessary, the conations which conflict with its standards. This instinctive force is not derived from a single primitive instinct, but is a sublimation of the primitive energy of those instincts which contribute to the formation of the ego-complex. It is a secondary creation, fashioned and consolidated in the fire of life by the interplay of the instinctive forces of the mind with the facts of experience.

To the ethical self the cognitive and rational power of the mind is an indispensable servant. This power is the only agent which can appreciate and sift the instinctive forces actually at work to form the conations which appear in the mind. All these forces must be taken into account, including, of course, the call of herd instinct as represented by the moral law. Only by this work of the rational function can a result be reached which represents the personality as a whole and is worthy of being identified with the will of the individual, and thus a real self-consistent harmony of thought and action attained.

In other words, knowledge and the capacity to use knowledge are essential to the highest type of conduct, just

as they are essential to man's control of external nature. Man cannot create the internal forces which impel him to action any more than he can create the forces of external nature. In either case he can only use them, diverting one into a new channel, letting a second have full play in its own, skilfully combining a third and fourth. Just as it is possible blindly to obey an external moral code, so it is possible to deal with material things by the guidance of a routine code, and up to a certain point the method is successful. But no code in either sphere can deal with all the possible cases that may arise; the rules, though right in the main, get out of date in some respects, and the man who trusts them implicitly will inevitably fail in certain emergencies. Nor can he hope for the highest success in any human career unless he will take all the data into consideration and let his reason guide his action.

The problems of conduct in those affairs of man's life into which moral factors enter must be dealt with in the same way. Here also he can only use the forces which pre-exist, and here also he must face all the facts and plan his actions in accordance with them if he is to use the pre-existing forces intelligently, if he is, on the one hand, to avoid being the slave of these forces, and on the other to avoid being the slave of an external code.

This, then, is what we mean by rational conduct in the full sense of the word. It necessarily involves full consciousness of all the springs of action—a consciousness often difficult, and sometimes impossible to attain, but always worth the effort to attain it.

It is often urged by moralists, and particularly by those who are concerned to insist on the validity of the moral law because they see behind it a supernatural sanction, that reason itself is a frail and fallible guide to conduct. This is true enough, because the human mind, for all its greatness, is altogether a frail and fallible thing, and especially because rationalization in the service of some instinct so often masquerades as the true rational process. The true rational process *must* take account of *all* the relevant facts,

and of their relative importance. It is here that the fallibility and frailty come in. It is so difficult, when we are driven towards a course of action by the unconscious or half conscious impulse of an instinct, or of a complex based upon an instinct, to bring into full consciousness all the facts and to estimate fairly their relevance and importance. But it can usually be done, if we are really determined to do it, if we will put truth and clarity of mind above the immediate gratification of instinct, if we doggedly insist on dragging the hidden sources of our impulses into the light of full consciousness. It is the easier path to follow blindly the current moral code, which indeed owes its currency to the fact that obedience to it is the easiest way to secure approximate uniformity of conduct in the interests of the herd.

We conclude, then, that reason, though incapable of initiating action, is indispensable as the co-ordinating and harmonizing agency of the mind. If it is not consciously used in the service of the ethical self as the supreme selective and directive agency in determining conduct, it will be abused by being prostituted in the service of some complex based on instinct. In no case can it be banished from the mental processes determining conduct. The striving after mental harmony is a fundamental attribute of the mind. It represents the effort to keep the poise and balance without which the mind becomes a chaos of conflicting instincts. The acceptance of an external code of belief and conduct suffices to maintain harmony so long as the current code has overwhelming authority, and before the rational function is directed to questions of conduct. But directly the authority of the herd becomes weakened this is no longer sufficient. The rational faculty prompts the mind to refuse implicit obedience to anything external, and the instincts begin to get out of control. This, of course, is why moralists so often denounce reason as a guide to conduct and stigmatize rationalists as immoral people. The only cure for the disturbance caused by this sceptical and destructive action of reason is to bring reason still further into play and make

it the supreme arbiter of conduct in the service of the ethical self. We must not, however, mislead ourselves into believing we have done this when we are merely "rationalizing" opinion or action based on a complex. We must unfalteringly drag into the light all the mental elements contributing to our opinion or pushing us towards action. Unknown or unrecognizable elements may be present, and these must be marked down along with those we can fully understand and appreciate. With practice in this higher rationalization of the ethical function more and more elements that baffled us will become intelligible. The process, as has been said, does not differ essentially from the study of a non-ethical problem involving action.

That is why the state of complete ethical freedom is ultimately identical with that of wisdom, and this again with that of virtue. We must be free from the unchecked sway both of our instincts and of all external moral codes before we can set reason free to do its work in the ethical sphere. Only when it has done its work on the experience of life do we attain to anything like wisdom. And only when harmony of mind and conduct is attained is the higher virtue realized.

PART VI

THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND

CHAPTER XVIII

THE PRIMITIVE INSTINCTS AND THE GREAT
COMPLEXES

THE general mechanism and mode of working of the mind have been sketched in outline, from the viewpoint of the New Psychology, in the preceding chapters. We have now to consider more in detail the nature and mode of working of the great dominant instincts which mould the actual content of the mind, determine the formation of what we have called the "universal complexes," and thus the essential outlines of human conduct. These great dominant instincts are, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, connected respectively with the self (or empirical ego, as it is sometimes technically called), with the herd (the social environment of the individual), and with sex. Biologically it is clear that these things must represent the most fundamental concerns of the individual, since the first corresponds with his own existence as an individual, the second with his existence as a gregarious animal, while the third conditions his power of reproducing the race. Psychologically the complexes corresponding with these three instincts bear by far the greater part of the affect of the mind, contain the psychical causes of all the major conflicts, and determine the greater part of human conduct. If we consider what exists in the mind outside the domain of the three great instincts, the

most important object of interest that will occur to us is *occupation*—a man's daily work, his career, or his hobby. These things, however, as we shall see, may legitimately be regarded as extensions of the ego-complex. The other complexes which exist in different human minds are of the most various kinds and complexions according to temperament, culture, civilization, and special surroundings, but none is universal in the sense in which the self, the herd, and sex are universal factors in the human mind. These other complexes, important as may be the part they play in the mind and in life, are essentially *accidental* and *particular*, as opposed to those determined by the three great dominant instincts which are *necessary* and *universal* throughout mankind.

A complex, as we have seen in Chapter V, is a well-defined system of ideas and emotions, created in the mind by the play of experience upon the primary forces of the mind—the instincts. In its simplest form the working of an instinct does not involve the intervention of a complex. An object in the environment excites the appropriate instinct, a conation directed towards it is initiated, passes over into action, and the instinct is, for the time being, satisfied. But the actual conditions of life do not permit, in most cases, of this simple and straightforward procedure. The conflict of the primary instincts with one another, and especially the conflict of herd instinct with the egoistic instincts, immensely limit the possibilities of instinctive action. This throws the mind, so to speak, back upon itself, and leads to the elaboration of the mental mechanism intervening between the exciting object and the motor response of the organism. The paths from the one to the other become indirect, the possibilities of satisfaction are limited by the intervention of conflicting instincts. The checking and imprisonment of the libido lead to the construction of bypaths, through which the instinct, baulked of its direct outlets, seeks with varying success an indirect or a substituted satisfaction.

This process leads to the storing up of the energy of

the libido, with its associated affect, in systems (complexes) of mental elements connected with the objects of desire. When such a system is stimulated by the focusing of attention on an object which excites it, the stored and imprisoned libido strives to discharge itself, rushing along the conative channels and seeking release in action. If action is barred the affect becomes painful, and if it is constantly denied the mind as a whole may refuse to tolerate the pain and one or other of the means described in Chapter X is taken to remove it. In the case of a weak complex not actuated by the energy of one of the strong primary instincts, failure to discharge the appropriate conation will not result in intolerable pain, the psychic energy involved in the complex being easily removed to another sphere.

The great primary instincts, from their very strength, cannot help antagonizing one another, instant satisfaction of any one, on simple and straightforward lines, being most frequently incompatible with the equally strong demands of the others. Consequently it is the great primary instincts which are most prolific of strong and important complexes, and these, in fact, together dominate by far the greater part of human life. Indeed, if we allow the extensions of the ego into the external world to be included in the ego-complex, we may fairly say that they dominate the whole of human life. Each of the great primary instincts may be responsible for many different complexes, and the segregation of the different systems of ideas and emotions formed by a single fundamental instinct may be so complete that the different complexes formed by one and the same instinct often come into conflict with one another. Thus, owing to the complexity of his social environment a man may belong to several different herds, and these, each appealing, within his mind, to the fundamental herd instinct which is rooted there, may call upon him for different, and completely incompatible, courses of conduct. And the same, as we shall see, is true of sex. Harmony and peace are attained by the mind precisely in proportion to the fewness of its

strong complexes, or to the success with which it reconciles their claims.

The outlines of the major complexes formed by the great primary instincts are frequently very vague in consciousness, because they are rooted in what we have called the primary unconscious. This is perhaps specially true of the ego-complex, whose basis is the most fundamental part of the psychic being. Generally, the deeper-lying psychic elements are the least readily brought into consciousness (see Chapter IV), while they are the constant unrealized dominants of the mind. The pathological complexes, usually modified from normal complexes based on the primary instincts, are sharply segregated from the rest of the mind and have become secondarily unconscious, except where, temporarily or continuously, as in dreams or in mental derangement or insanity, they dominate or obsess the entire mind. The normal accidental or particular complexes, on the other hand, are mainly conscious, and do not dominate the mind except at the will of the individual.

In his very valuable *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Dr. McDougall makes an attempt to discover the primitive instincts which lie at the roots of all the affective and conative activities of the mind. From the emotions (affects) corresponding with these he forms the "complex emotions," each compounded of two or more simple emotions, and the "sentiments," which, following Shand, he defines as the mental dispositions formed by the attachments of affects to concrete objects; e.g. the "complex emotion" of love, forming a "sentiment" in relation to an individual person. These "sentiments" are really the affects attached to complexes according to the terminology here employed.¹

Of "simple instincts" McDougall distinguishes twelve, of which a list is given below. The names are mostly

¹ McDougall, however, includes the cognitive and conative elements in his sentiments, thus making them *equivalent* to the complexes of this book (cf. Preface, p. 9).

taken from the characteristic conation of each, the name of the corresponding affect (where it has a name) being given in italics.

Flight, <i>fear</i>	Parental instinct, <i>tenderness</i>
Pugnacity, <i>anger</i>	Reproduction (sex)
Repulsion, <i>disgust</i>	Feeding
Curiosity, <i>wonder</i>	Gregariousness
Self-assertion, <i>elation</i> ("positive self-feeling")	Acquisition
Submission or self-abasement, <i>sub- jection</i> (negative self-feeling)	Construction

Dr. McDougall's efforts in the very difficult work of distinguishing and describing the elemental unitary instincts which are together supposed to form the entire basis of the human mind, are exceedingly valuable. No criticism of his detailed analysis will be attempted here, since we are more concerned with seeking to discover and explore the dominant combinations of factors which determine the great activities of the human mind.¹ From this point of view the "simple instincts" of McDougall are obviously of very unequal importance, i.e. they play very different parts, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in building up these combinations.

Taking the list, then, without criticism and at its face value, we find that the instincts² of self-assertion and self-abasement form the basis of the ego-complex, and the instinct of gregariousness that of the herd complex, while the instinct of reproduction and parental instinct lie at the root of the sex complex. Of the remaining seven "simple instincts," all are concerned in the first place with man's relation to his material environment, and at the same time are so

¹ The elucidation of the simple unitary impulses of the human mind is not yet, in the author's judgment, completely satisfactory. A careful correlation of the entire series of psychoanalytical results with knowledge derived from other sources will have to be undertaken before we can arrive at a really secure basis.

² It may be questioned if these are "instincts" in quite the same sense as most of the others, but they serve very well as part of the provisional basis.

intimately connected with the ego that they may almost be said to form part of the structure of the ego-complex. But this is true in different ways and in different degrees in the case of the different instincts. Thus, feeding is an instinct on which the physical basis of the ego absolutely depends, and thus stands by itself. Flight and pugnacity are instincts very closely connected with self-preservation, but nevertheless they stand distinctly apart from the centre of the self. Of repulsion and curiosity almost the same may be said. Curiosity is of specially great qualitative and quantitative importance in the development of the mind. It is the most potent instrument of primitive human development, and is also notably important in later mental evolution as one of the bases of all scientific discovery, while its affect, wonder (if, indeed, wonder be truly the corresponding affect), enters largely into the higher affective life. The instinct of acquisition is closely allied to that of feeding—biologically, perhaps, it is an offshoot, since the primary acquisition of the organism is the acquisition of food, which may be consumed at once, or may be stored like other things which are acquired. The instinct of construction is of incidental origin and subordinate importance in the earliest stages of human development, but acquisition and construction have, it is clear, been the basis of the largest parts of man's material achievements during the later phases of his evolution, and have profoundly elaborated and modified the form and structure of human society. In so far as they are concerned with occupation and career they appear, together with curiosity, as the bases of the most important extensions of the ego-complex, and they react upon it profoundly, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Thus, we see that while a single instinct, according to McDougall's enumeration, is responsible for the various forms of herd complex, and two others for the various forms of sex complex, a number of distinct primitive instincts combine in the making of the ego-complex. The relations of the simple instincts to the ego-complex may perhaps be represented diagrammatically somewhat as follows (Fig. 10).

When it is said that the "outlying" instincts enter to some extent into the structure of the ego-complex, and that the minor complexes they may form react upon and modify the ego-complex, it must be remembered that the same is true of the herd and sex instincts, which, while they centre round perfectly distinct entities, yet react upon and profoundly modify the ego-complex.

The contrasted instincts¹ of self-assertion and self-abasement, with their affects, positive and negative self-feeling, belong to the very centre of the ego. They determine the whole tone of mental activity, and modify most profoundly the conations and affects of the other instincts. McDougall




FIG. 10.—RELATION OF SIMPLE INSTINCTS
TO THE EGO-COMPLEX.

recognizes this in constructing many of his "complex emotions" by compounding the emotions of positive and negative self-feeling with the other simple emotions. Thus, envy is said to be compounded of the primary emotions of anger and negative self-feeling, and contempt is said to be a combination of disgust and positive self-feeling. Also, as McDougall argues at considerable length, the self-regarding sentiment, which is based on self-feeling, is the foundation of all the higher morality.

The complexes corresponding with the great primary instincts, as has been said, constantly interact upon and

¹ See footnote 2 on p. 203.

modify one another. Upon their harmony and balance depends the proper development of mind and character. All the minor complexes of the mind, however large a share they may claim of conscious thought and practical activity, however important they may be in developing the richness and variety of mental content and environment, may be regarded as segregations, modifications, or offshoots of mental material activated by these great instincts.

CHAPTER XIX

THE EGO-COMPLEX

THE complex relating to the self is in all respects the most fundamental of the great universal complexes. Its origins go back in history, both of the race and of the individual, to the first appearance of mental elements, and belong essentially to the unconscious groundwork of the mind. Its appearance and elaboration in the foreconscious are the appearance and elaboration of *self-consciousness* in the strict sense.

The first constituents are the parts of the body and the mass of sensations arising from them, and particularly from the internal organs—the “common sensations” as they are technically called. These common sensations are scarcely analysable, the means of exploring them being almost wholly lacking, and thus their psychical components belong very largely to what we have called the “primary unconscious.” In so far as they appear in consciousness they are vague and undefined, but their affect is in the aggregate immensely powerful—the most powerful emotional factor of mental life. As Jung remarks, one’s own personality is the firmest and strongest complex, maintaining itself through all psychic storms. Other complexes, even those of the herd and of sex, which we have distinguished as universal, may wax and wane in importance, but the ego-complex necessarily maintains its dominance so long as life lasts, because it is rooted in the physical unity of the body and because it carries the always living emotional tone associated with the body.

The remaining constituents of the ego-complex are the

thoughts, emotions and strivings associated with the self, particularly those which are habitual. Many of these lie in the foreconscious, i.e. they arise into consciousness easily and completely: of some the mind is no more than half conscious: others, again, lie in the primary or in the secondary (Freudian) unconscious. All these elements, which are concerned with the mind rather than with the body of the individual, are, in the healthy mind, firmly knit to the bodily group, because of the organic unity of mind and body. Habitual introspection, the habit of turning the mind inward upon itself, develops this part of the ego-complex by raising the half conscious or unconscious elements into consciousness, so that thereafter they are always accessible; and by making clear, or seeming to make clear, the interrelations of different elements or groups of elements.

The practice of introspection may, indeed, over-develop the ego-complex, so that it forms too large a part of the conscious content of the mind, overshadowing altogether the other great universal complexes. This may happen equally whether the mind be base or noble, whether its reactions towards the empirical self are concerned with "selfish" interests, or with the idealistic solution of profound ethical problems. The mind, then, becomes "self-centred," and the balance essential to mental health tends to be lost. It must not be supposed that a person who is ordinarily called selfish necessarily has an over-developed ego-complex. The conscious representation of the ego in such a person's mind may be very slight, and yet his external acts, prompted by unconscious self-regarding instincts, may be predominantly in his own selfish interests. On the other hand, the acts of a person with an ego-complex greatly over-developed by introspection may be almost entirely "unselfish."

An overweening sense of "self-importance" is an expression of over-development of the ego on the half-conscious plane, accompanied by an excessive ego-affect. Excessively "self-important" people are not much given to introspection, and their ego-complex is little focused or developed on the cognitive side. It is the affect of the

complex, attached to the various aspects of the self, the body, or the mind, and showing itself as vanity, conceit, or pride—various aspects of self-love—that is over-developed here. Self-respect, on the other hand, is the normal affect of the ego-complex. Injury to self-respect damages the ego-complex, and the breaking of self-respect cripples it.

The conations of the ego-complex are, first of all, self-maintenance—the “will to live”—and, secondly, self-advancement, the magnification of the individual—in its highest form Nietzsche’s “will to power.” The ego reaches out in order to develop itself with the help of its environment, and what we may call the “wider ego” so formed includes part of the environment. William James expressed this strikingly in his description of what he called “the hierarchy of the Me’s.” Thus the wider ego includes a man’s clothes as a necessary adjunct of his body, his house and other possessions, and often his wife and children: in the case of an absolute monarch, his country. The extent to which these are identified as parts of the wider self varies, of course, in different people, but the conation of the ego is to include as much as possible and to identify all that is included with the self as closely as possible. The tendency to carry this process to excess is corrected by the development of the other great instincts, and in the normal mind a balance is maintained between them.

The instinct of acquisition is thus seen as the primary force leading directly to the extension of the ego-complex. Its first form is the acquisition of food, the basic function of all organisms. Necessary at first to maintain the body, the physical basis of the self, in existence, the instinct of acquisition is carried far beyond the bounds of such necessity and made the means of enlargement of the ego and of the consequent increase in its scope and value.

The excessive developments of the egoistic instinct of acquisition are only too well known, and are the causes of many of the worst troubles which hamper the smooth and harmonious evolution of the herd. Checked by herd law in their naïve expressions—the forcible seizure of persons

and of property for conversion to the use and enjoyment of the individual—they find outlets through every kind of indirect channel. The greed of wealth, the overmastering desire for the magnification of the ego that the possession of wealth brings, leads to every kind of dishonesty and chicanery on the part of individuals and on the part of those unholy combinations of individuals, the sinister bond of which is the common motive of unlimited grab. The immemorial struggle between the “haves” and the “have nots” is even now rising to a new pitch of intensity, and unless the herd finds some means of removing it, or at least of mitigating it much more effectually than in the past, the conflict will involve the human race in overt and irreparable disaster.

Constructive activity is a similar means of extending the limits of the self. The origin of the constructive instinct is less remote in history, but it is deep-rooted in all the dominant races of mankind. If a man not only secures his food but builds himself a house, he has by so much extended the scope of his personality. What a man has made is part of himself, in a more intimate sense even than what he has merely acquired, and that whether it is a material or a mental thing, a railway or a social organization, a picture or a system of philosophy. Sharply differing from the instinct of acquisition in its effect on the well-being of the herd, the instinct of construction is perhaps the most valuable instrument in the development and progress of the human race. It has the blessed quality of enriching alike the individual and the community, and except in a few degraded and perverse forms it stands out as the most potent positive factor in human development.

The ego-complex is gradually developed and extended, from earliest infancy throughout the life of the individual. Normally it continually grows and expands with age and experience, at least until senility sets in, but it is seriously influenced on the affective side by success or failure in life. For instance, if a man steadily progresses in his career, obtaining suitable advancement or consistent success, his self-respect constantly increases and his ego-complex becomes

constantly more stable. If, on the other hand, his hopes are blighted and he fails to realize his ambitions or to obtain the advancement he expected, his self-esteem may be severely wounded and the whole of his ego-complex seriously damaged. If a set-back of this sort leads to painful conflict it is likely that partial segregation may ensue, i.e. that the extended ego-complex may tend to break up, and parts of it may be more or less repressed, i.e. attention refused to them. Certain types of the "disappointed man," as was suggested in the discussion of repression (Chapter XI), have probably experienced some such process, but the subject has been very little investigated.

Adler has described and analysed the profound effects on mind and character of attempts at psychical compensation—and over-compensation—for inferior bodily structure.¹ One of the best known examples of psychical compensation is that of the extraordinary increase in the efficiency of the senses of hearing, touch and direction in the blind, brought about not by modification of the sense organs themselves but by education of the mental structures used in appreciating and interpreting the sensations received from these organs. In this case, the sense of sight being wholly absent, the compensation takes place in connexion with other organs, but extra development commonly occurs in relation to the defective organ itself. Often quoted instances are the stammering boy, Demosthenes, who trained himself to become a great orator, and Beethoven, with congenital ear trouble, which finally resulted in deafness; Adler quotes cases of successful painters with marked visual defects. The notable success in developing mental organization corresponding with the defective organs Adler attributes to the difficulty of normal adaptation to environment leading to the inferior faculty being constantly in the focus of its bearer's interest and thus becoming the subject of perpetual conscious or unconscious attention.

¹ Adler, *Eine Studie über Minderwertigkeit von Organen*, 1907. Translated as *A Study of Organ Inferiority and its Psychical Compensation*, New York, 1917.

General weakness of constitution, based on a defective central nervous system, may provoke a general reaction, which profoundly affects the whole mind and character, and may react upon the body to the point of actually developing conspicuous robustness. Theodore Roosevelt seems to have been an excellent instance of this effect. An exceptionally weakly boy, he struggled against his infirmities so successfully that he became a noted roughrider, big-game hunter, and one of the most forceful politicians of his generation. Most of us know of similar if less conspicuous instances.

In a second work¹ Adler has discussed the effect of unsuccessful attempts at psychical compensation, in which he sees the whole foundation of neurotic character. While the validity of Adler's general view of the mind cannot be admitted, and some of his claims are greatly exaggerated, there can be no doubt that in this work he presents a picture wonderfully true to life of a certain type of "neurotic," and his theory of the causation of this type of character and behaviour appears to be well founded. Similar traits, in which the same kind of causation can be recognized, exist in many people who are not generally regarded as "neurotics."

The primitive human mind, as represented, for instance, by that of the young child, is at first bewildered by the manifoldness and apparent chaos of the reality with which it has to deal. With its inadequate instruments for grasping and finding its way among this confusing material, the mind has to adopt the simplest conceptions, and among these the simple antithesis is the easiest of all. One of the most primitive of these conceptions is the antithesis *up-down* or *above-below*, which, as Adler points out, is necessarily most firmly implanted in the mind of the child by the physical facts of the action of gravity and the power of man to stand erect, reinforced by the falling connected with weakness and death and the increased power of resisting gravity as the child grows. This conception is extended

¹ *Ueber den nervösen Charakter*, Wiesbaden, 1912. Translated as *The Neurotic Constitution*, New York, 1916.

to nearly every human relationship, the "upper" position becomes the goal of effort, and comes to symbolize all that is desirable in life. Especially does this way of looking at life characterize and obsess the mind of the weak child, in whom a sense of inferiority—of being "below"—is never absent, and whose ego-complex this sense most profoundly affects. There is a constant feeling of insecurity, of inability to cope with the world, and correspondingly a constant effort at compensation. In cases like Roosevelt's the struggle is successful, and a particularly vigorous and forceful personality results. But in many cases success is very partial, and the sense of inferiority remains, accompanied by pathetic efforts to attain security and to assert superiority in all sorts of fictitious ways.

One of the typical manifestations of the sense of insecurity is the effort to "keep in touch with the enemy" (i.e. the whole environment), to avoid surprise, by constant exploration, continual testing and re-testing, extreme ultra-conscientious thoroughness, and the greatest caution before taking a step in advance.¹ All this easily becomes excessive, out of harmony with the real requirements of the situation, and leads to love of detail for its own sake, to an incapacity for making decisions, to vacillation and dilatoriness in action—giving us the picture of a well-known type of mentality. These manifestations may alternate with violent assertions of superiority, due to an over tense ego-complex, which represents the attempt to compensate for the innate sense of inferiority.

Adler traces the same neurotic tendencies in many other well-known traits of behaviour, for instance in the quite unreasonable expectation that the partner in marriage will provide the sense of security which the individual is unable

¹ It is interesting to note that these qualities are characteristic of the successful scientific investigator, and when not carried to excess are indeed a necessary part of the scientific equipment. This is a case where traits which may easily become neurotic, can, if applied to reality with a definite purpose, be made to serve one of the highest of human activities.

to obtain for him or herself. When this expectation fails to be realized the disillusion provides a basis for distrust and antagonism, and attempts to assert superiority by humiliating the partner. We are all familiar with the weak and fussy husband who is constantly striving to humiliate his wife by perpetual unreasonable fault-finding, and equally so with the neurotic semi-invalid wife who asserts her baffled desire for real superiority by making slaves of all the members of her household. Sometimes the humiliation of others and the assertion of superiority are secured by the opposite of the obvious method, through the parade of "unselfishness," through the display of excessive modesty, and the like. Akin to this are extreme indulgences in feelings of guilt and orgies of self-torture for real or imagined sins, generally unaccompanied by any serious attempts to effect improvement.

Thus the "inferiority complex" may account for a whole series of well-known human traits: on the one side many which are clearly neurotic; but on the other, by the formulation of a clear ideal contrasted with the felt weakness, and by strenuous efforts directed to its realization in accordance with the actual conditions, it may be used as the basis of fine human endeavour and of outstanding attainment.

The primitive instinct or instincts which lie at the root or form the core of the ego-complex are not easy to define and describe. It is always most difficult to put into words what is most intimate and nearest to the centre of the self. We might speak of an instinct of self-maintenance, but the term covers too wide a range of conations. McDougall's method of exhausting the primitive human activities, and then trying to analyse them into the simplest conations with their corresponding affects, is perhaps the best method of approach. In this way he arrives at self-assertion and self-abasement, with what he aptly calls positive and negative self-feeling as the corresponding affects. The instincts of feeding, in the first place, and then of pugnacity, repulsion, flight, and perhaps of curiosity, serve as the principal tools of the function of self-maintenance.

The twin instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement,¹ with their affects of positive and negative self-feeling (elation and depression) are normally excited by the cognitions of relative superiority and inferiority to another person. But these emotions and conations also arise as the result of other exciting causes, especially as concomitants of the psychic pleasure and pain following on the success or thwarting of conations in general. They enter into and affect the tone of the ego-complex in a notable degree. Upon them is based that all-important affective constituent of the highly developed ego-complex, which McDougall calls the self-regarding sentiment. This may be identified with what we have called self-respect. The self-regarding sentiment is normally built up, as McDougall shows,² in relation to the herd, that is to say, the empirical ego-complex is largely the representation in the individual's own mind of himself as a member of the herd, and it defines his status, his rights, and his obligations in that capacity. This is the case because man, as a gregarious animal, is entirely unable to divest himself of herd relations, which are constantly moulding the whole of his affects and conations. His ego-complex, in fact, is very largely, though not entirely, the image of himself that he sees reflected from the minds of his fellows, modified by herd suggestion. Only in the realms of pure reason or pure creation, and momentarily, when his mind is occupied with passionate emotion and conation of any kind, can man temporarily escape from the bonds of his status as a herd animal. Nevertheless, the highly-developed self-regarding sentiment can and does escape, as McDougall also shows,³ not indeed from the obligations of membership of the herd, but from the immediate pressure of the herd, as it is normally exercised on the average man. "Conduct on its highest plane is regulated by an ideal of conduct that enables a man to act in the way that seems to him right regardless of the praise or blame of his immediate social environment." ⁴

¹ See footnote on p. 203. ² *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 186 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. viii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

This highly-developed self-regarding sentiment, which enables a man thus to escape from the immediate pressure of the herd, is nothing else than the ethical self, which, as we saw in Chapter XVII, is the highest authority in conduct, and the existence of which is necessary to moral freedom. The factors necessary to its development seem to be first a well-consolidated ego, with a harmonious adjustment of its different functions. Particularly those great twin instincts¹ of self-assertion and self-abasement must be well balanced, neither being exaggerated nor dwarfed. The basal ego-affect, self-respect, must be well developed, without self-love, conceit, or, on the other hand, excessive humility or self-depreciation. Secondly, the individual's relation to the herd must be accurately appreciated and felt. He must neither cut himself off from the influences of the herd, on the one hand, nor on the other become excessively dependent upon it. He must give full weight to herd morality and herd opinion, because a member of any herd owes, and if he is normally constituted, feels that he owes, a certain respect to the mind of the herd to which he belongs, and without which he could not continue to live. If he denies or represses this relation he is denying or repressing something based on a fundamental instinct, and he will suffer accordingly. But he must never be a slave to the herd, and accept its opinions or its morality as representing that authority which he can only find in himself, though he may prefer to project it upon an ideal God. Thirdly, he must employ reason to the fullest extent of which he is capable in the service of his ethical self, for only knowledge, and the use of knowledge, can enable him to deal rightly with the problems of life. These precepts amount, no doubt, to a counsel of perfection, but they clearly represent the only worthy ideal of the ethical self.

A very important feature of the ego is the desire for objective truth and the power of recognizing it when gained. Upon these is based the possibility of constructing the whole fabric of science, and they are essential servants in

¹ See footnotes on p. 203.

the building up of the ethical self. By objective truth is meant the kind of knowledge recognized by all normal minds as valid when all the relevant facts are appreciated.

The desire for objective truth is certainly not a primary element of the human mind. The power of recognizing it has been gradually built up by the experience of man in relation to external nature in the way that was briefly indicated on pp. 174-176, and the sense thus developed has been transferred to the abstract field and to his own personality. The *test* of this kind of truth is comprehensive self-consistency, a harmony between its parts, which does not break down when contact is made with other fields of cognition. The desire for it is partly utilitarian, based upon its usefulness in practical life, since it is essential to the conduct of all practical life, and is partly based upon the instincts of curiosity, acquisition, and construction, and upon that desire for harmony and unification which we have noted in previous chapters as a fundamental need of the human mind. Curiosity can, however, often be satisfied by very fragmentary knowledge, and harmony and unification can be and are constantly secured by all sorts of other means, for instance, by rationalization and projection, which have no connexion with the attainment of objective truth. We have to recognize a new entity—the ideal of objective truth—set up in the human mind as a result of the coming together of all these factors, which are merely its raw material.

There seems, in fact, to be a cognitive and rational self, parallel with the ethical self, which is one of the highest products of the mind, and which is based, like the ethical self, upon the mind's need for internal and external harmony. The primitive instinct of curiosity is one of its most important instruments, and the primitive instincts of acquisition and construction, originally confined to material things, co-operate in a sublimated form. Its enemies are many, just as are the enemies of the ethical self, because the mind persists in taking short cuts to unification. Incomplete knowledge, regarded as complete, and false theories may satisfy the

mind, especially if they minister directly to the satisfaction of the primitive instincts, just as false views of the moral order and of God may satisfy it. The 'ruth may be repressed because it does not suit some of the untamed instincts, because, for instance, it does not sufficiently magnify the ego, or because it conflicts with some distorted moral code. But once the ideal of the cognitive and rational self has been set up it cannot be destroyed any more than can the ideal of the ethical self.

Thus we see that the ego-complex, on its mental side, i.e. so far 'as it represents the mental elements of the personality, is normally built up by the interaction of the group of instincts immediately related to the self with herd instinct. The self-regarding instincts, directly they come into contact, so to speak, with other personalities, begin to be modified, checked and pruned in various ways, mainly, as we shall see in the next chapter, as a result of herd suggestion. This process of moulding begins in infancy, directly a child finds out that it cannot on all occasions have everything it wants, and remains constantly at work up to and throughout adult life. Sometimes the ego-complex is hampered in its due development, impoverished, or partly repressed as a result of excessive pressure of the herd ; sometimes it escapes unduly from that pressure, yielding only in certain externals, and there results an ego-complex swollen on the affective and conative sides. Some sort of equilibrium is commonly reached, but the highest development of self is only attained when, after the process of moulding by the action of herd instinct, the ego-complex undergoes a further internal development, and conduct, the translation into action of the conations arising from the ego-complex, comes to be regulated by something approaching ideal self-knowledge and self-respect. c

CHAPTER XX

THE HERD INSTINCT

THAT man is a gregarious animal is a sufficiently obvious fact; and the implications of his gregariousness may be thought too well known to need emphasis. Yet the implications of the obvious are often imperfectly realized and understood, and it is striking how little the consequences of man's gregariousness—its fundamental effect on the constitution of his mind and the determination of his beliefs and conduct—are generally realized. If one tells the average thoughtful man that his mental make-up and its expression in his beliefs and actions are determined by his relations to the society in which he lives, in a degree comparable to that in which they are determined, for instance, by the self-regarding instincts and by sex, he will look at one with doubt and wonder if he does not meet the suggestion with a flat denial.¹ And yet a survey of the mental phenomena connected with the social habit in man can lead us to no other conclusion.

The profound importance of the social relation on the human mind is clearly brought out by McDougall in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, where, as we have seen in the last chapter, the development of the ego-complex in the mind of the individual is shown to be conditioned in all its phases by the individual's relation to his fellow men. But the instinctive basis of this profound effect of social environment on the human mind is not adequately developed by the author. The instinct of "gregariousness,"

¹ The psychological causes of this difficulty in realizing the primary importance of herd instinct will be considered later on.

i.e. of association with the herd, is recognized and described, and this no doubt forms the biological basis from which the whole herd instinct has been developed, but the specific effect of the herd on the individual mind involves something more than the mere instinct of association with the herd. It is to Trotter that we owe the explicit recognition and clear statement of an instinct based on *the specific sensitiveness of the individual mind of the gregarious animal to suggestions arising from the herd.*¹ We have, in fact, to recognize that the gregarious animal is instinctively prompted not only to be *in* the herd but also to be *of* it. The normal individual man *must* obey suggestions arising from his social unit, or he will be as miserable as if he is physically cut off from human society.

This reaction to influences arising from the herd is a necessary result of the gregarious habit. Gregariousness is not merely a habit superadded to the individual's characteristics, leaving his mental make-up unaltered or only superficially altered. It is a condition which vitally affects his whole mental constitution, because it makes him no longer a free unit depending upon and responsible to himself alone, but, to some extent at least, an *organ* in a larger unit, depending upon and responsible to that larger unit—the herd. This can be seen very clearly in the case of certain animal herds, such as the bee swarm and the wolf pack. In such cases the individuals composing the herd are absolutely dependent on one another for the well-being and maintenance of the whole social organism on which they all depend. In other words, the herd in these cases

¹ W. Trotter, "Herd Instinct and its bearing on the Psychology of Civilized Man," *Sociological Review*, 1908. Reprinted in *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, 1916. Professor McDougall refers this suggestibility, like all suggestibility, to the "instinct" of submission. Even if we admit that Trotter's "herd instinct" is secondary in *origin* (clearly it could not develop in the ancestors of man till they became gregarious, while in the child it must take origin through his relations to his parents and family), it has become a well consolidated instinctive mechanism with the characteristics of a "simple instinct," and it is not misleading in practice to treat it as such.

is extremely closely knit, or to use the scientific phrase, is very highly integrated. In the case of the bee or ant community, the integration reaches so high a pitch that the individual insect can scarcely be regarded as more than an organ of the social organism. With the subordination of the individual goes differentiation of different individuals to serve specific ends, just as in the animal body different tissues and organs are set apart to perform different functions for the well-being of the whole organism. The perfect females, workers and drones, of a bee community are differentiated in this way—none of these classes can maintain themselves without the co-operation of the others. In certain ant communities the differentiation goes further, a special class of "soldiers" is set apart for the defence of the whole. In the social communities of non-human mammals the differentiation of parts, i.e. of classes of individuals performing special work for the whole community, does not reach so high a pitch, but the dependence of the members of the herd upon one another is still very marked. The wolf pack works as a whole, and is a far more efficient mechanism for carrying out its main business—the hunting and killing of prey—than the individual wolf would be. In certain cases, at any rate, the individual wolf perishes from starvation if separated from the pack, because it cannot bring down its quarry alone. Similarly the gregarious herbivorous animals, e.g. deer, horses, cattle, sheep, rabbits, depend upon the herd organization for defence against the carnivora. The individual is defenceless, and is soon killed and eaten if it becomes separated from the herd.

When we come to consider human societies we find a similar but much more complex interdependence of individuals. The comparison of a developed human society with an animal organism has often been made. We meet with the same sort of division of labour between different classes of the community as we find among the organs and tissues of the animal body, and the same sort of dependence of each upon the others and upon the well-

being of the whole organism. The correspondence is not, of course, absolute and complete. Even when the society is most complex and the classes are most strictly subordinated, the individual human being retains a greater autonomy than is the case with the tissue or organ of an animal body; and this depends primarily on the physical separateness and power of reproduction of the individual organisms of which the social community is composed. The power of adapting himself to changed circumstances possessed by the individual man is much greater than that of the individual animal, and this adaptability results from his more highly developed mind and consequent decreased dependence on highly specialized instincts. But even so there are very many cases, especially in complex civilized societies, where the individual must actually die of hunger or exposure if he is completely separated from his herd.

All this dependence of the gregarious individual on his herd organization has the profoundest effect on his mental constitution. He must obey the impulses of the herd or he ceases to act as part of the herd, and becomes cut off from the herd activities upon which its and his well-being depend. Thus arises the herd instinct or group of instincts, with their associated cognitions, affects and conations. The cognitions are the recognition of the herd and its call to him, the affects are represented by the desire to be one with the herd, not only physically but mentally, and the feeling of satisfaction, harmony and peace when the desired oneness is attained. The conations are the striving to attain and maintain this mental and physical union with the higher entity. The whole set of phenomena has all the characteristics of the great instinctive reactions—their universality, their non-rational character, the satisfaction when the conation is fulfilled in action, the blind misery when it is persistently thwarted.

Trotter has shown in a perfectly convincing way that a large number of the non-rational beliefs of civilized men are directly traceable to the effect of herd suggestion. Such beliefs have the same a priori character, the same

quality of utter convincingness, as beliefs based on other instincts, such as that good food or an attractive member of the opposite sex are desirable things. The difference between the beliefs arising directly from instinct and those which are the result of herd suggestion is that these last are not *specifically* related to the instinctive mechanism, while the former are. *Anything* may be believed provided it is suggested by the herd. When such beliefs appear to conflict with reason they are rationalized, in order that the harmony of the mind may not be disturbed (Chapter XVI). The rationalization may or may not be justified, but the existence of the beliefs themselves has nothing whatever to do with objective truth—it is simply the result of the sensitiveness of the mind of the gregarious animal to herd suggestion.

The whole system of morality and the moral law¹ are the direct outcome of herd organization, and the felt obligation to obey the moral law is a direct expression of herd instinct. The moral law is primarily the rule of the herd to regulate the behaviour of its members. The herd's moral law, like its other characters, is subject, of course, to natural selection, and therefore, in a general way, is useful to the herd. Often it is very intimately and beautifully adapted to the needs of the community. Sometimes, on the other hand, it is vestigial, adapted to circumstances that have long passed away and maintaining itself only by the inertia of tradition. Often exceedingly useful features are closely blended with undesirable or actually harmful survivals. But whatever the relative value of the precepts which form the moral code, the appeal of all to the individual members of the herd has the same basis. The "moral sense" is the sensitiveness of the individual to the call of the herd to regulate his conduct according to herd law.

The moral law holds for animal communities just as it does for human societies. Mr. Kipling, one of our greatest modern exponents of the glories of herd life and the herd

¹ In the sense defined in the footnote on p. 193.

instinct, has brought this out in his delightful stories¹ of the wolf pack and the bee-hive. But for the solitary animal it does not hold at all. One can no more talk of the morals of a tiger than of the morals of an oak tree. Trotter very aptly remarks that while the cat and the dog alike fear punishment for acts which they know from past experience will be considered as blameworthy by their human masters, the cat's effort is only to escape, while the dog will actually come, though reluctantly, to be punished. The dog knows he has done *wrong*, he has a *sense of sin*, and recognizes that punishment is his *due*, and that his master, whom he puts in the place of his herd leader, is *right* to inflict punishment. The sense of *guilt* of a dog is obvious to all from his expression when he has been disobeying the rules. The cat has no such moral sense, because it is not a gregarious animal.

The impulse to obey the moral law is perhaps the most typical expression of the herd instinct in the mind of the individual. In its pure form it differs from law enforceable by the herd or its representatives under legal penalties in carrying its "sanction" primarily in the mind of each individual, though fear of herd disapproval or ostracism powerfully reinforces the primary sanction. We may obey a law of the state which strikes us as being wholly trivial and futile, i.e. which appeals to nothing in our own minds, solely from fear of the penalty attached to its breach, though it is true we may obey it partly from a sense of loyalty to the state, i.e. from herd instinct. On the other hand, we obey the moral law primarily because we should feel uncomfortable "inside" if we disobeyed it, and we should feel uncomfortable because we should be disobeying the instinctive impulse to follow the rule of the herd in those matters which concern the bases of human conduct. That there is here no question of a direct apprehension by the individual mind of "absolute right and wrong" is proved

¹ See especially "Mowgli's Brothers" in *The Jungle Book*, "How Fear Came" in *The Second Jungle Book*, and "The Mother Hive" in *Actions and Reactions*.

by the infinite variations of the moral code among different races, and in the same race at different periods of its history. What is apprehended is the teaching of the herd in regard to conduct. Rightness of conduct is its conformity with the rule of the herd. It is perfectly true, as we saw in the last chapter, that through the development of the ethical self a man may base his conduct on his own ideas, in spite of the immediate pressure of his social environment. In doing so he transcends the law of the herd and asserts his right to individual judgment—herd instinct no longer dictates his actions. When this happens "rightness" acquires a new meaning. If we choose we may speak of the "higher morality" as determining actions dictated by the ethical self. But we must recognize that ordinary morality is dictated by the herd, that it has the validity of herd law, and that it varies according to the different circumstances of different herds.

The so-called "conscientious objectors" to military service in the Great War furnish an excellent case which points this contrast. Military service for fit men of military age who could not demonstrably be better employed in civil work for the country was clearly the valid herd morality from the beginning. Afterwards it became the law of the land as well. A certain number of men objected to enter the fighting services, some to doing any national work, on the ground that such work was helping the country to carry on the war of which they disapproved. These were clearly claiming the right of their private judgment to transcend the herd law in a crucial case. There was some controversy in the newspapers as to the use of the word "conscience" in this connexion. It was urged that no one had a right to set up his private "conscience" above the "conscience" of the community in such a matter. Those who took this view were championing the supreme right of herd law to over-rule the individual judgment; those who defended the "conscientious objectors" denied that right. The word "conscience" can be used in either sense. It is a case of one of the numerous confusions of

thought resulting from the use of the same word for different things—in this instance for things relating to the ego-complex and for things relating to the herd complex. The things are not the same things. The ego-complex is largely modified by the herd complex, and the ethical self could not exist without the herd; but the ego-complex, as such, pre-existed and is always a perfectly distinct thing. The individual conscience is necessarily largely modified by the herd conscience, but once it is brought into being it has a perfectly distinct existence. For the majority, however, the herd conscience, where its call is clear and overwhelming, is the thing that matters. Morality is *primarily* a herd concern, for it cannot, in fact, exist without the herd. The "higher morality" is a secondary thing, which could not have existed without the herd, but which is distinct from herd morality when it does exist.

✓ The herd also largely controls the actions of the individual by means of what is called *convention*. Convention has not the sanction of morality—it is not thought to involve questions of right and wrong. This appears to mean that the dictates of convention are of a less degree of importance than those of morality—they are as it were "regulations," the breach of which is a comparatively venial offence, as compared with the breach of the "laws" of morality. Convention deals with minor matters of conduct and is generally recognized as varying from place to place and from time to time. In the struggle for freedom of the individual the word "unconventional" is even used as a term of approbation, whereas the word "immoral" never is.¹ The disregard of convention carries a feeling of slight discomfort in the individual mind due to the opposition

¹ The word "unmoral" is, however, sometimes used to signify, if not exactly approbation, at least a certain toleration of and even sympathy with an individual who is supposed not to have submitted to herd law and thus to be free from the guilt of the "immoral" person who accepts herd morality and yet transgresses it. This feeling towards the person supposed to be exempt from the obligations of morality indicates the occasional restiveness of the ego under the restraints of the moral law.

of the herd instinct, though this may be more than compensated for by the elation accompanying the assertion of the ego against a slight resistance. The fact that we often speak of "conventional morality" seems to show that there is no sharp distinction between convention and morality, for the phrase is clearly applied to a borderline region where the one passes into the other, and implies a doubt whether the "regulations" in question have a real claim to the sanctions of morality proper.

"Etiquette" and "good form" are herd regulations of even slighter importance than convention. They hold only in certain limited spheres of activity to which special forms of procedure are applied by the pundits or herd leaders in those particular spheres. Like morality and convention they have an historical significance. Their current significance is mainly that of providing a definite procedure or ritual in spheres in which some sort of definite order is required. They furnish, nevertheless, by the strictness with which they are often imposed and accepted within their spheres, an excellent example of the power of herd instinct.

The influence of *authority* in matters of opinion is an outstanding evidence of the power of the herd instinct. It naturally holds in the spheres of religious belief, morality, convention, party politics—all spheres in which the influence of the herd is supreme. But the intrusion of authority into spheres where it is intrinsically out of place—the spheres which owe their existence to the independent powers of the individual mind, such as art, science, and philosophy—is specially significant. Here, if anywhere, the mind should be altogether free from the bonds of the herd complex. And yet the authority of a dominant theory in science, of a prevailing "school" in art is everywhere felt, and it is only a few of the most independent minds which can free themselves from it. The imitative bent of the mind of the average herd animal is ineradicable, and makes itself felt even in spheres in which it stultifies the whole nature of the mental activity involved.

Herd instinct is, of course, historically younger than the other great universal instincts, because the gregarious habit is a secondary habit. In man the gregarious habit seems to have arisen as a result of the abandonment of forest life by his immediate non-human ancestors and their taking to the life of the plains, which necessitated the association in herds (or more properly packs) for the purpose of hunting in common. Carveth Read has suggested that many of the fiercer qualities of gregarious man, his delight in hunting and killing for its own sake, are the outcome of this transformation of habit. The savagery and cruelty of the human mob may be one of its effects. The conflict between the kindliness of the individual, as an individual, and his implacable fierceness when on the war-path or the hunting track with his fellows may represent the conflict between the amiable domestic traits inherited from the higher anthropoids and the new spirit of fierceness arising as a result of his later developments as a member of a hunting and fighting pack.

An important result of the secondary origin of the gregarious habit is that, while the springs of psychic energy are primarily associated directly with the self-regarding instincts and with sex, the herd makes use of these sources of energy in its individual members, regulates their display, and more or less successfully turns them into channels useful to itself. In the case of many, so-called primitive, savage communities every activity of life is minutely regulated by the herd, so that there is no such thing as individual freedom. Thus it comes about that herd instinct is largely associated with obeying restrictions which fetter and confine the free working of the self-regarding instincts and of sex. "You must not do this, you must only do that in such and such a way and under such and such conditions." But in joint work with other members of the herd—hunting, fighting, agriculture, and so on—the powers of the individual are actually increased by co-operation. The call of the herd is to increased activity. The libido has actually fuller scope in the herd channels. And not only so, but

the herd instinct itself adds its own energy to the doing of things *for the herd* and finds its satisfaction *in the identification of the individual with the herd* which results from the performance in common of recognized herd work.

In the transition to the civilized societies of modern times, with their immensely greater control of external nature and consequent increased powers of production and greater reserves on which to draw for the feeding and general maintenance of their members, the tendency has been, on the whole, to relax or abolish many of the minute restrictions on the activities of everyday life, and thus to increase individual freedom. At the same time, with the increase in complexity of society, the call of the herd to positive co-operative action has, on the whole, diminished. Public ownership has decreased, the public functions have become so specialized that they are largely assigned to special classes who do not regard their performance as a public duty but as the means of securing a livelihood. This applies, for instance, to the civil and fighting services, and largely even to the service of religion. Production, distribution and construction are mainly in the hands of private individuals or of private corporations. The feeling of obligation to public service remains a tradition only in a very restricted class where it finds its outlet in politics or in one of the fighting services, though it is true that individuals of other classes also feel it, finding their opportunity in the ministry of religion or in some voluntary public work.

Hence it comes about that in a modern complex individualistic state herd instinct largely finds its expression, so far as the society as a whole is concerned, in the obligation to obey the moral law, which still consists mainly of restrictions and prohibitions, though their scope and severity have much diminished from the days when every activity was minutely regulated under the "sanction" of tremendous penalties, material or spiritual, or both. The employment of the activities of the instincts connected with the self in herd work, and their consequent enhancement by the energy of herd instinct, is largely in abeyance, and spiritual

impoverishment is the result. Another result is the doubt, alluded to at the beginning of the chapter, with which the average man regards the assertion that herd instinct is one of the primary motives of human action. The cause of this doubt is that he connects the effect of his social environment upon his mind mainly with restriction rather than with enhancement of his activities.

From the nature and complexity of human society this limitation of freedom must always obtain to a considerable extent, but the modern diversion of energy from herd channels is responsible for a one-sided view of the natural scope of herd instinct. When the positive call of the herd comes in the shape of an appeal to active patriotism, as in the call to service in the Great War, herd instinct at once comes into its own. The precedence which the herd takes over self-regarding instincts is at once clear, and the vast majority of the nation answers the call to service and sacrifice in no uncertain way. The response to the call to arms of a people whose training in active public service had been for so long in abeyance is universally acknowledged as a striking and, to many, an unexpected phenomenon. Its manifestation had all the characters of an overwhelming instinctive response: a response hindered at first in many cases by conflict with other instincts, but gaining weight and volume as the call of the herd became clearer and more imperative, and soon, in the great majority of cases, sweeping everything before it: a response often rationalized, and legitimately enough rationalized, as the desire to protest effectively against unprovoked and cruel aggression and to go to the help of the weak and oppressed, but essentially and at bottom an instinctive response to the call of the herd: finally, a response which, when it had been fully made, brought that peace of mind which only the response to a great instinct, the translation into action of a great instinctive conation, can bring.

In considering the nature and effect of herd instinct on the human mind, we must be careful to distinguish the

psychical effect of the *herd* from that of the *crowd*. A herd is any social organization to which a man is conscious that he belongs, and to the suggestions arising from which his mind is susceptible, whether it be his immediate limited social environment, the personnel of his trade or profession, his social class, his nation, or mankind at large. A crowd is the actual physical aggregation of a number of human beings actuated by common impulses and emotions. Many of the herd characteristics are seen at a high degree of intensity in the crowd, the herd complex being typically absolutely dominant in the minds of its members, and the herd affect often rising to the pitch of passion. The crowd is, in a sense, the primitive biological herd in active physical being, in full control of the situation, and working through purely instinctive channels. The irrationality of the crowd is notorious, its cognitive powers being limited to the bare recognition of objects or symbols which excite its affects and impulses. The rational powers of the individuals composing it are in abeyance, when once its instincts are excited. The ease with which a crowd is excited and led by a skilful crowd-leader who knows how to play upon its instincts; or by a chance individual who can gain its ear and can pose, for the moment, as a leader; or even by any accidental happening which acts as a stimulus to its instincts—these things are too well known to need illustration. Everyone who has even once been a member of an active excited crowd—not an individual included in it by chance and holding aloof from its emotions, but a *member*—sharing its emotions and impulses, knows well enough what its psychical characteristics are—the sense of wild enthusiasm, of unrestrained satisfaction of instinct, and of irresistible intoxicating power; and everyone who has even once had to face a *hostile* crowd knows the overwhelmingly terrible and intimidating effect of its hostility—only the very highest personal courage can resist it unmoved.

The crowd, as has been said, is the primitive herd in action. It is a dangerous instrument, as many would-be

herd-leaders have found to their cost ; and the leaders of even the most primitive herds have had to introduce restraints, indirect forms of action, so as to secure some sort of order in the carrying out of the herd will. Thus we have councils of representatives with delegated or usurped authority to give laws to the herd and to decide and act in its name, courts of justice, with traditional forms of procedure which must be strictly followed, judges and executioners to carry out the vengeance of the herd on offenders against its laws.

With the increase in size and complexity of the effective herd unit the crowd plays a smaller and smaller part in herd life. Herd action becomes more and more indirect, so that its normal action becomes the action of public opinion, indirect, subtle, all-pervasive, working on the herd complex in the mind of the individual rather than by direct crowd judgment and physical action.

The herd, then, exists permanently, and the herd complex, with its effects on the beliefs and conduct of men, is a permanent and fundamental constituent of the human mind and of human life. The crowd, in modern civilized life, is a temporary and as it were accidental phenomenon ; though when large numbers of the herd have common instincts strongly aroused crowds always assemble—the primitive biological herd form is reverted to.¹ Many of the characteristic crowd phenomena, also, are aroused in the herd by the work of the modern popular press, which excites large numbers of the population by working on primitive instincts, often through the symbolic appeal of catchwords, and the temporary creation of "heroes" and "villains" which it holds up for adoration or obloquy. The effect of hundreds of thousands of credulous suggestible people throughout the country simultaneously reading the same rhetorical and violent appeal to their passions is

¹ Sir Martin Conway's *The Crowd in Peace and War* (London, 1915) contains an interesting account of herd phenomena in modern life, but the title is misleading. Most of the topics with which the author deals relate to the herd rather than to the crowd.

similar to, though not so intense as, the effect that would be produced by the same people listening together to the rhetorical and violent speech of a demagogue. Thus the difficulty of addressing crowds of significant size in our great modern nations is partly overcome by modern journalism.

CHAPTER XXI

PARTIAL HERDS AND THE UNIVERSAL HERD

THE herd complex, then, contains all those mental elements which are associated in the individual's mind with his relations to so much of his social environment as has an effective bearing upon his life. How wide this range may be differs in different cases. The immediate human environment, the people with whom a man comes into daily contact, their standards and their demands, have the weightiest effect. In the case of the sedentary individual whose immediate society is strictly limited the range of effective influence is similarly limited. The morals and public opinion of the world outside his own class or set have little or no access to him. He can only respond to the actually effective herd influences. With a wider range of association the range of herd influences on the individual extends. But the added variety tends to weaken the effect of specific influences working alone within a narrower sphere, though where this effect has been strongly impressed during childhood, its traces usually persist throughout life. His sharply cut code of morals and conventions becomes softened as the variety existing in wider circles is impressed upon his mind. In the common phrase, he becomes more "broad-minded." This process may tend to blur and weaken the individual's moral sense altogether—apart from the development of the higher ethical self—whether it does so or not depends upon other factors, the effect of early education, mental disposition, and so on; or it may merely result in the abandonment of the local peculiarities, so to speak, of the narrower herd which formed his first environ-

ment, and the retention of the common elements which exist throughout the wider society with which he ultimately makes acquaintance.

In the primitive conditions of tribal life, the whole weight of the tribal traditions and rules of conduct, and nothing but that, is brought to bear on the individual. With the expansion of the tribe, or the welding together of several tribes, into a nation, the "nation complex" will partly replace the tribe complex in the mind of the individual to whom the opportunity comes of realizing his nation as a whole. Side by side with this nation complex, or perhaps included within it,¹ the complex determined by his local or class environment will remain. Thus there arise more than one partial herd complex in the mind of the individual—a segregation of the herd complex takes place. The segregated partial herds are usually more consolidated and rigidly organized in a nation like our own with an old civilization, and this works to the detriment of the national herd complex. As a writer in *The Nation* (April 21, 1917, p. 58) expressed it: "The ferment of thought and feeling is far more rapid and energetic in America than in our more class-bound and segregated communities."

To each partial herd the individual makes the proper response. The strength of each complex naturally depends upon his education and experience. In a complicated modern society the number of partial herds to which an individual may belong is almost unlimited, and depends upon the different modes of association which the individual, impelled by his gregarious instinct and the circumstances of his life, may undergo. Thus a man may have

¹ Under the segregated and artificial conditions of modern life it is not necessarily the case that what may be called the "everyday life herd complex" lies within, i.e. forms part of the "nation complex," where both exist in the mind. A man's mental representation of his country, with the affect of patriotism, may be not only a distinct and separate thing from, but have scarcely any points of contact with, his mental representation of the society in which he spends his daily life. Ideally, no doubt, the latter should be included in the former.

one complex relating to his family and kinsmen, another to the society of his fellow-workers, a third to the political party to which he belongs, a fourth to his Church, and so on.¹ Each of these modes of association carries its own specific traditions and activities, and to each corresponds in the mind of the individual member a complex with specific affect and conations. To suggestions arising from each of these partial herds the individual is susceptible, and his conduct is shaped very largely by the sum of the suggestions arising from all of them. Often, of course, the suggestions arising from different partial herds conflict with one another. Sometimes one or another partial herd complex acquires predominant influence, depending upon the power of that particular partial herd to inspire enthusiasm. The affect of the particular complex rises in intensity and the corresponding conations are carried out with great energy. The individual is said "to throw himself into" the work of the particular herd, i.e. he identifies himself with it especially closely. A large part of his psychic energy flows along those particular herd channels, be they those of religion, politics, trade unionism, social sport or what not.

A marked characteristic of the older and more closely knit types of partial herd is the spirit of exclusiveness they develop. This is seen alike in tribal life and in the partial herds which make up the social structure of a modern complex nation, less in the nation as a whole, whose common life is less highly integrated. Exclusiveness is often associated with a close community of material interests, and a feeling of need for defence against conflicting interests outside the herd in question. Such a spirit is clearly shown by the old learned professions, notably the doctors and lawyers. These professions have well-marked ancient traditions, and consequently a highly-developed herd affect: hence they exhibit very well the characters of a

¹ The different partial herd complexes are identical with the different "social selves" of William James (*Textbook of Psychology*, p. 179)

highly-integrated partial herd. They often represent the strongest herd complex in the minds of their members, and this exists in the mind of the individual in spite of his direct competition with his fellow members of the partial herd. The spheres of the ego-complex and of the herd complex in professional life are very clearly marked out. The individual doctor or lawyer strives after his own advancement, that is, to enlarge his ego-complex, but always according to the rules of his particular herd. He avoids infringing these rules—largely codified, though unwritten, as “professional etiquette”—not primarily because of the penalties attached to infringement, though these are very considerable, but because of “loyalty to the profession,” i.e. because his herd instinct, focused on his partial herd, will not let him. Alongside of loyalty to the profession, goes hostility to anything and anybody that threatens, or seems to threaten, its interests; particularly to competition from outside its ranks. Hence the violent hostility on the part of members of the medical profession towards “quacks,” a hostility often quite unjustifiable on general grounds, sometimes partly explained by possible damage to professional interests, but primarily motivated by herd exclusiveness—what is permissible to a member of the herd is by no means permissible to an outsider, even though the outsider be an honest man and doing good work for the benefit of the public. This hostility is often rationalized on the ground of damage to the public interest, in many cases quite unplausibly.

Another manifestation of the herd instinct which is clearly seen within these closely-knit partial herds is the even more bitter hostility towards a real or supposed enemy within the herd itself. A traitor in the camp always arouses greater feeling than an enemy outside, not only because of his supposedly greater power for harm—since he may conceivably gain followers and even succeed in splitting the herd—but because his activities outrage the instinctive loyalty without which the herd cannot be kept together. The man may be a genuine reformer, transparently anxious

for the betterment of the herd, and without selfish interests to serve, but this does not save him from persecution if he attacks established traditions.

All these factors give to many partial herds the hard "caste" spirit which is so characteristic of them, and which is seen alike in such diverse vocations as those of the soldier, the priest and the trade unionist. This often acts as a serious bar to progress within the profession. A cast-iron tradition is apt to become dominant, supported by the whole strength of the non-rational herd instinct, and the free play of reason and imagination essential to progress falls largely into abeyance.

Many vocations show the same phenomena in varying degrees and often with an intensity unparalleled in the wider herd of the nation—except indeed in war-time, when the members of the nation are immediately drawn more closely together because of the threat to the herd as a whole. The sudden increase in herd affect, the tightening of the bonds between the members of the nation, as a nation, on the outbreak of war in August 1914, outwardly shown, for instance, in the much greater readiness with which strangers spoke to one another in public places, was at the time a common subject of remark.

Besides the partial herds with which we have just been dealing, there are, of course, the stratified *classes* of society within the old and complex nations like those of Western Europe, and some of these show the characteristics of the partial herd in a marked degree. An old aristocracy forms one such well-marked partial herd. It has common traditions, a common mode of life, on the whole common tastes. These form the foundations of natural herd organization. In modern times the old aristocracy has more and more begun to feel the threat not only to its power, but to its very existence, involved in the rising strength of the proletariat. The passing of political power to the middle classes scarcely threatened seriously the prestige and influence of the aristocracy. The middle classes had some interests in common with the aristocracy, and in any case

were too comfortable, too loosely knit and too snobbish to aspire to usurp their power. But with the further transference of power to the proletariat, which is now complete, the aristocrats are actually threatened with a deadly menace. The process of modern social evolution has been too much for them, and they are, in fact, a decadent herd with no adequate weapons of self-defence. Another partial herd in the upper range of the social scale is formed by the plutocrats, primarily the successful merchants, business men, financiers and speculators. Diverse as are the qualities of this heterogeneous class, they are held together by the possession of money and the power which money brings. With the progress of industrialism the limits between this class and the old aristocracy have become more and more blurred. The creation of peers from among the ranks of men who have become rich, intermarriage, and the turning of some of the older aristocrats to commerce or speculation has tended to weld the two classes together and to make one class only, characterized by the possession of wealth. This process, though not yet quite complete, has advanced a long way, and the class thus created is very far from decadent. Its interests also are very seriously threatened by the rise in the power and organization of the proletariat. What the result of the inevitable conflict may be, remains to be seen; the next few years, of course, are critical for the development of social organization.

The middle classes form, as has been said, too loosely knit a herd to have any great significance. It is doubtful, indeed, if they can properly be called a herd at all. It is possible that a very serious direct threat to their interests also may weld them together into an effective organization. Attempts in this direction are already being made, but it is doubtful if they will meet with any considerable measure of success, because the factors making for class consciousness (partial herd consciousness) are relatively weak. Their circumstances and tastes are too diverse. They are too unimaginative as a whole, and they cannot, like the proletariat,

enlist in their cause the unselfish devotion of men and women who are stung by an abiding sense of injustice, inequality, and miserable conditions of life, and are inspired by the ideal of a fair and rational social organization. Still, many members of the middle classes have suffered a great deal during the war, and if they continue to suffer they may show an unexpected power of consolidation in defence of their interests—they may become really integrated as a partial herd. Common suffering and common action lead to the development of common feeling—the essential link between the members of an effective herd.

Finally, we have the great partial herd of the proletariat itself, whose "class consciousness" has increased so enormously, and is still increasing with every step in the direction of better education, improved means of intercommunication and more clearly realized demands upon society at large. Trade unionism, of course, has been the most potent instrument in this development, which took place at first on occupational lines, creating a number of highly and deliberately organized partial herds. Lately these have reached out in different ways so as to embrace the whole, or nearly the whole, of the wage-earners of the country; and although this universal proletarian organization is not yet complete, it is rapidly becoming so. At the present time the proletariat is certainly the most intensely class conscious of all the social classes; and this, apart from its preponderating numbers, means that it is much the most powerful and important of all existing partial herds—potentially at least, for it has, of course, by no means reached the zenith of its political power.

So powerful, indeed, had become the class consciousness of the proletariats of the different nations of Western and Central Europe, even before the war, that it threatened, or was thought to threaten, the old primary division of mankind into national herds, by cutting across the boundaries of nations and welding together the proletariats of that part of the world. It used to be said, for instance, that if the Governments of France and Germany declared a state of

war between those nations, the proletariats of each would throw down their arms and refuse to fight against their brothers. This, as we know, did not in fact happen. The national herd proved stronger than the international proletariat. The ties of common race, common language, and common tradition, the love of fatherland—in a word, all the bonds of the national herd, prevailed against the newer and, as yet at any rate, weaker ties of common economic interests. But the circumstances of the test were all in favour of the national herd. The German herd, nourished in a tradition of vigorous aggressiveness, compared indeed by Trotter with the wolf pack, aroused the herd feeling in the western nations to the highest pitch by its unprovoked and brutal aggression, and the “union sacrée” in France, the overwhelming rush to the colours in England, were the result. Whether this intense heightening of national feeling will last, or whether the “International” will arise rejuvenated and stronger than ever, we cannot yet tell. The issue will largely depend, no doubt, on economic factors, on the rate of economic recovery of Western and Central Europe, on the success of the efforts that will be made to bring about a more equal distribution of wealth, or rather of the amenities of life, among the different classes of society, on the measure in which the peoples can obtain relief from the burden of armaments. If these things can be successfully accomplished, there can be little doubt that the evolution of the world will take place more smoothly and harmoniously on national lines than it will on the lines of the programme of the “International.” The strength and vitality of the national herd unit has received a very striking demonstration, and the national organization enshrines a great deal of what is most precious and valuable in human institutions.

But there is a further condition. The conflicts between nations must be first mitigated and finally removed by definite progress towards the ideal state of a world federation. The brotherhood of man has had little meaning hitherto. The “world herd” has scarcely existed as a well-

defined complex, save in the minds of a very few idealists. It will be difficult to bring to birth in the minds of the many, because it is so remote, and must remain for so long remote, from the experience of their everyday lives. As it is, the life of the nation is remote enough from the everyday lives of the workers, and is only brought closer to them in time of war. Before there can exist an international life which has any reality, and particularly before it can correspond with a sense of world solidarity in the minds of the common people, and thus create a complex of the world herd which alone can give solid support to international organization, a very long road will have to be traversed. When disappointment was expressed because an effective League of Nations could not be brought into existence in the course of a few months, it was forgotten that we are dealing with the whole of the last stage of social evolution—a tremendous affair which, even with the increased rate of development we may fairly expect, cannot possibly be consummated in a few months or in a few years.

Evolution to a higher unit of social organization must necessarily be slow. Side by side with the integrating factors which are always tending to build up higher entities from lower ones, the more complex from the less complex, we have the disintegrating factors, in herd organization as in the mind of the individual, which result in segregation, in the formation of partial herds which have their own separate interests and which acquire "class consciousness" and engage in "class warfare." Segregation is an inevitable incident of increase in complexity, as may be seen in the evolution of the animal body and of the human mind. A certain degree of segregation is indeed necessary to progress. The parts of the whole fulfil their functions better when they possess a certain degree of autonomy. It is only when segregation is carried to the pitch at which the parts become at enmity with one another, when they are given over to competition instead of to co-operation, that the life of the whole organism is endangered.

Just as class consciousness and class warfare may conflict

with national life and tend to hinder national efficiency, so do national consciousness and warfare between nations conflict with and hinder the evolution of the world state. Until the old herd instinct of nationalism can be, if not merged in, at least made perfectly compatible with, the wider form of herd instinct which embraces all mankind, it will be impossible to form a league of nations which has the living reality of the people's will behind it. A few statesmen sitting round a table can never hope to devise and put in motion a complete working system which will abolish war, abate national rivalries, and create a positive living world organism. That can only be the laborious work of many decades, perhaps of centuries, with many mistakes, many set-backs and disappointments.

The notion that a living, effective world federation can be manufactured to order is a good example of that unpractical idealism which imagines that a scheme of such magnitude can be realized at once, because it is an admirable ideal scheme. The cognitive faculty and the faculty of forming ideals are constantly envisaging solutions of practical problems which are not ripe for solution, and thus running far ahead of reality. There is confusion between what can be brought about by unimpeachable logical schemes, and what can only be done by the slow and laborious process of detailed evolution and integration in the human mind. In this case what must be attained is a harmony between the organization of herd instinct in the national and partial herd form with a new organization of universal herd instinct, the process of which has hardly more than begun, even though the desire for its consummation may exist in the hearts of millions.

But there is certainly no reason to despair. We must not underrate the effect of ideals on the human mind, or the influence of great men—the herd-leaders—on the herd mind. The feet of the world's leading statesmen have been definitely set on that road, the will of a large part of the peoples of the world is towards that goal. The ideal has been spread broadcast through the suffering peoples.

That is an immense step forward, and it is a step in the line of the progressive evolution of higher and higher social organisms which has been the history of the past. The work of the future is the creation of more and more international life and organization, until the world herd becomes a reality in the minds of the peoples. Along with this must go the improvement of the national organisms which will form the constituent parts of the world organism, for it is clearly on these lines, not on the lines of a premature and artificial cosmopolitanism, that solid progress will be realized. Particularly we must have freer scope for the *positive* functions of the herd spirit on wider lines. We have been living through a period in which the herd complex has been largely represented in the individual mind by the restrictions it imposed on the free activity of the human spirit. What we want is the opening of channels through which the individual can *serve* the herd, can help to enrich and perfect the life of his nation—the most valuable herd unit we possess to-day—and ultimately the life of the world herd, mankind.

CHAPTER XXII

THE SEX INSTINCT AND THE PRIMARY SEX COMPLEX

MANY of the essential psychological characteristics of the sex instinct are clearly based upon the biological features which mark the mating of the male and female reproductive cells—*gametes* as they are called in biology—as these can be studied among the lower organisms; and a thorough appreciation of these biological features, which are essentially constant in all organisms reproducing themselves sexually, is of fundamental value as a starting point in considering the psychology of sex. The minute microscopic gametes are the actual mating organisms: the “sexual” features, both physical and mental, of the complicated bodies which, in the higher animals, produce and protect them till mating can be accomplished—the sexual individuals of ordinary language—are built up in relation to the primary characteristics of these mating cells.

The mating of living cells to produce a new organism is not necessarily associated with a difference of sex. In many of the lowest forms of life the pair of mating gametes are equivalent in all respects—in size, form, structure and behaviour. But in tracing upwards the various lines of evolution from these primitive types which have no sex, the fundamental differentiation which we know as sex soon appears, and in forms of life otherwise very simple sex is already fully differentiated. This condition obtains in all the higher organisms, both animals and plants, and it is therefore only with the psychology of organisms bearing sexually differentiated gametes that we are concerned.

The sexual gametes are very unlike in every respect. The male is small, very active, and often very sensitive to chemical stimuli arising from the female. The body of the male gamete is, in fact, reduced to the smallest limits compatible with these qualities and with the carrying of the substance necessary for a fertile mating—the substance, that is, which is the material contribution of the male gamete to the “zygote” (or cell produced from the union of the two gametes), which forms the starting point of the embryo of the new organism, the offspring of the sexual union. The male gamete is short lived, having no store of reserve food, nor the power to nourish itself, and if it does not succeed in mating it soon dies.

The female gamete, on the other hand, is relatively large, containing a quantity of stored food, at the expense of which the zygote starts its development into the new organism, and is quite passive so far as actual movement is concerned. An important part of its activity, however, is often the production of certain chemical substances which diffuse into the medium around it, and, reaching the male gametes, guide these to the female. Normally, only one male gamete mates with the female, and as soon as mating occurs the secretion of the attractive substance is stopped.

The sexually differentiated gametes of many of the lower forms of life are either discharged into the water in which the parent organism lives, and mate quite independently of the organisms in which they were formed, or the female gamete may be retained in the parent body till conjugation is completed. The parent organisms themselves are not sexually differentiated: male and female gametes are often, indeed, borne by the same individual. In higher forms of life, however, the bodies of the parent organisms come to share in the sexual characters, and the history of the evolution of the sexual mechanism is very largely a history of the spreading of the typical characters of the gametes just described to various parts of the body, sometimes of the acquirement by the whole body of the physiological characters of the gametes which it bears. This process results

in the appearance and elaboration of arrangements for facilitating mating, and for protecting and feeding the new organism during the first stages of its development. The arrangements for attracting and receiving the male gamete may be transferred to accessory structures, while in the higher animals the male organism as a whole is attracted to the female organism and only discharges its gametes just outside or within the body of the latter, so that their access to the female gametes is rendered more secure.

This extension of the fundamental characters of the male and female gametes to the male and female individuals has its psychical complement in the minds of the highest forms, and the characters indicated, the primary passivity and attractiveness of the female, the activity and sensitiveness of the male in courtship are clear enough. The protection and nursing of the young during the early stages of life make great additional demands on the mind as on the body of the female organism, while the male is free from any comparable demands immediately connected with sex, so that his bodily and mental structure and energy may be devoted to a wide range of non-sexual activity.¹ This activity, in many of the higher animals, as in man, is, however, commonly devoted to acquiring food for the female and her offspring, as well as for himself. The *primary* interest of the male in sex ends with the act of mating, that of the female extends right on till the offspring are able to support themselves.

The whole primary mentality of the two sexes responds to, or more strictly may be said to be built upon, these fundamental differences of sexual function, though the varying circumstances of life may considerably modify the response. For instance, if the females much outnumber the males in

¹ In certain animals the male responds to this freedom from demand by degenerating and becoming physically parasitic on the female, and in some human races where the general conditions of life are easy the women do all the necessary work and the men are lazy and degenerate—economically parasitic on the women.

a monogamous society, the rôles of activity and passivity in courtship are apt to be reversed, while over-luxurious conditions of life free the female from many of the more onerous demands of the care of offspring, and may lead to the degeneration of her sexual instinct. This degeneration may be partial, affecting merely the care of her offspring; but it may result in the refusal to bear offspring, or even lead to lack of interest in the act of mating itself. Even the normal conditions of civilization for the "comfortable" class of society permit of a certain relaxation of the rigour of the sex demands, and this leads to corresponding psychical modifications. The general trend of these is towards the blurring of the sharp differentiation between the minds of the two sexes, towards a tendency of the male to acquire feminine qualities and of the female to acquire masculine ones. The woman acquires a wider interest in life, in affairs, in sport, in things of the intellect, owing to the partial freeing of her interest from absorption in biological duties. The man, partially freed from absorption in the struggle for food, takes more interest in his children and in domestic concerns generally. All this extends the psychical basis of the relation between the mates, and consequently increases its stability. The standard of sexual taste rapidly adapts itself to such changes, and the intercourse of the sexes undoubtedly gains in interest and variety. Nor does it lose in biological soundness provided the changes do not impair the primary attractiveness of the mental characters of each sex to the other, or the primary willingness to discharge the normal sexual functions—a condition which depends upon the retention of the fundamental characters of sex-mentality. The extension of the man's interest to his offspring is, of course, in the first instance, a natural outcome of the permanent union of the mates, which extends his sexual interest beyond its original goal of mating to the results of mating. Though in its primary physical aspect, the nursing and care of children are necessarily the mother's concern, their support and part of their protection are, under most conditions of human society, the rôle of the father, so that the extension

of his interest is a necessary one, though it lacks the physical intimacy of the mother's

We are now in a position to consider the make-up of the primary sex complex as it appears in the normal mind of the civilized individual. The primitive centre of interest is the physical relation to the member of the opposite sex who is desired, since the biological basis of the complex is the physical act of sexual union. A second centre of interest is in the relation to the mind of the desired mate, since of the total intercourse between the couple the larger portion is necessarily mental. A third centre lies in the results of mating, in the relation to children, and round this is built up what may be called the domestic complex, relating to the family and the home.

Considering the normal primary sex complex as a whole, the minor complexes which are grouped round these three centres of interest may be conveniently called sub-complexes. They possess considerable individuality of their own, and, as we shall see, may become segregated pretty completely. The first is biologically primitive for both sexes; for the woman the third also is primitive, for the man it is of later development. The evolution of the second necessarily depends on the evolution of mind, though its rudiments are present directly mind appears. The mind relation of a man and a woman who are sexually attracted may consist of two distinct elements, the first depending on the specific sexual mentality, which is sharply opposed in the two sexes, and forms part of the apparatus of sex attraction, and the second on non-sexual mental elements, such as would form a basis of mental attraction in two people of the same sex. The first is practically always present, and is essential to the complex emotion of sex love. The second may or may not be present, but when it exists it powerfully reinforces the attraction, and acts as a strongly stabilizing influence on the relation. Later on it may even form the sole basis of the relation, if the mental sexual attraction disappears.

In an ideal union all three centres of interest are fully occupied. Their potential separation does not come into question. But if the conditions of the union fail to satisfy one or another of them, the sex interest is liable to stray to some other object in search of satisfaction. In the absence of the restraints of morality and convention, the transference to the second object would generally be complete, because of the freshness of the new object,¹ but where the individual is tied, and restrained from transferring complete sexual interest, a partial transfer may often take place. For instance, what we have called the second centre of interest—the mental—may be transferred; a so-called “platonic” friendship may be formed between a married man or woman and another individual of the opposite sex. By a “platonic” friendship is here meant a relationship of mutual affection into which the sexual element enters, but in which the physical relation is not contemplated. Friendships between men and women into which sex interest does not enter at all, or into which it enters to a minimal degree, are no doubt possible and actually exist, but it may be safely stated that in by far the greater number of cases sex does enter into such friendships to a considerable extent. The “danger” of such platonic friendships is very well known. The sex instinct is difficult to confine to the mental sphere, and if the interest reaches a passionate intensity it almost always involves physical desire, i.e. it involves the first sub-complex. Nevertheless, and especially if the first sub-complex is otherwise satisfied, a passionate platonic friendship may not only exist, but endure.

Similarly, the third—the domestic—sub-complex, represented by the interest in home and children, may be segregated. Thus a man may be deeply attached to his wife and children, but have a mistress who satisfies both his physical and his mental sexual desires, or he may even have two mistresses—a physical and a spiritual one. It is pretty clear that, in women, the three centres of sexual interest are more closely bound together and less readily

¹ See below, p. 252 ff.

segregated. This, as we shall see presently, is partly a primary feminine character, due to the high degree in which a woman's sex instinct is necessarily absorbed in the third sub-complex, the relation to children, to which the other two, together comprising the relation to her mate, sometimes become, as it were, incidental; and partly the result of the fact that under prevailing social conditions a woman has less freedom to split up her sex-complex without running the risk of ruining her life. Segregation of the sub-complexes is made possible by the keeping of each in an "emotion-tight" compartment of the mind, but in both sexes segregation produces a certain feeling of internal strain. This is partly due, of course, under existing conditions, to the conflict with morality, the fear of discovery and the other complications, such as jealousy, that are involved. Probably it is also partly due to the separation of parts of a complex which are constantly striving to re-unite because they are actuated by a single instinct and primitively form a single whole. A position of equilibrium, albeit an unstable equilibrium, can be reached by segregation, but it is difficult to maintain because the main force of the sex instinct is very likely indeed eventually to run into the primitive biological channel and thus upset the precarious balance.

Making allowance for the different nature of what may be called the apparatus of sexual attraction in the two sexes, there seems little reason to doubt that its effect on the mind of the opposite sex is *essentially* the same in the two cases, though direct introspective evidence on the point is naturally impossible to obtain. The symptoms shown by a man and by a woman in love are almost, if not quite, identical: in other words the sexual emotion has a very strong and characteristic specificity, which is common to the two sexes. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to relate this to the original equivalence of the gametes which unite in the act of mating (p. 245), just as what may be called the secondary psychological characters differentiating the two sexes may be related to the secondary differentiation of the male and female

gametes and of the masculine and feminine bodies which contain them. The reaching out from the self-contained equilibrium of the individual organism, the feeling of having found a *complement* in the mate, are the leading characteristics of the specific sexual emotion in its wider psychical aspects. In the "zygote," or cell formed by the union of the two gametes and itself forming the starting point of the new organism, the offspring of the mating gametes, we have something more than a symbol: we have the biological basis of sexual union in the highest forms of life. Each mating gamete has literally found its complement in the other. Happy the human couple in which the whole of the physical and psychical characters actually find as satisfactory a complement in those of the mate.

But the difference of sexual function which, as we have seen, so profoundly influences the psychology of man and woman, has as one of its results important differences in the relation of each to sexual union. The male gamete is completely absorbed in the egg, its independent life is at an end with the act of mating. The masculine body which produces these gametes, and the masculine mind, however, are by that very fact freed from further *primary* concern with the results of mating, and are all ready to initiate a fresh sex conation.¹ This may be directed towards the original mate, but, on the other hand, it may not. The demand of the sex instinct for *fresh* sex stimulus is well recognized, at least as a masculine character. The tendency to *exogamy*, to the choosing of a strange woman rather than a "house companion" as a mate, is at least very widespread in the human race, as is the corresponding tendency among the lower forms of life, and this impulse does not die out after marriage, when the original mate becomes a house companion. This, we can scarcely doubt, is the biological origin of the proverbial "fickleness" of man, of the ineradicable tendency of his affections to stray from his "lawful" mate to some other source of sexual

¹ Cf. the remarks on recurrent stimulus and conation, p. 70.

stimulus.¹ Under the pressure of morality, of the sense of loyalty, and of all the other factors which tend to keep him faithful, his sex complex, as we have seen, often segregates, splits up into its components, and one or more of the centres of sexual interest find¹ their objects elsewhere, while he maintains part of his original relation towards his wife.

With a woman the case is different. In the first place her interest in sex does not end with the physical act of mating, but extends to the bearing and rearing of children, and the physical intimacy with her children thus arising often engenders a stable and absorbing interest in them which extends throughout her life. This is the first great factor tending to stabilize a woman's sex activity—her intimate concern with the third sub-complex, which frequently absorbs all her interest and energy and leaves little opportunity for vagrant affections. Thus a woman comes to have, in effect, but one sexual life, while a man may have an unlimited number. The sense of being finally committed, upon marriage, to one mate, tends in itself to keep a woman's affections constant. It may be said that an honourable man equally feels himself finally committed when he marries, but in so far as he does the feeling is the result of herd suggestion, of a sense of loyalty, and lacks the biological compulsion which is operative in the case of a woman. The second factor which tends to keep a woman constant is the primary passivity of her sex function. The man makes love, the woman is made love to. It is common knowledge that a married woman may remain faithful to her husband so long as some more sexually attractive man does not cross her path and make love to her. If he does, she may "fall"; and hence the strong herd precept that it is dishonourable to make love to a married woman. The third factor is the social and material disaster that is likely to follow upon a woman's unfaithfulness. So potent is the threat of this,

¹ The frequent practice of polygamy in the ancestors of man and in many branches of the human race is partly an expression of this tendency, though consolidated, of course, by particular social and economic conditions.

that it may be thought to account sufficiently for the fact that wives are more often faithful than their husbands. No doubt it is a factor which is most constantly present to the conscious mind of the woman. But the other factors are the psychological groundwork, mainly unconscious, without which the herd penalty for unfaithfulness would be more often braved than is actually the case. In fact, when a woman has never felt, or has lost, love for her husband when she is still young and is not actually engaged in child-bearing, it is her affection for her children, one of the direct fruits of the biological factor, which very frequently keeps her from breaking the marriage bond. In the absence of this check, the very severe herd penalty is often enough defied, if a fresh call upon her sex comes to her, for she then feels that she is free to make a fresh start.

There is no reason to suppose that the demand for fresh sex stimulus is any less real in the case of women than in the case of men, if the woman's sex energy is not absorbed in the way in which it is normally absorbed. Directly these conditions, which confine a woman's psychical and physical energy to the sphere of the home, are altered by an increase of material resources and by the accompanying change in ideas and relaxation of the old conventions, so that she is no longer entirely absorbed in her home, may have as few children as she likes, and may often transfer to others the care of those she has, we see the woman remaining young and attractive for a much longer period, and the accompanying demands of her sex instinct for fresh sex stimulus, mental or physical, or both, coming into prominence.¹

¹ In his interesting book on *Sex Antagonism* (London, 1913) Heape contends that exogamy, the tendency to seek a "strange" woman to mate with, shown both in the original mating and afterwards, is a fundamental character of the male sex instinct, and that the expression of this is limited and controlled by the female sex instinct, which constructs systems of regulations to enforce such limitation and control, expressed among "primitive" tribes by elaborate totemic systems. Such systems of sexual regulations, initiated and maintained by feminine influence, are specially marked, according to Heape, when the external conditions of life are not too hard, on the one hand, and not too

It is no part of the aim of this discussion to suggest a solution of the practical problems which arise from the sex differences described. The future will find its own solution or approximation to a solution, and he would be a bold man who would prophesy the next position of equilibrium in the matter of the relative rôles of the sexes in society. We are now witnessing a definite emergence of new forces in the State—the acquirement of political power by the proletariat and by women. No one can tell with any approach to certainty whether these forces are ultimately going to bring about any radical change in the institution of the family, or in conventional sexual restrictions. If the family, in its present form, is really essential as a firm foundation on which stable social organization, allowing of progress in civilization, can be built, then—unless the world relapses into social anarchy—the family in its present form will be

luxurious, on the other. In such intermediate conditions the feminine influence is at its strongest, while in extreme conditions masculine sex energy asserts itself and obtains more freedom, because under hard conditions of life women are exhausted with the strain of maternity and hard work, and have not at their disposal the surplus energy necessary for domination, while under luxurious conditions their sex instinct tends to degenerate and they become indifferent or perverse. These relations are illustrated alike among savage tribes and in the classes of society in Europe and America. For instance, among the middle classes of Western Europe and in America, strict sex morality, inspired and maintained by feminine influence, is markedly more dominant than in the highest and lowest classes. It does not seem by any means certain, however, that the tendency to exogamy, and particularly the need for fresh sex stimulus, is confined to the masculine instinct. It may well be, as suggested in the text, that the apparent absence of the need in women is caused by the absorption of woman in her much more exacting sexual functions, an absorption which corresponds with the stability of society based on the family. Heape would suggest that this very stability is primarily a feminine interest because the magnification of the idea of the family magnifies feminine importance, and that what is commonly called by feminists a "man-made world" is really in origin a "woman-made world," so far at least as sexual relations are concerned, into which man has merely introduced certain safety valves for the escape of his redundant sexual energy.

maintained, and in the main the woman will have to look after it, though a considerable lightening of the exhausting labour at present involved, by means of labour-saving devices, communal conveniences, and the like may be expected. So long as the family is maintained it is useless to talk about sexual equality. Legal equality, in sexual as in other matters, is perfectly easy to secure and no doubt should be secured, for it will remove a sense of grievance, the worst sort of grit in the machinery of smooth and rational progress. But real sexual equality in practice cannot be secured so long as the fundamental business of the woman is to maintain the home. Practical sexual equality could only result from restricting the sexual liberty of men or from increasing that of women in the current code of morality and public opinion. There is no effective means available of doing the former, and the latter can only be brought about by radically modifying the basis of social life. This, of course, would mean, among other things, the gradual discountenancing by public opinion and the ultimate passing away of the whole idea of *possession* of the person in married life. It may, perhaps, be doubted whether this idea of possession, and the accompanying emotion of jealousy, are not too deeply entwined with the root emotions of sexual union to admit of such a change. But it is not an impossible belief that the pride of possession and the accompanying jealousy of married life could be curbed, just as, for instance, the pride in the ownership of land can be curbed. There can be no question that *quâ* emotion it is desirable that the expression of love should be free according to herd law, just as love itself is free in actual fact: the only legitimate question is—can we establish a workable state on such lines? It is a question that cannot be answered except by experience which we do not possess.

There seems no doubt that mental instability is increasing in the population at large, and that it has been doing so for many years. This is no unmixed evil, for mental, like organic instability, means the capacity for fresh evolution. The decay of the old sanctions of morality, the political

and social instability brought about by the war, the emergence to political power of the proletariat and of women—all these are factors making for new experiments in social organization. It has often been said that women are a conservative factor in society, and Heape's belief that the maintenance of the family as the unit of social organization is primarily a feminine interest because the magnification of the family magnifies feminine importance, ensuring a definite, stable, influential and honourable status to the married woman, would support this view, and lead us to believe that the political power of women will be decisively thrown on that side. It is possible to conceive of a tightening of the bonds of sexual morality under increased feminine influence, of a state of society in which the existing tolerances and modes of escape for men's redundant sexual energy were severely restricted, involving, for instance, not only the possibility of divorce for simple adultery, but rigid penalization or boycott of the offender. But it is exceedingly doubtful if such a condition could be established permanently and universally. It is a question whether sex energy can be diverted or sublimated on so large a scale. Where sexual morality is strictest, there the evils of prostitution are commonly most rampant.

A large amount of sex energy is, of course, constantly diverted to other channels. Hard work has long been a favourite, and often a successful prescription for the alleviation or "cure" of sexual desire. But in many cases it proves impossible to divert energy in sufficient quantity from the channels of the sex instinct so as to render it inactive. Where it is more or less repressed the energy used up in repression represents a serious drain on the mind's total supply, and the friction created may seriously impair the efficiency of the mind, even if the result is not definite mental disorder. It has often been said that only when our instincts are satisfied have we the peace of mind necessary to full effectiveness in other spheres, and when all that can reasonably be urged about the necessity of self control and the possibility of the transfer of energy to other channels

has been freely admitted, we can scarcely¹ doubt the broad truth of the statement.

Furthermore, a code of morality, with its strict conventional rules and its inevitable accompanying logic and emotion-tight compartments of the mind, which may be very well adapted to a preponderatingly stable-minded population, is quite unsuited to one in which the unstable-minded element forms a large and increasing proportion.

It must also be remembered that the excess of women over men in some modern communities cuts off a large number of women from any possibility of monogamous marriage, and while some are able to divert or sublimate their sex energy, this class, together with unhappily married women, provides a large number of cases of mental disorders due to sexual repression. All these elements provide possible material for new experiments.

The old scheme was, on the whole, a very workable one. For those who could not stand the pressure there were safety valves and modes of escape—not too easy and not approved, barely tolerated by public opinion, so that they should not be adopted with too great readiness. The sexual scheme of regulations and tolerances and modes of escape adopted by the herd was, indeed, like all herd schemes which maintain themselves for any length of time, essentially practical and workable *under the existing conditions*. But these conditions are changing. The old scheme bore hardly on some men, but it bore far more hardly on more women, and it is a question whether the new generation of politically enfranchised and more widely educated women will tolerate it. The demand for "sex equality," the outcry against prostitution and venereal disease, things that are being faced far more frankly and widely to-day than was the case even five years ago, are not insignificant. The only way to extirpate venereal disease and substantially to reduce prostitution would seem to be first to take drastic and universal sanitary action, to give women an independent economic status, and then to do away with the illicit character of extramartial sexual intercourse. The alternative of what

is called "raising the standard of men's sexual morality" would seem a chimerical means of escape from the existing situation, because it runs counter to fundamental facts of sex psychology.

It may be, of course, that after a struggle for unpractical changes women will continue to acquiesce in the old conditions, in other words that the world will remain what feminists call a "man-made world," though so far as sexual regulations are concerned, it is not accurately described in that phrase. There are married women who do not scruple to say with regard to the existing objectionable "safety valves"—"We don't mind them, they are our salvation." And this selfish view is probably held more widely than is suspected by the puritans.

Altogether the forces at work to-day are too complex, and their resultant effects too incalculable to enable us to form any precise idea of what is likely to happen during the next period of social evolution. "Humanity," as General Smuts has said, "has struck its tents and is once more on the march." Those who believe that it had reached its final resting-place in the standard relation of the sexes in Western Europe and America during the epoch which has recently closed will probably be undeceived, but it is impossible to forecast the position of the next camp. It is well to remember that while the contents of the moral code can be indefinitely modified, the instincts are unalterable except by selective breeding, though their channels and modes of expression may be very considerably varied.

In considering the possibility of changes in the expression of the sex instinct we must not neglect the mitigation of the pressure of sex energy to discharge itself along normal sex channels which can be brought about by the diversion of that energy to other and non-sexual channels. Most men, of course, do normally employ by far the larger part of their psychic energy in non-sexual channels, and in many cases this is pretty clearly in considerable part energy which has been diverted from sex. We cannot get statistics on the point—we cannot know even in a single case how much

energy which is used in other channels has actually been diverted from the sex channels. All we can say is that the most probable hypothesis is that the great instincts are each endowed with a certain quantity of energy, which probably varies with the individual, that a surplus is normally available for use through any channel which the circumstances of life favour, and that of the energy normally attached to any instinct, a certain portion, but not all, can, under stress, be diverted to another (cf. p. 89). We can pretty safely add that under the conditions of civilized life a large part of the energy of sex is so diverted. Under such conditions as exist at present the sex energy of a man goes into outside work, of a woman largely into the third sex sub-complex, which, of course, has non-sexual outlets. But sex energy can be far more easily diverted into certain non-sexual channels than into others—for instance, into any channel where the affect is strongly marked and tends to rise to the pitch of passion. Music, and, perhaps to a less degree, other artistic channels, are instances. And what we called in the last chapter the positive herd channels, involving work in which there is opportunity for altruistic service to the community, are other instances. If, as was suggested at the end of the last chapter, we pass into a phase in which more of such channels are opened to a wider range of people, then with such a greater richness and variety of opportunity there should come a marked easing of the pressure of sex energy. But this means of escape will not by itself be sufficient, for in a balanced healthy mind enough energy must remain inseparably attached to the sex instinct to demand direct outlets.

To return now to the question of the actual differences between the sex instinct of man and woman. We have seen that there is a firm biological foundation for the statement that a large part of a woman's sex energy is instinctively devoted to the bearing and nurture of children. And the emotion she exhibits, the whole character of her relations with her children, clearly show the instinctive nature of the reaction. But it is equally obvious that the existing

social conditions have until recently tended to confine her exceedingly rigidly to this work, and to debar her from other work of which she is very capable. The conviction of some feminists appears to be that the confinement of women to the domestic sphere is wholly the result of a sort of conspiracy on the part of men to keep her there. They tend to ignore the very clear biological basis of the arrangement, which is not a matter of man's convenience but of necessarily differentiated sex instinct. Miss Cicely Hamilton's very clearly written book, *Marriage as a Trade* (1916), exemplifies this tendency very well. Miss Hamilton's contention is that a woman, as an organism, has, like every other organism, self-maintenance as her primitive function, and that her sexual functions are secondary; that she often marries solely to obtain a living, and that her education is wholly directed to teaching her that marriage is her fit and proper career. As a matter of biology the function of reproduction must stand on an equal footing with the function of self-maintenance, or the species could not survive, though self-maintenance necessarily precedes reproduction in time in the life of the individual. From the biological standpoint, every individual human being who does not want to produce offspring must be accounted abnormal, for the same reason. It is true that such abnormal individuals may be very valuable members of the human race, but until we produce, like the bees, a class of neuters, they are not biologically normal. That is, of course, no reason at all why they should be neglected, despised, or ill-treated. But looking round at the world as it actually is, can it be seriously contended that the vast majority of girls do not *want* to marry? Or that their main thought in contemplating marriage is that they may be supported by some one else and so escape from wretched economic conditions? Are not the marks of a great instinct plainly written on their attitude towards marriageable men, just as the same marks, *mutatis mutandis*, are plainly written on the attitude of the great majority of men to marriageable girls?

There seems, however, to be this much of truth in Miss

Hamilton's contention. A great many girls, especially perhaps in the lower and lower-middle classes, do undoubtedly marry men whom they do not love, and the actual motive is largely, though not wholly, the need of material subsistence, which is obtained through marriage in the easiest and sometimes in the only tolerable way. They have not the opportunity of free choice, their sex instinct is not free: if it were, they would wait or look for some one whom they could love. But that is not to say that their sex instinct is not operative, even in a loveless marriage. Being rooted in the unconscious, the fundamental motive is not present or not clearly present to their minds, while the stern everyday necessity of food, clothing, and shelter is necessarily clearly present. Similarly many men in seeking marriage are primarily actuated by sex instinct, though when they are not in love they may represent their desire to themselves as arising from the advantages of settling down and acquiring a housekeeper, which are also motives, but which could obviously be obtained in other ways. Passionate emotion, on the other hand, in both sexes, forces the root motive into consciousness.

The superior detachment of a very considerable number of men from thoughts of sex and marriage is due to their superior facilities for diverting psychic energy to other channels, facilities which are based on the more temporary nature of their sexual activity, and the less profound penetration of their whole organism, body and mind alike, by the sexual characters, though these facilities are also, it is certain, heightened by their education. That the same detachment is also observable in a certain number of women is true, and that this is not encouraged by the education, or what has been, until very recently the education, of the average girl is also true. Why, then, it may be asked, is this detachment from sex possible to women if it be true that the whole feminine organism is more profoundly penetrated by sex characters than the masculine organism?

It has often been stated, and there is a good deal of evidence—both physiological and psychological—for the state-

ment, that the feminine organism takes longer to rouse to a state of sexual excitement than the masculine one. It seems likely that this is very largely the result of education, designed by the herd to preserve the "purity" of society. In so far as it is organic it is probably based on the very fact that sexual activity means more to the woman than to the man, that her life is much more deeply committed by indulgence in it, and that consequently the need to maintain balance, to check conation and avoid action which will upset the stability and well-being of the organism—a need which, as we saw in Chapter VI, is a fundamental character of all organisms—is more marked in regard to sex activity in the woman than in the man. This need is greatly emphasized, of course, by the present constitution of society, and the education which is fitted to it. It is also believed by some that certain stimuli during childhood serve to lay the foundation for what may be called a state of sexual receptivity, and it may well be the case that if such stimuli are not received during childhood sexual receptivity is decidedly lessened. In other words, the sex channels of the libido are imperfectly developed, and other channels may take their place. The competence of many women in certain affairs of life quite remote from sex is very well marked—notably in many departments of business and in administration. These activities may be devoted to purely egoistic ends, just as they may be so devoted by a man, but they are very often turned into herd channels; and public service, particularly of a philanthropic kind, has attracted a great number of the best and most vital among women. The psychical relation of each of these spheres with the domestic activities of a competent married woman is sufficiently obvious.

The conclusion is thus suggested that the feminine mind has two paths open to it, either of which may lead to fairly complete satisfaction—the sexual sphere with its normal result, in the case of permanent mating, of the care of the family and the administration of the home; or the herd sphere, in which the affect of public service takes the place

of the sex affect. Some women, it is true, combine the two, enabled to do so by the power which money affords of lightening the burden of domestic work. Such a combination often causes a very obvious physical strain—sometimes accompanied by a psychical strain—and it has been suggested that a division of activity between the two spheres is generally impossible with satisfactory results. It has even been suggested to the writer by Mr. Trotter that we may see a psychical and functional differentiation among women analogous to that existing among the bees—a splitting into two distinct classes, the one of perfect females, the other of non-sexual workers in the service of the community, derived from potential females. It is certainly true that the type of woman most attractive to men—at least to what may be called the crude masculine sex instinct—is the type whose psychic energy is almost entirely concentrated in the sexual sphere, and when it is recognized that the other type is likely to play a more and more important part in the world, it is perhaps not unnatural that the masculine intelligence should tend to insist on the reality of such a segregation as has been indicated, so that the type attractive to the masculine sex instinct should not be destroyed or blurred. We must beware of such sex-interested reading of the facts. It is too early to say what women's capacity may be to occupy new spheres and to undergo new adaptations, nor can we tell how the standard of sexual taste may be modified in response to newly directed feminine activities. There has certainly been a modification within recent times in the direction of an increased demand for intellectual comradeship between husbands and wives.¹ Still, the strain involved

¹ The attractiveness to the masculine sex instinct of the effort to stimulate sex activity in the mind of a woman whose sexual receptiveness is not fully developed is well known; and the effort required is so much the greater in the case of a fully-grown woman whose interests have taken other paths. This is, of course, quite a different case from that of the second type suggested in the text, in which the potential sex interest is supposed to be wholly converted into other forms of energy. The power of attracting and satisfying the masculine sex instinct must depend on how far the woman retains the power of full sexual response.

in the division of the channels of the libido into two groups, each involving a large expenditure of energy and a high degree of emotion—those directed towards the husband and children and those directed towards the welfare of the community—may turn out to be more than any but the most exceptionally endowed women can bear. There is no corresponding strain in the case of a man because his sexual activity is more intermittent, and therefore does not make anything like so high a demand on his psychic energy as a whole.

CHAPTER XXIII

BY-WAYS AND COMBINATIONS OF THE SEX INSTINCT

THE immensely far-reaching, subtle, powerful, and often devastating effects of the sex instinct in human life are largely due to the severe restrictions to which its expressions are subjected. If the sex conations could always be carried out immediately without let or hindrance, the sex libido would not bank up and give rise to fierce conflicts, it would not form intricate complexes into which the most varied non-sexual elements are drawn, and it would not make use of the numerous indirect modes of expression which it actually employs. This checking and banking up of the sex libido have incidentally enriched the emotional life of the individual as well as the cultural life of the community in the highest degree. To the compulsion of the sex libido to find indirect modes of expression we owe, on the one hand, nearly the whole field of pornography, erotic literature and a considerable range of wit, as well as much literature and pictorial representation which, while it professes to be something else, is really an unconscious expression of the sex libido. On the other hand, we owe to it some of the highest exaltations and the deepest miseries, the most intense pleasures and the severest psychical pains, the stimulus to gigantic efforts, and some of the noblest music, literature and plastic art. The attempt to trace even a few of these developments would, lead us far beyond the scope of the present work.

The last-named modes of expression involve what has been called *psychical sublimation* in its purest form, the use,

that is, of the energy derived from a primitive biological instinct in higher conations belonging entirely to the mental sphere. One of the simplest examples of sublimation of the sex instinct is what is sometimes called "intellectual" or "spiritual" love, the love of a man and woman centred primarily in the mind, the concentration of interest in the second sub-complex (see p. 249). This phenomenon we considered in the last chapter as the result of secondary segregation, but it also appears as a characteristic first phase of love in the adolescent whose mind has been constantly directed towards the "spiritual" aspects of love. This kind of sublimation has its dangers, since it tends to divorce the instinct from the physical side of sex. Until very recently, it has been generally regarded as indecent for the adolescent boy and especially the adolescent girl to have any knowledge of the physical mechanism of sex. Sane sex education would enlighten the growing child gradually and harmoniously, and would pay due attention to all the aspects of sex, emphasizing particularly the ultimate goals of the conation, both physical and mental. Excessive sublimation of the sex instinct in the form of purely "spiritual" love leads to sentimentality, a want of emotional balance, and sometimes to a severe dislocation of the sex affect when the physical facts of sex are suddenly encountered. It is particularly important for each sex to understand sympathetically the physiological characters and the psychical make-up of the opposite one, for this is the surest available precaution against inharmonious and disastrous marriage. Far too many young people enter upon marriage with practically no knowledge or understanding of the constitution of their mates' sexual psychology. Largely as the result of a sentimental education, the idea of purity is immensely over-emphasized. The physical symbol of purity is virginity, and its mental counterpart is a state of complete ignorance of the facts and emotions of sex. Nothing could be worse as a preparation for married life. As a woman has written :—"The average man admires the cold ambiguous woman because he thinks there is some-

thing behind her reserve : that he, and he alone, will be the favoured mortal who will storm the citadel and take the treasure—but *there isn't any treasure.*" What may be called the "treasure myth" has wrecked many marriages. And the ignorance of the "pure and innocent girl" of the sexual needs and demands, both physical and mental, of the average man has wrecked many more. Only knowledge, understanding and sympathy, which it is often too late to acquire after marriage, can adequately guard against this kind of disaster.

So far we have been dealing with the sex instinct mainly as displayed in the relation of mating between the opposite sexes. We have now to consider certain difficult questions concerning the relation of the sex instinct to other objects.

What are the real boundaries of the sex instinct in life as a whole? How far and in what directions does it extend outside the mating relation and how far is it complicated by association with other instincts? We know at least that it has wide extensions and that some of the phenomena involved are of real importance in the constitution of the mind.

In the last chapter we included in the sex complex the interest in children which is a primary instinctive characteristic of the feminine mind and enters, usually to a much less degree, into the masculine complex. If we restrict the contents of sex instinct solely to the primary relation of mating between men and women it is clear that this relation to children is not included. But we cannot separate the natural result of mating, involving its whole biological significance, from a consideration of the primary phenomena, and thus it has become usual for writers of a certain school to extend the term sex to a wider set of phenomena, which investigation shows to be closely associated. The fact is we want two terms, one for the narrower, one for the wider range, and the use of the term sex for both leads to a good deal of misunderstanding and confusion. We may speak of them as *sex* in the narrower and *sex* in the wider sense.

The normal relation of a mother to her children is at least as intimate, and in some respects more so than her relation to her husband, and some of the same primary emotions are involved. What McDougall calls *tender feeling*, and regards as corresponding with a simple primary instinct which may be called the *tender instinct*, is especially characteristic of both relations. It is also characteristic of a man's feeling for his wife and children and is closely associated with the function of *protection and service*. Tender feeling is, in fact, the great psychical bond which binds the mates to one another and to their children. It is an essential element in the complex emotion of love. McDougall regards tenderness as primarily characteristic of the mother's relation to her children. But whether primarily or not it is certainly now a close concomitant of the more permanent type of sexual relation, though it is undoubtedly quite distinct from the sexual instinct in its simplest form. The simple sexual instinct, which finds its direct expression in what is called "physical desire," may be and often is experienced separately. It is essentially intermittent in its manifestation, and in itself has no necessary connexion with tenderness. The tender instinct, on the other hand, is much more continuous and permanent in its manifestations. Its biological function is to hold the family together for mutual protection—in the first instance probably the mother to her children, then the husband to his wife, the father to his children, and the wife to her husband. Later it may also characterize the relation of children to their parents, of friends to one another, of individuals to those who are weaker than themselves, and even of the individual to all other human beings. It is, in fact, the essential basis of much of what is called altruism, though herd instinct is clearly involved in many altruistic actions.

Tender emotion is the most intimate of all human feelings except the ego-affect, and thus forms the closest bond between one individual and another. The fact that it is often so closely associated in practice with the simple sexual instinct that it is difficult to separate them

in the mind has been responsible for much confusion of thought.

We have to recognize that the simple sexual instinct is normally aroused to some extent between all or nearly all individuals of opposite sexes. The different nature of the emotional relation between a mother and her son, and between a father and his daughter, on the one hand, and between a father and his son and a mother and her daughter, on the other, is generally admitted, and it can only be due to the difference of sex. The moral barriers to the full development of the sex instinct in these cases are much stronger than those which serve to check its development in the case of other prohibited members of the herd. The disgust aroused by any suggestion of incest may be partial and modern, but it is exceedingly vigorous. The relation of tenderness between parents and children is not only not prohibited, however, it is admired and encouraged. So that in these particular human relations we have two instincts aroused, both of the most intimate nature and often closely associated, to one of which the freest play is given, while the other is so strongly discountenanced by herd instinct and the associated shame and disgust excited in the individual mind, as often to lead to the severest repression. Here we have all the elements of conflict and tragedy, of which the Oedipus-myth is the symbolic expression.

The conditions thus obtaining are peculiarly favourable to the development of that kind of complex—the pathological kind—which was first clearly described by Jung, and which, as we have already seen, is particularly sharply defined because it tends to be cut off from the rest of the mind owing to its repression—i.e. the refusal of attention to it. Such a complex, as we have seen in earlier chapters, becomes a kind of pariah of the mind and eventually a parasite upon it, growing as a cancer grows in the body; for the libido or interest involved forms a separate centre of energy working independently of the rest of the mind, disturbing its harmony and peace, and in the extreme case usurping the dominance of the normal ego. Modern psychiatrists agree

that a complex of this kind is at the bottom of very many cases of mental disorder and insanity. Some, indeed, hold that such a complex is present in every normal mind, and plays an important part in ordinary mental development. Here, however, we may venture to doubt if they do not go too far. In many normal minds it is difficult to discover any trace of such a complex, and on general grounds we should not expect it to be developed when the root instincts involved have found opportunities for normal healthy growth in other directions.

It is certain, however, that the danger exists during normal adolescence, and it is very important in practice to provide channels by which the mind of the adolescent can find outlets for the instincts which may otherwise become tied up in the pathological Oedipus-complex.¹ This is a special case of the necessity of securing conditions by which the developing mind can emancipate itself from the bonds of the family. Any weakness of psychic energy in the individual makes it more likely that the mind will linger in the old infantile paths, as the lines of least resistance, instead of breaking into the new paths of normal psychical development (see Chapter IX). The sentiments of tender affection which children entertain for their parents in the case of what is often called a "united" family may be alone responsible for the absorption of their adult life in the life of their parents. There is here no question of the specifically sexual psychic relation whose presence and repression is necessary for the formation of a pathological complex of the kind described. In the case of the devotion of a son to his mother or of a daughter to her father, however, the specifically sexual psychic relation strongly reinforces the bond, and the greater intensity of the tie in such cases may frequently be observed. In most cases, however, the sexual component does not come into consciousness and is entirely mastered by the tender emotion, so that no repression and no "pathological" complex results. Nevertheless, the com-

¹ The pathological complex arising in the mind of a daughter in relation to her father has been distinguished as the *Electra-complex*.

plex centering round the relation to the parent, reinforced as it is in such cases by the energy of the sex instinct, may easily become the dominant influence in the life of the individual, to the grave detriment of a healthy mental life. The conflicts that arise between such complexes and the demands of instinct along other paths have been a frequent enough theme of treatment in fiction. Thus a daughter may refuse to give her love to a suitor because it would mean leaving a father to whom she is devoted, or a son may have a bitter struggle with his desire to take up a career which would involve separation from a beloved mother.

In the relation of a father to his son or of a mother to her daughter, on the other hand, we have a different state of things. In the absence of any marked degree of homosexuality the sexual instinct is practically absent from the relation, which may take two opposed forms.¹ First there is the feeling that the child is part of the wider ego of the parent, which is a necessary result of the creation of a family in the light of the instinctive tendency to aggrandize the ego (see Chapter XIX). The extreme form of this feeling is seen in the claim to absolute possession and complete freedom of disposal of the persons of children successfully asserted in the more primitive states of society. This claim is checked in the case of the son by the fact that the son is recognized by the herd as having rights as a potential adult member of the herd, and by the development of the son's own ego-complex which, sooner or later, revolts against the authority of the father. In the old social state organized on masculine lines there is no such check in the case of the daughter, and in the absence of tenderness on the part of the father his claim to the disposal of her person in marriage has been successfully asserted, even in highly civilized societies, until very recently. The retention of the daughter in his own service has been and still is an alternative claim put forward by the father, though this is less favoured by the herd because marriage is regarded as the normal and

¹ A consideration of the operation of the tender instinct in this relation is omitted for the present for the sake of clearness.

proper destiny of the woman. In regard to his son the extreme unwillingness often shown by the father to allow his son to work out his own destiny in his own way, the insistence, for instance, that the son shall enter his father's business, and that he shall conform in most respects to his father's ideas, bears witness to the immense strength of the instinct to magnify the ego and to keep for oneself what has been acquired. The primitive tenderness of the parental relation, which above all things desires the welfare of the beloved child, combined with an increasing sense of reality, which recognizes that the son will naturally and normally desire and require a life of his own, often successfully checks the selfishness of the father which strives to make and keep the son a part of his own personality.

The second feeling involved in the relation of father and son is that of antagonism, as the son approaches adult life and develops his own personality. This has two sides, the sexual side, on which the son may be a rival of his father in the affections of his mother, and the side on which the son may wound his father's pride by setting up his own opinions and refusing to conform in his conduct to his father's precepts. The presence of an adult male in his household may become intolerable to the father and equally intolerable to the son from either or both of these causes, unless the father has succeeded in making his son in fact nothing but a part of his own ego, and incidentally in spoiling his son's manhood.

The struggle thus resulting has been often portrayed in fiction, notably in Turgeneff's *Fathers and Sons*. The story of *Sohrab and Rustem* is the classical expression of this primitive conflict. The normal biological course, which is happily usually followed in practice, is for the son to leave his father's household as soon as he attains full manhood. Where the ego-complex of neither father nor son is over-developed, and where the relation of tenderness initiated in childhood persists, as it sometimes does, into adult life, this antagonistic relation never becomes acute, and the relation of father and son may remain admirable and beautiful to the end.

The relation of mother and daughter is comparable *mutatis mutandis* with that of father and son, both in regard to the tendency of the mother to look upon the daughter as an expansion of her own ego, which she may love with the intense regard given to part of one's own personality¹—an attitude quite incompatible with any proper respect for the individuality of another person—and in regard to the matter of sexual rivalry. The same problem appears as in the case of father and son, and the same way of escape is open, whether the daughter's future is marriage or an independent career. The case in which the daughter remains under the domination of her mother even after marriage is well enough known, and is the origin, of course, of the well-worn mother-in-law joke.

The extension of the ego-complex of the parent to all children of either sex is quite inevitable, and is the more dangerous the stronger the development of the self in the parent. It can only be combated by altruistic tenderness, not by the kind of "tenderness" one has for a part of oneself, and by the full and conscious recognition of children as individuals, with their own rights to independence—a hard counsel to many parents. Many parents, indeed, instinctively condemn all characteristics in their children which they do not recognize as emanating from themselves. When the sex instinct is as strong as, or stronger than, the tender instinct, the relation of a parent to a child of the opposite sex, particularly to an only child or to a "favourite" child, has, in addition, the element of sexual attraction, which may very well entail the desire to keep "possession" at least as long as possible if not permanently,² while it is without the element of sexual rivalry.

We now turn to consider that curious outpouring of

¹ See, for instance, the admirable study of the relation of Mrs. Trenchard to her daughter Katherine in Hugh Walpole's *The Green Mirror*.

² The instinctive opposition of many fathers to a prospective son-in-law is well known. The rivalry involved is well symbolized in Wotan's relation to Siegfried in Wagner's *Siegfried*.

sex instinct upon unsuitable objects, which is known as homosexuality. In childhood the sexual instinct, having as yet no means of normal biological expression, finds all sorts of objects on which it tries, so to speak, to expend its energy, and this process, under suitable conditions, may very easily result in the establishment of various forms of sexual perversity. If the proper sequence of stimuli is forthcoming development proceeds in the proper biological channel, the typical heterosexual reaction takes place, and these early experiments are discontinued, since nearly the whole energy of sex is absorbed in the heterosexual channel. But even when this duly happens the mind does not wholly lose its primitive infantile capacity for expending its sexual energy on objects other than those which are biologically normal, though the expression of this capacity is naturally severely restricted, and plays a minimal part in life.

During childhood and adolescence the expressions of sex are very abundant and promiscuous, though, as years go on, they are increasingly restrained by education and discipline. Among girls they are not restricted by the educational code to anything like the same extent as among boys, where they are completely barred, and feminine kissing and caressing consequently remain very common. Kissing and caressing among the members of the same sex must certainly be considered as homosexual manifestations, since they are the natural accompaniments of heterosexual union, and are clearly remnants of the childish efforts to find sexual expression. The corresponding emotion is by no means unknown, however, among normal men, in spite of the tremendous effect of education and tradition, which, in this country at least, completely bars any physical expression of the sort that is so common among women. It may be objected that physical caresses between members of the same sex are more naturally considered as expressions of the tender instinct than of the sexual instinct. But this is certainly not the case, as a little analytic introspection will reveal. The desire to caress is not necessarily accompanied by tender feeling, but is always accompanied by a

feeling indistinguishable from that which accompanies sexual desire in the narrow sense. Tender emotion and sexual emotion are often so closely associated that the specific affects and conations are very liable to become confused. The conation of the tender instinct is certainly to render service to the beloved object—primarily, perhaps, by protection. The two instincts are typically fused in ideal sexual love, where both have scope for the fullest expression.

The extreme physical expressions of homosexuality take the form of one group of what are known as the sexual perversions. Here we have the primitive diffuse sex energy canalized in non-biological channels of physical expression. Such developments, as is well known, are absolutely barred under the severest penalties by herd morality, and in some civilized countries their expressions are very serious criminal offences. They disgust and revolt the moral sense of the modern community in the highest degree. This is explained by Freud as due to the existence and repression of a homosexual component in the sex complex of the ordinary mind. The imprisoned libido attached to this component finds an indirect expression in condemnation of homosexuality in others, just as the repressed sex instinct of the prude finds expression in the condemnation of normal sexual activity.¹ The marked tolerance of homosexuality among certain ancient civilizations, combined with the smaller degree of sex repression, tends to confirm this explanation.

Homosexuality, then, does not play any profoundly important part in the life of the "normal" mind. What has been called the "homosexual component" of the sex instinct in the normal mind is really to be regarded as the weak remnant of the diffused sexuality of childhood, remaining in a channel which is not biologically useful. Its more superficial manifestations, such as those which have been described, are common enough phenomena of everyday life, especially among women, and in the relation of the mother to her children. Among women, however, these

¹ Cf. also Chapter XIV, on the mechanism of projection.

phenomena do grade imperceptibly into the extreme forms of homosexuality on both the physical and the psychical sides. Even without expression in the most extreme forms they may absorb so much of the sex energy of a woman that not enough is left for the development of the normal channels, with a resulting disinclination for marriage, or at any rate for normal sexual relations with a man. The result is similar to that in which the greater part of the energy that would normally be devoted to sex has been diverted to non-sexual channels, such, for instance, as the preoccupations of an independent career. There is, however, this important difference between the two cases. Where most of the available energy has gone into non-sexual channels, the sexual channels remain undeveloped and capable of development at a later stage. Thus a woman who has followed an independent career and has never responded fully to sex stimuli during the earlier part of her adult life, may fall in love, marry, and lead a more or less successful sexual life in middle age, though it may be doubted whether it would be as fully successful as that of a woman whose sex instinct had been fully aroused in early life. But a woman whose sexual channels have been strongly developed along homosexual lines is unlikely to be able to turn her energy into the normal heterosexual channel later on. The same thing applies to men in an even more marked degree, because the class of homosexual men is more sharply separated from the normal, owing to the difference in education, tradition, and morality in the two sexes. The abnormal channel has been made from its source in the sex instinct and an alternative is no longer possible *for that instinct*. This is the sort of fact which inclines us to the view that of the total stock of psychic energy part is inseparably attached to the various instincts, though the rest is free and can be devoted to the service of any instinct which has already been developed.

With Dr. McDougall¹ we may well regard the tender

¹ *Social Psychology*, chap. iii, pp. 66-81.

instinct as having arisen in the first place from the mother's relation to her offspring, with its extreme physical intimacy and prime biological importance in the higher forms of life. The maternal relation is the essential foundation of the family. Afterwards the father is drawn in, and in the "united" type of family the tender instinct prevails in the relation of all the members of the family, children and parents alike, to one another. We may probably safely follow McDougall further and regard the extension of the instinct of tenderness, with its conation of protection, to other members of the herd as the foundation of charity and benevolence, and, when it is thwarted, of moral indignation by the intrusion of anger: thus of the sense of justice¹ and of the desire that "right" should prevail between all the members of the herd, and ultimately between all the members of the human race. This sense is quite distinct from herd instinct, which may readily acquiesce in the grossest inequalities and cruelties between different members of the herd, provided the herd suggestion is that such inequalities and cruelties are a necessary part of the social order. In fact, the painful conflict in the minds of many moderns in contemplating the cruelties of the existing social order is precisely a conflict between the tender instinct and the still potent herd suggestion that these things are inevitable. And the source of the efforts to revolutionize the social order on the part of those who are not themselves suffering directly from its constitution is the endeavour to find an issue from this conflict.

We have seen, then, in this chapter and the last, that the universal sex complex is normally crystallized, so to speak, in a particular heterosexual complex relating to a member of the opposite sex, that it may become segregated into sub-complexes corresponding with different centres of

¹ The sense of justice has, however, another and more fundamental basis in the need of "compensation" to preserve the sense of equilibrium, primarily in the individual, secondarily among members of the herd and between different herds (see Chapter VI, pp. 75-6).

interest, which may be located in relations with different persons; and that the question of the concentration of women's sex interest in the third sub-complex—that relating to the family—is the key to the most important modern problems concerning the sex relation and the family as the unit of society. We have also seen that the tender instinct, distinguished by McDougall, is essentially distinct from the sex instinct, and, as he holds, probably has its foundation in the maternal relation, whence it spreads to many other relations of life; and we have glanced at the complex relations arising within the family from various combinations of these two instincts with one another and with egoistic impulses. We have briefly considered the phenomena of homosexuality, and shown that they are to be regarded as the remnants of the diffuse sexuality of childhood, directed to biologically unsuitable objects, as a result of the misplacement of stimuli during childhood and adolescence.

Thus the instinct of sex, in association with the tender instinct, is found to form not only a single well-defined complex in relation to the mate, but to penetrate life in many other directions.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE INTERACTIONS OF THE UNIVERSAL COMPLEXES

THE fundamental tendency to maintain a balance or equilibrium, adjusted to the conditions of life, among the various mental complexes which are formed as the result of the interaction of the great instincts with the external world has often been alluded to in the preceding chapters. Some sort of balance, even if it be a precarious one, is always maintained so long as sanity continues, but a just balance is indispensable for mental health and full efficiency. We have now to consider briefly the ways in which the great universal complexes act and react upon one another to maintain this condition.

We have already seen (Chapters XIX and XX) how profoundly the herd complex works upon the mental self, modifies each step of its development from childhood by means of herd suggestion acting through the authority of parents and teachers, and through the public opinion of schools and other associations of young people, checks and controls the actions, and largely forms the opinions of the adult through the codes of morality and convention, and the systems of belief connected with them, of the numerous "partial herds" to which he belongs. We have also seen that these influences, which play so preponderant a part in forming the mind of the individual, necessarily check or deform to a very considerable extent the spontaneous impulses to action arising from the egoistic instincts; and that there is further scope for reaction of the individual to the herd in that active participation in the common life of the herd

which it is the function of herd instinct to bring about in all primitive herd organizations. This active participation has too largely fallen into disuse with the increase of complexity and specialized organization of the herd, which has largely taken away the opportunity of direct herd service, though this finds partial expression in political activity and in social and other public work. The constant effort to arouse a "sense of citizenship" in the individual is an expression of the feeling of this need in relation to the main significant herd—the nation. A unique opportunity was provided by the necessity of widespread co-operative effort in the Great War, and herd suggestion to active effort was responded to with a feeling of satisfaction which betrayed the deep-seated need in the individual mind of the use of the individual powers for the common good. But in order to satisfy this need continuously we want normal peacetime avenues through which the individual can use his powers in the service of the herd, and we want continuous herd suggestion, especially during the period of childhood and adolescence, that he should so use them. We want, in fact, as has often been said, a proper "training in citizenship"—active citizenship—but we must also have a development of the channels through which the impulses so aroused can be made effective.

The problem of adjustment of the ego-complex and the herd complex in the individual mind is one of the most fundamental in human life. Sometimes we have so striking a disproportion in their relative development that any satisfactory adjustment seems out of the question. On the one hand, we have the egoistic extrovert who, if his powers amount to genius, and unless they are devoted to definitely anti-social activities, may be tolerated and even admired because of his positive contributions to useful material activity, to knowledge or to art. Otherwise he is always more or less an enemy of society and leads a lonely and unbalanced spiritual life, entirely devoted to his own individual concerns. At the other extreme we have the man whose mind is completely dominated by the herd complex.

At best he is a useful member of society without much individuality, at worst he is nothing more than a tool of the herd, entirely without spiritual autonomy. In any case he necessarily lacks the personality without which a human being is scarcely more than a slave, for personality must be founded on a satisfactory development of the ego-complex.

For those whose minds fall between these two extremes there is necessarily always conflict between the two complexes, a perpetual attempt at adjustment between conflicting instincts which is too often as perpetually unsuccessful. One of the lines of least resistance is external conformity with the herd demands, accompanied by satisfaction to the utmost degree possible of the egoistic instincts, but that line of compromise does not, of course, bring harmony or mental peace. The only satisfactory solution is the employment of the individual powers in suitable herd channels. If these can be successfully discovered and the will identified with the effort to use them, there is a prospect of real happiness.

The sex complex, when its conations are sufficiently satisfied, serves to complete the ego-complex in a notable degree. The combined outpouring of the sex instinct and the tender instinct on the beloved object gives rise to the specific emotion of love, which is among the most vital of the instinctive activities, and the transference of the tender emotion to children continues and completes the activity. In this regard, as has been said times out of number, love is an extension and a completion of the ego. The reaching out of the personality is comparable with that involved in the instinct of construction, and the objects of both instincts are made parts of the wider ego. The completest human being is he who can find, not only in the individual beloved but in humanity itself, an object of his tenderness, associating the tender instinct with the service of the herd, as the lover associates it with the service of the beloved.

The conflicts of the individual egoistic instincts with the sex instinct are the occasion of many well-known mental

disturbances. The cases in which a man has to choose decisively between love and a career are not so common, because society is so organized as to enable him to have both, but it is common enough for the demands of his career (i.e. of his extended ego-complex) to conflict with the obligations of sexual life, while the conflicts between the ordinary primitive egoistic instincts and these obligations are very well known as the causes of many of the petty frictions of married life. There is no solution here except the universally valid precept in all cases of conflict between primitive instincts—the development of a just and harmonious balance between the conflicting complexes, often, unfortunately, very difficult to obtain.

The conflict of the ego-complex with sex is potentially much more fundamental in the case of a woman, because of the far heavier demands that sex makes upon her whole organism. The old solution was for the woman to mould her ego-complex in the service of sex and of the activities arising directly and indirectly from that service, and this solution is still adopted by the vast majority of women. But with "emancipation," with a wider education and the growth of a fuller self-consciousness, the development of the ego-complex often takes other lines. The typical example of the conflict so engendered is the necessity of a decision between marriage and a career, which to-day actually faces many women of the middle classes. The most various attempts at adjustment are being made with more or less success. Some women boldly attempt both, and a few succeed. But it is difficult to believe that such a combination can ever become general, because of the absorbing and exacting nature of both pursuits. Much, however, may be done by modification of current convention which are already in progress, by the development of a more rational outlook on life, of which also there are signs, and perhaps by a modification of the institution of the family as was suggested in Chapter XXII. It is hard to predict what will be the next position of equilibrium in the relations of the sexes to one another and to the work of the world until

we have had more opportunity of gauging the power of the new forces which have been released.

The effect of the herd instinct upon sex is very considerable and very definite. The herd forbids promiscuous mating, and lays down more or less stringent rules for the regulation of mating, which in the case of some savage tribes reach an extraordinary degree of complexity. In the modern civilized community the rules are much simpler, but they are strictly enforced, partly by law, but much more by public opinion working on the mind of the individual through his herd complex. One of the earliest psychological means employed by the herd to suppress promiscuous expressions of the sex instinct is the inculcation of shame and disgust for such expressions in the mind of the individual, thus converting the positive attraction of the possible sexual object into a negative quantity—an actual repulsion. Into the nature and cause of these rules we need not enter here, but their general effect on the sex complex is clear enough. If the individual's sex instinct is satisfied in an available channel approved by the herd no conflict, of course, arises. When the herd not only approves, but applauds, as in the case of a love match between members of families it is desired to unite for social reasons, the simultaneous satisfaction of the libido belonging to both complexes in one channel very greatly enhances the total affect. If the individual's will is completely submitted to the will of the herd no overt conflict arises even when the most intense sex satisfaction is not obtained. The sex instinct is pruned, and its growth directed into the channels approved by the herd, even though its natural luxuriance is curtailed. But if satisfaction is not obtained in an approved channel, from whatever cause, the sex instinct will seek outlets, and a conflict will at once arise. The force of herd instinct acting through the morality complex will exercise a repressing effect on the sex instinct, which will strive to break through the bonds thus imposed. The issue will be very various according to the relative strength of a multitude of different factors. Repression of the entire sex complex may result, with pathological

symptoms, or segregation may ensue, the complex splitting up into parts corresponding with the centres of sex interest described in Chapter XXII. Partial outlets may be found, but illicit gratification will always be accompanied by a sense of guilt, or at least by a sense of discomfort, varying in degree with the strength of the herd instinct embodied in the morality complex of the individual. Sometimes herd instinct actually prevents real passion for a strongly attractive forbidden individual from developing at all—the mind is inhibited from “letting itself go,” and thus a certain balance is maintained, even though indulgence in the lighter forms of sex gratification be permitted. Sometimes everything is sacrificed to sexual love, and the integrity of the mind is maintained, though often at a great cost. All phases of this type of conflict have been so abundantly illustrated and described by novelists and dramatists that we need not pursue them further.

The interactions of the universal complexes are thus seen to be the most important factors in moulding the character and personality. In the first place balance depends upon the proper adjustment of the ego to the herd complex, and upon this adjustment depends the foundation of the character. Secondly, the sex complex has to be adjusted to the rest of the mind. Except in those comparatively rare instances in which the sex instinct is so weak that it plays an altogether subordinate rôle in life its adjustment is hardly less important, and where sex is exceptionally strong it may become even more important than the adjustment of the ego and herd complexes. As we saw in the last chapter, its influence is by no means confined to primary sexual desire—it interpenetrates the activity of the mind in all sorts of human relations, and its expression and satisfaction may be very largely mental.

All the adjustments of the mind which contribute to the attainment of harmony and balance are very largely automatic and unconscious, even when self-consciousness and introspection are highly developed. Psychic energy, welling

up from its springs in the primary unconscious, and only able to manifest itself through the complexes formed in the foreconscious, is perpetually shifting its course, flowing now into one channel, now into another, as the mental elements form, group and regroup themselves according to the incidence of experience. The whole of these processes are primarily unconscious, so that knowledge and some small measure of control of them can only be attained, as it were, from the surface, which represents the conscious part of the mind. Over the springs themselves the most highly developed mind and the most powerful will can have no control.

INDEX

- abnormal mental processes, 22
- "above-below" contrast, 212
- "absence of mind," 125
- abstract knowledge, 175
 - reasoning, 23
 - thought, 91, 92
- acquisition, instinct of, 167, 203, 204, 205, 209
- acquisitiveness, 294
- action, man of, 170, 174
- active forgetting, 122
- acute conflict, 116
- adaptation to reality, 109, 110
 - incomplete, 110, 183
- adaptive responses, 40
- adjustment by interaction of complexes, 115, 289
- Adler, A., 211-213
- adolescence, 63, 103, 288
- adventurer, 128
- advertisement writers, 99
- affect, 35, *passim*, 299
 - in dreams, 136, 139, 145, 146
 - pursuit of, 166-170
- affective bond, 60
 - ends, 170
 - life, 64
 - thinking, 148
- afferent nerves, 42
- alcoholism, projection of, 156
- alpine climber, rationalization of, 182
- altruistic instincts, 85
 - service, 260
 - tenderness, 274
- anger, 109, 203
- ant communities, 221
- apologetics, Christian, 185
 - rationalizations of, 186
- "appearance" and "reality," 29
- applied science, 174, 175
- Arabs, 92
- architecture, 91
- aristocracy, 238, 239
- art, 25, 96
 - critic, 177
- artist, 148, 176, 177
 - dream-, 145
- artistic appreciation, 23
 - creation, 90, 91, 152
 - developments, 91
 - work, 90
- ascetic, 128
- association, 58
- associations of dream material, 133-139
- associative network, 58, Fig. 7
- attention, 39, 40, 177
 - refusal of, 129
 - resistance to, 136
- authority, 102, 227
- "autistic" thinking, 148
- autosuggestion, 99-101, 299
- available energy, 89
- awareness, 31
- balance of mind, 87, 280, 285, 288
- "bandit of the mind," 165
- Baudouin, 99, 100, 101

- beauty, 53, 170
 bee community, 221
 hive, 224
 swarm, 220, 295
 behaviour, 30, 38
 behaviourists, 30, 299
 beliefs based on herd suggestion,
 222, 223
 benefactor, 87
 beneficence, conation of, 86
 biological fallacy, 33
 herd, 231
 process, 173
 viewpoint, 22, 35
 biology, 33, 245, 296
 comparative, 34
 Bleuler on autistic thinking, 148
 boiling water, analogy with, 77
 bram, 26, 27, 29, 30, 42, 49, 70,
 71, 75
 cortex of, 42
 "business morality," 117

 capital punishment, 87
 caress, desire to, 275
 caresses, 170
 caressing, 275
 Carveth Read on origin of human
 fierceness, 228
 caste spirit, 238
 categories of space and time,
 31
 "caterpillar stage," 95
 causal chain, 29
 causation, knowledge of, 92
 law of, 28
 causes of and reasons for con-
 duct, 190
 central nervous system, 78
 "centre of gravity" of the mind,
 84
 cerebral localization, 27
 character and personality, 285
 formation, 119
 foundation of, 285
 checks, automatic, 84

 child, as part of parent's ego,
 272-274
 growing, 96, 218
 childhood, 113
 "childish temper," 109
 children, interest in, 248, 249,
 250, 251, 253, 260, 268
 mother's relation to, 269
 psychic energy in, 78
 regression in, 109
 rights to independence, 274
 tender emotion and, 269
 Christian Science, 101
 Christianity, 159 186
 chronic conflict, 116
 Church, the, 185, 292
 cinematographic film, 149, 153
 citizenship, sense of, 281
 class consciousness, 239, 240
 warfare, 242
 classes of society, 238-240
 clumsiness, 125, 143
 cognition, 35, 41, 61, 63, 71, 92,
 167, 169, 173, 174, 177,
 179, 291, 299
 cognitive and rational self, 217
 elements, 60, 165, 169, 175, 177
 ends, pursuit of, 169-170, 172-
 176
 "collecting instinct," 167
 combative instinct, 74, 81, 167
 combativeness, 294
 committee, comparison of mind
 with, 113, 114
 common sensations, 207
 compensation, 84, 87, 155, 278
 psychical (Adler), 211, 212
 complexes, 6 ff., 59-69, Fig 7 (58),
 Fig 8 (61), 73, 74, 75, 88,
 89, 199, 200, 280, etc.,
 299
 conflicting, 84
 conflict of, with reason, 185
 dominant, 67, 68, 85, 201, 202
 incompatible, 164
 painful, 121, 126, 128

- complexes, particular, 65, 200
 - repressed, 120, 121
 - separation of, 116
 - universal, 65, 199, 280
- conation, 35, 41, 61, 63, 71, 72, 76, 79, 80, 87, 289
 - in dreams, 136, 139
 - recurrent, 81, 252
- conations, conflicting, 190
 - incompatible, 83, 113, 193
- conative channels, 74, 76, 78
- conceit, 209, 216
- conceptual constructions, 31
- condensation, 145
- conduct, 69, 181, 182, 190, 215, 218
 - moral law as guide to, 193
 - rational, 192-198
 - ultimate authority in, 195
- conflict, 82, 111, 112-119, 120
 - acute, 116
 - chronic, 97, 116
 - major, 115, 116
 - minor, 115
- conflicting complexes, 84
 - instincts, 130, 157, 190
- conscience, herd and private, 225, 226
- conscientious objectors, 160, 225
- conscious actions, 40
 - hypocrisy, 118
 - thoughts and feelings, 20
- consciousness, 20, 21, 22, 31, 39, 48
 - content of, 19, 48
 - stream of, 48, 49, Fig. 6 (54), 147
- construction, instinct of, 203, 205, 210
- constructive scientific thinking, 152
- convention, 228, 280
- conventional morality, 226
- Conway, Sir Martin, on the crowd, 232
- coordination of mental activity, 112, 114
- Cornford, F. M., 93
- cortex of the brain, 42
- Coué, 99, 100
- creative artist, 176
- crowd, the, 231-233
- crystal gazing, 153
- curiosity, instinct of, 203, 204, 205
- dancing, 90
- Darwin, 22
- daughter and mother, 270, 274
 - and father, 270, 271, 272
- day-dreaming, 148, 149, 150, 151, 156
- death-complex, repressed, 123, 129
- decoration, 91
- defence reactions, 109, 118, 182, 183, 184
- deification, 157, 158
- delay of response, 43
- Descent of Man, The*, 22
- desires, 24
- detachment of mind from sex, 262
- determinism, 28, 296, 299
- Devil, the, 158, 159
- 'disappointed man,' the, 127, 211
- disappointment in love, 109, 127
- disgust, 127, 203, 205, 220, 284
- disintegration, 161, 177, 179
- displacement, 89, 166, Fig. 9, 178
- dissociation of complexes, 121, 164
 - of personality, 126
- diversion of psychic energy, 38-37
- of sex energy, 257, 259, 260
- divination, 140
- dog, moral sense of, 224
- "domestic" subcomplex, 250
- dominant complexes, 67, 68, 85, 202
- instincts, 199

- "double life," 165
 personality, 126
 dream artist, 145
 books, 132, 141
 censor, 142
 life, 53, Fig. 6
 memory, 132
 motive, 142
 pictures, 133, 139, 142, 144,
 146
 story, 133, 134, 142
 -work, 142
 dreaming mind, 133, 145
 dreams, 54, 55, 131-146
 as allegories, 140, 146
 concerned with sexual relations,
 144
 condensation in, 145
 fragmentary, 135
 initiation by sense stimuli, 132
 interpretation of, 132, 135, 137,
 140
 pictorial and affective elements
 in, 139
 popular belief in value of, 131,
 132
 prophetic value of, 132, 140,
 146
 symbolism of, 55, 124, 131, 136,
 139, 141, 142
 "wish" theory of, 133
 education, 78, 95, 97, 119
 sex, 267
 efferent nerves, 42
 ego, the, 114, 115, 205, 208, 209,
 210, 216
 -complex, 7, 59, 127, 200-203,
 205 (Fig. 10), 205-218, 219,
 237, 281, 282, 283-285
 domination of, 114
 empirical, 69, 199, 208
 wider, 282
 egoistic extrovert, 281
 impulses, 96
 instincts, 200, 280, 282, 283
 elation, 203
 Electra-complex, 271
 emotion, 26, 35
 emotions, 24
 "emotion-tight" barriers, 130,
 165, 166
 energy, physical, 71, 72, 75, 77
 89, 289
 psychic, 69, 70-87, 88, 89, 95,
 96, 98, 102, 104, 106, 108,
 109, 112, 124, 171, 178,
 201, 259, 277, 285, 288,
 289, 300
 equilibrium of mind, 81, 84, 85,
 86, 87, 185, 280, 290
 maintenance of, 84
 position of, 84, 86
 erotic literature, 266
 ethical freedom, 198
 self, 118, 195, 216, 218, 291
 sense, 23
 etiquette, 227
 professional, 237
 evolution, 22, 24, 33, 34
 social, 242, 296
 exogamy, 252, 254, 255
 "experimental psychology," 27
 explosion of unstable substance,
 43
 explosive, detonation of, 38, Fig. 1
 external moral codes, 291
 nature, 53
 world, 30, 31, 32, 36
 ends in, 166, 168, 173
 extroversion, 102, 107, 288, 299
 extrovert, 102, 107, 299
 failure of libido, 108
 family, the, 115, 249, 255, 269,
 271, 278, 283
 father and daughter, 270, 272, 274
 and son, 272, 273
 relation of, to children, 209-
 273
 fatigue of conative channel, 84
 disintegration in, 177, 178, 179

ear, 35, 128, 203
 repression of, 128, 129, 139
 "fear of fear," 129
 fear-protection dream, 139
 symbolised in dreams, 142, 143
 feeding, 203, 204, 205
 female, degeneration of sexual
 instinct, 248
 gamete, characters of, 246
 organism, characters of, 247, 248
 females, differentiation of, 263-265
 feminine body, 252
 importance, 255, 257
 influence, 255
 mind, 268
 qualities, 248
 sex instinct, 139, 184
 feminists, 255, 259, 261
 Ferenczi, 100
 fickleness, 75
 of man, 252
 fighting, 90, 187
 conation, 188
 flexibility of mind, 105
 flight, 36, 203, 204, 205
 flirtation, 170
 folk-lore, symbolism of, 146
 food, as object exciting instinct,
 35, 223
 foreconscious, 31, 50, 52 Fig 6,
 (53), 54, 55, 57-61, 63, 125,
 208, 299
 repression from, 59, 61, 118,
 120
 forgetting, 119, 121, 122, 123, 126,
 129
 freedom as moral agents, 28
 desire for, 85
 of love, 256
 wisdom and virtue, 198
 fresh sex stimulus, 252
 demand for, by women, 254
 Freud, Professor, 23, 30
 on dreams, 131
 dream censor, 142
 work, 142

Freud, Professor, on nutrition and
 sex, 95
 "pleasure" and "reality"
 principles, 111
 regression, 110, 111
 representation of dream
 motive, 145
 repression, 120-125
 repression of homosexual
 component, 276
 sex dreams, 144
 sexual perversions, 170
 stumbling, 143
 Freud's theory of the unconscious,
 50, 51
 use of "libido," 74
 "wish" theory of dreams, 133-
 137, 140, 141
 Freudian unconscious, 53, 54, 58,
 62, 120, 134, 208

 games, 78, 167
 "gametes," 245, 246, 247, 251, 252
 ganglia, 42
 geometry, 91, 92
 God and the Devil, 158, 159
 as a result of unified projection,
 158, 159
 as projection of the ethical
 self, 160
 of the "conscientious objector,"
 160
 of the individual, 160
 the ideal, 216
 the supreme herd leader, 159
 good and evil, 159
 form, 227
 gratitude, 86, 87
 Greeks, 92
 gregariousness, 203, 219, 220

 habit, 86
 habitual conations, 83
 Hamilton, Miss Cicely, on mar-
 riage for a living, 261
 handicraft, 91

- harmonization of conations, 115, 190
 harmony of mind, 113, 157, 185, 190, 192, 217, 223, 285, 290, 296
 Hart, Dr. Bernard, on complexes, 59
 on dissociation, 126
 "logic-tight" compartments, 117, 165
 projection, 155
 repression, 127
 the party politician, 189
 the sex complex, 64
 hatred, rationalization of international, 187-189
 Heape on feminine origin of sex regulations, 254, 255, 257
 hedonism, psychological, 78, **300**
 Hegel, 192
 Heine, 123, 129
 herbivora, gregarious, 221
 herd, the, 10, 87, 101, 115, 186, 190, 199, 216, 231, 284
 approval, 284
 disapproval, 224
 call, instinctive response to, 222, 228, 230
 channels, 222, 236, 244, 260, 294
 -complex, 65, 204, 226, 232, 234, 235, 236, 237
 interaction with ego-complex, 280, 281, 282
 God, 158, 159
 instinct, 10, 11, 103, 127, 181-2, 185, 189, 195, **219-233**
 effect upon sex, 284, 285
 the "sanction" of morality, 224
 integration of, 221
 leaders, 159, 224, 232, 243, 293
 mind, the, 293
 evolution of, 294
 morality, 216
 herd, national, 235, **241**, 295
 opinion, 216
 ostracism, 224
 penalties, 354
 restrictions, relaxation of, 229
 suggestion, 101, 218, 222, 223, 278
 symbolization of, in dreams, 141, 144
 use and restriction of individual energy, 228
 work, 228, 229
 herds, partial, **235-240**, 242
 hermit, mentality of, 128
 heterosexual reaction, 275
 heterosuggestion, 100
 higher mental process, type of, Fig. 5 (45)
 historical fallacy, 33
 history, 25
 of an organism, 33, 34
 of biology, 33
 of individual life, 94-95
 hobbies, 67, 167
 Holt, Professor, 30, 38, 39
 "homosexual component," 276
 homosexual perversions, 276
 homosexuality, 272, **275-277**, 279
 hunger, 95
 hunting for sport, 81, 167
 husband, 253-264, 269
 métier of, 74
 hypnagogic state, 135
 hypnotic state, 99
 hypocrisy, 118
 hysteria, 23, 59, 110, 125, 165
 hysteric, sexual, 156
 hysterical delusion, 126
 idealism, 161, 243
 President Wilson's, 294
 idealistic schools, 29
 idealization, **156**, 157-161
 ideals, 161, 162
 identification, **156**
 of individual with herd, 229

- illicit love, 117
- imagination, 105, 106
- imaginative poet, 145, 146
- imbecility, of integration in, 179
- imitativeness, 102, 227
- imprisoned libido, 126
- incest, 270
- individual as organ of the herd, 221
 - freedom of, 226, 295
- infantile complex, 110
- inferiority, sense of, 213
 - successful and unsuccessful compensation for, 211, 214
- injuries, 86
- insanity, 23, 125, 165
 - based on projection, 155
- inspiration, 152
- instability, increase of, 256
- instinct, actions always motivated by, 192
- instinctive action, type of, Fig 4 (44)
 - ends, 42
 - reactions, 36
- instincts, 23, 24, 34-36, 40, 41, 42, 62, 81, 82, 300
 - dominant, 199
 - the basis of mental activity, 34, 192, 287
 - the primitive, 88, 89, 94, 96, 115, 167, 181, 182, 199-206
- insurgent instincts, 85
- integration, 30, 38, 39, 163, 190
- integration of activities, 113
- intellectual life, 173
 - pleasures, 168, 169
- interaction of mental elements, 115
- interactions of universal complexes, 280-286
- interdependence of individuals of herd, 221
- interdetermination of phenomena, 28, 29
- interest, 75
 - fluctuations of, 122
- "International," the, 241
- international life, 242, 244
- introspection, 20, 21, 208, 251, 275, 285
- introversion, 102, 288, 300
- introvert, 102, 103, 107, 109, 300
- James, William, 209
 - on social selves, 236
- Janet, 23, 126
- jealousy, 251, 256
- joie de vivre*, 78, 90
- Jones, Dr Ernest, 182
- Jung, 23, 64, 70, 79, 95, 102, 123, 139
 - on the complex, 59
 - the ego-complex, 207
- justice, 87, 278
- Kant, 92
- kindness, 184
- kinetic energy, 76
- Kipling, Rudyard, on making thoughts your aim, 173
 - on morality in animals, 223-224
- kissing, 275
- knowledge, 173
 - abstract, 175
 - empirical, 174
 - essential to highest conduct, 195-196
 - primitive, 174, 176
- "latent content" of dreams, 134 300
- League of Nations, 242, 243
- least resistance, line of, 111, 119
- lecanoscopy, 153
- libertine, 128
- libido, 74-81, 300
 - activity of, in dreams, 140

- libido, banking up of, 266
 diversion of, 88-97
 emancipation of, 110
 failure of, 108
 imprisoned, 126
 indirect expressions, 144, 146, 266
 obstacles to, 108-110
 regression of, 109-111
 life, as ordered discharge of energy, 71, 81, 82, 112
 literature, 25, 266
 "logic-tight" barriers, compartments, 117, 130, 165
 love and a career, 283
 disappointed, 109
 freedom of, 256
 intellectual, 90, 267
 making, 170, 253
 sexual, 63, 249, 251
 spiritual, 267
 loveless marriage, 262
 lover, 68, 76, 157, 168
 lyrical poetry, 91
- McDougall, Dr., on gregarious instinct, 217
 on self-regarding sentiment, 215
 on sentiments, 9, 60, 202
 on simple instincts, 202-206
 on tender feeling, 269, 277
 major conflict, 115, 116, 199
 male gamete, 245, 246, 247, 252
 organism, 247, 248
 mammals, 22, 89
 "manifest content" of dreams, 134, 300
 marriage, 253, 256, 261, 262
 disastrous, 267
 disinclination for, 277
 maintenance of a bad, 187
 shrinking from, 110
Marriage as a Trade, 261
 married man, 125, 250
 woman, 250, 253, 259
- masculine body, 252
 mind, 252
 qualities, 248
 sex energy, 255
 instinct, 254, 264
 maternal relation, 249, 253, 269
 278-279
 mates, 248, 249, 251, 253, 269
 mathematics, 91, 175
 mating, 246, 252, 253, 268
 of gametes, 245, 246, 252
 permanent, 170, 263
 psychical essence of, 252
 Maury's dream, 133
 "meaning" of dreams, 134
 memory, 50, 122, 129
 dream-, 132
 -traces, 50, 51
 mentality of adventurer, 128
 of hermit, 128
 sex, 247-249
 types of, 102-107
 mental process, the typical, 33-47
- metaphysics, 175
 middle classes, 239, 240
 mind, origin of, 30, 31
 mind wandering, 147
 mis-reading, 123
 mis-speaking, 123
 mis-writing, 123
 mixed motives, 184
 money making, 80, 85
 moral affect, 119
 code, the, 186, 223
 defects of, 193-194
 adaptation of, 194
 codes, 126, 198, 291
 complex, 182, 187
 law and herd instinct, 223
 as guide to conduct, 193
 authority of, 195
 of animal communities, 223
 sanction of, 194, 195
 principle, 114, 127
 sense, 223

- morality, 83, 115, 185, 186, 223,
 257
 and herd instinct, 186
 complex, 284
 mother and daughter, 271, 272,
 274
 and son, 270-272
 relation to children, 249, 253,
 269, 277-279
 motor actions, 112, Fig. 9 (166),
 289
 organs, 32, 42
 responses, 38, 41, Figs. 3-5
 (44-45)
 settings, 30
 multiple personality, 125, 126
 murderer, identification with, 156
 music, 90, 91, 260, 266
 mythology, 25
 symbolism of, 146

 nation, 235, 238, 240, 241, 243-
 244, 281
 complex, 235
 national herd, 241, 243, 295
 nationality, particularism of, 294
 natural science, 92, 94
 nature, projection of human per-
 sonality upon, 157, 158
 "naughtiness," 64
 navvy, psychic and physical
 energy of, 72, 73
 negative self-feeling, 203, 205, 214
 Neisser, 6, 59
 nerve cells, 30
 centres, 42
 nervous system, 26, 27, 32, 36,
 37, 41, 42
 tissue, 49
 neurasthenia, 165
 neuroses, 130
 "neurotic character," 212
 Nicoll, Dr. Maurice, on the
 primary unconscious, 55,
 139
 on the introvert, 103

 Nietzsche, on "committee of
 instincts," 113
 on consciousness, 52
 the will to power, 209
 non-rational complexes, 181
 proctases, 21, 22, 24, 87
 nutrition, 95
 -libido, 95

 object, 30, 31, 35, Figs. 3, 4, 5,
 (44, 45)
 objective truth, 68, 93
 desire for, 185, 216, 290
 occupation, 67, 200
 Oedipus-complex, 271
 myth, 270
 opposed conations, 83
 "outcropping of the unconscious,"
 100
 "outlawed" complex, 165
 outrage, 156

 pain, physical, 79
 psychical, 79, 119, 121, 126
 painful complexes, 128
 painting, 91
 parasite of the mind, 165, 270
 parental instinct, 203
 parents, 95, 269, 274, 278
 sentimental attachment to, 110
 "pariah of the mind," 165, 270
 partial herds, 234-240, 242
 exclusiveness of, 236
 particular complexes, 65
 particularism of nationality, 294
 party complex, 189
 politician, 59, 68, 189
 politics, 185, 189
 passion, 76, 231, 260, 300
 "passion," appeals to, 293
 passionate action of libido, 75
 conation, 215
 emotion, 76, 215, 262
 people, 75
 striving, 76
 "passions," 293

- passive forgetting, 122
 passivity of female gamete, 246
 of female in courtship, 247
 pathological complex, 270
 developments, 23, 24, 84
 patriotism, 115, 185, 230
 militant, 187
 penalties, herd, 224, 237, 253,
 254, 276
 perception, 166, Fig. 9, 176, 177,
 288
 ends in, 176
 personal freedom, 158
 religion, 160
 responsibility, 158
 perversion, 64
 perversions, sexual, 170, 276
 philandering, 170, 172
 philosopher, psychic and physical
 energy used by, 72, 73
 philosophy, 29, 91, 92, 93, 176,
 290
 modern, 176
 recent, 29
 physical and psychical worlds,
 the, 28-32
 energy, 70, 71, 72, 75, 77, 78,
 89, 289, 290
 "physical desire," 269
 physiological processes, 24, 26,
 84
 terms, 27
 physiology, 27
 pity, 35
 plastic art, 266
 Plato, 93
 platonic friendship, 250
 passion, 64, 250
 play, 90
 pleasure, 78
 as a guide to activity, 79, 80
 detachment of, 79, 80
 pursuit of, 79, 168
 the man of, 168
 "pleasure principle," 12, 111
 plutocracy, 239
 poet, work of imaginative, 145-
 146
 poetry, 91
 political complex, 180
 creed, 68
 power of proletariat, 240, 255,
 257
 of women, 255, 257, 258
 politician, party, 68, 189
 politics, 67
 pornography, 266
 positive self-feeling, 203, 205, 214
 possession, pride of 256
 potential chemical energy, 74
 conflict, 144
 energy, 75
 psychic energy, 62, 75, 76, 88, 94
 power, feeling of, 231, 292
 pursuit of, 80, 168
 prayer, 99
 presentations, 59
 press, popular, 232
 pride, 209
 of possession, 256
 primary unconscious, 53, Fig. 6,
 54, 55, 59, 62, 87, 207, 208
 Primates, 46, 92
 primitive channels of instinct,
 91, 94
 ends, 162, 169
 instincts, 88, 89, 90, 94, 96,
 97, 115, 167, 181, 182,
 189-206
 Prince, Morton, 126
 profession, 67, 238
 medical, 236, 237
 professional etiquette, 237
 professions, learned, 236
 loyalty, 237
 projection, 155-161, 216, 300
 proletariat, 240, 241
 political power of, 255, 257
 upheaval of, 295
 propitiatory sacrifice, 125
 prostitution, 257, 258
 prude, 68

- prudishness, 127
 psychiatrists, 110, 134, 155, 270
 psychic ends, 167
 psychic energy, *see* energy, psychic
 instances, 142, 146
 psychical displacement, 80, 166
 segregation, 80, 163-166, 178
 sphere, 26, 28, 29, 32
 psychoanalysis, 101, 134, 142,
 144, 300
 psychoanalytic treatment, 101,
 146
 psychological theory, 23
 psychologists, 20, 22, 48, 49
 Psychology, the older, 19, 20,
 22
 The New, 24, 192, 199, 296
 psychopathology, 22, 23
 psychotherapy, 101, 296
 puberty, 62, 63, 95, 96
 public functions, 229
 opinion, 141, 144, 232, 234,
 253, 258
 ownership, 229
 service, 230
 spirit, 114
 work, 281
 pugnacity, 203, 204, 205
 punishment, 87
 justice of, 87
 rationalized as a deterrent, 87,
 184
 pupils, contraction and dilation
 of, 36, 37
 pure creation, 215
 reason, 215
 science, 175
 "purpose," 36
 "purposive" reaction, 36, 37, 40

 "quacks," hostility to, 237

 rational conduct, 192-198
 faculty, 20, 21, 197
 function, the, 180, 182, 195
 processes, 22, 196
 rational life, the, 192
 self, the, 217, 290
 rationalists, 197
 rationalization, 21, 106, 109, 118,
 182-191, 192, 196, 290,
 300
 readjustment of mind, 86
 reality, adaptation to, 109, 110,
 183
 external, 103
 "reality principle," 111
 reason, 92, 93, 180, 181
 as coordinating agency, 197
 can it affect conduct? 192,
 193, 197
 fallibility of, 196
 reasoning faculty, 20
 "reasons" for conduct, 21, 118,
 182, 190, 192
 "recession" of stimuli, 39
 recurrent conation, 81
 redundant sex energy, safety
 valves for, 255, 257-259
 reflex action, 30, 31, 36, 40, 41,
 300
 type of, Fig. 3 (44)
 regression of libido, 109-111, 300
 religion, 85, 96, 115, 185, 186, 290
 religious beliefs, rationalization of,
 185
 creeds, 185
 sanction, 186
 tradition, 161
 truth, 161
 remembering, 129
 Renaissance, 92
 repose, pursuit of, 168
 repressed complexes, 60, 62, 120-1,
 123, 125-6, 128, 165
 "wishes" in dreams, 133-4, 142
 repression, 59, 62, 118, 120, 121,
 124, 126-9, 155, 301
 mechanism of, 129
 sexual, 156, 257-8
 reproduction, instinct of, 203
 repulsion, instinct of, 203-205

- resistance to attention, 129
 resistances to psychoanalysis, 134
 re-pectable "reasons" for indefensible conduct, 183
 revenge, 86
 conation, 183
 "right and wrong, absolute," 224
 rightness, 225
 ritual, 90, 227
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 212, 213
 Russell, Bertrand, on philosophy, 93

 sanction of morality, 226
 herd, 229
 religious, 186, 187
 sanity, 84, 296
 science, 175
 applied, 174-5
 natural, 92, 94, 175
 of the mind, 19, 296
 pure, 175
 scientific investigator, characteristics of, 213
 investigation of mind, 27, 31, 32
 knowledge, 92
 sculpture, 91
 secondary channels of psychic energy, 288
 ends, 162, 179
 unconscious, 53-5, 58, 62, 120, 208
 values, creation of, 162
 segregation, psychical, 80, 163-166, 178, 301
 of subcomplexes, 249-251
 self, 64, 199 (*see ego*)
 wider, 209
 self-abasement, 203, 205, 214-15
 -assertion, 203, 205, 214-15
 -communing, 99
 -consciousness, 52, 207, 295
 -depreciation, 216
 -esteem, 211

 self, ethical, 118, 160, 195, 216-218, 291
 -feeling, positive and negative, 203, 205, 214-15
 -importance, 208
 -love, 209, 216
 -maintenance, 214
 rational, 217, 290
 -regarding impulses, 85
 -regarding sentiment, 205, 215
 -respect, 209
 selfish interests, 208
 senility, disintegration in, 170, 179
 sense organs, 42
 sensitiveness to experience, 104, 106
 sensual pleasures, 168
 sensualist, 168, 173
 sentiment, 171, 172, 301
 "sentimental" education, 267
 sentimentalists, 172
 sentimentality, 87, 127, 267
 sentimental people, 171
 sentiments, 9, 60, 171n., 301
 sex, 52, 62-5, 90, 95, 96, 110, 115, 127, 170, 172, 199, 203, 245-279, 283-4.
 centres of interest, 249, 250, 285
 sex-complex, 62-64, 90, 95, 203-4, 249, 251, 253, 268, 278, 282, 284-5
 conation, 63, 76, 95, 172, 184
 education, 267
 energy, diversion and sublimation of, 90, 91, 94, 96, 257-8, 259-60
 equality, 256
 gratification, 80, 184, 285
 impulse, 139
 instinct, 62, 64, 96, 115, 126, 156, 170, 184, 245, 260-2, 266, 269, 275
 feminine, 184
 masculine, 254, 264
 psychological characters of, 245

- sex-libido, 76, 91, 126, 266
 mentality, 247, 249
 blurring of, 248
 stimulus, 252, 254
 sub-complexes of, 249, 251, 253, 260
 sexual act, end in, 170
 function, 89, 247
 hysteric, 156
 ignorance, 267-8
 indulgence, 167
 love, 64, 121, 249, 282
 ideal, 276
 purity, 267
 receptivity, 263
 relations, 144, 277
 rivalry, 274
 sphere, 64, 263
 taste, 248, 254
 union, 252
 sexuality of childhood, diffused, 275-6, 279
 shame, 124, 270, 284
 Silberer, H., on crystal gazing, 153
 sin, 158, 224
 slothfulness, 168
 social God, the, 159
 sociology, 33
 somnambulism 125-6
 specific affect, 37, 68, 167
 response, 31, 38, 40, Figs 2-5 (44, 45), 46, 91, 301
 specificity of sex affect, 251
 stabilization of woman's sex activity, 253
 stable-minded type, 103, 104, 105, 107, 130
 stimuli, 24, 30, 31, 36, 38, 96
 structure of the mind, 32
 stumbling as sign of repressed fear, 143
 sublimation, 90, 96, 195, 218, 301
 of sex libido, 91, 257-8, 266-7
 submission, instinct of, 10, 203
 substituted channel, 109
 sucking infant, 95
 "sudden conversions," 85
 suggestibility, 98, 102
 suggestion 99-101, 180, 301
 herd, 101, 218, 220, 222-3, 278
 surplus energy, 89, 260
 symbolic expression, 55, 121, 124-5, 270
 symbolism, 124
 symbolization in dreams, 55, 131, 141-2, 144-6, 153-4
 tender affection, 271
 feeling, 269
 instinct, 159, 269, 272, 277-9, 282
 pity, 36
 tenderness, 203, 270, 282, 294
 altruistic, 275
 tension, release of, 13, 81-2, 111
 thought, 26
 trade unionism, 240
 "treasure myth," 268
 tribal god, 158
 Trotter, W., 241, 264
 on beliefs based on herd suggestion, 222-3
 on conflict, 115
 on herd instinct, 220
 on types of mentality, 103-6
 typical mental process, the, 39, 177
 unconscious, the, 50-1, 53-6, 301
 mental processes, 22, 24, 49, 140
 unification, need for, 157-9, 217, 289
 universal complexes, 65, 199
 unstable-minded type, 103-7, 130
 vanity, 209
 Varendonck, Dr J., 148-150, 153
 venereal disease, 258
 vermin dream, 136-7
 vices as perversions of libido, 80
 "vices," secret practice of, 165

- virtue, 198
- visual type of mind, 149
- water channel, analogy of, 75-76, 110
- weakness of psychic energy, 108, 167, 169, 170, 172
- will to live, 209
 - to power, 209
- winking of eyelids, 37
- wisdom, 198
- wit, 266
- wolf pack, 163, 220, 221, 241
- woman, absorption in domestic sub-complex, 251, 253, 255, 260
- woman and lover, 83, 184
 - demands of sex instinct in, 254
 - married, 250, 253, 259
 - self-maintenance and sex, 261
 - sex mentality of, 247
 - sexual receptiveness of, 263-264
 - wider interests of, 248
- women, independent economic status of, 258
 - political power of, 255, 257
 - suggested differentiation among, 264
- wonder, 203, 204
- world herd, 241, 244
- "zygote," 246

